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on Regulation |
| By: | John S. Ying (Department of Economics,University of Delaware); Mary T. Kelly (Department of Economics, Villanova University) |
| Abstract: | Regulation of the cable television industry was marked by remarkable periods of deregulation, re-regulation, and re-deregulation during the 1980s and 1990s. Using FCC firm-level survey data spanning 1993 to 2001, we model and econometrically estimate the effect of regulation and competition on cable rates. Our calculations indicate that while regulation lowered rates for small system operators, it raised them for medium and large systems. Meanwhile, competition consistently decreased rates from 5.6 to 8.8 percent, with even larger declines during periods of regulation. Our results suggest that competition is more effective than regulation in containing cable prices. |
| Keywords: | cable rates, regulation, competition |
| JEL: | L51 L96 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dlw:wpaper:07-07.&r=reg |
| By: | BARDEY, David; BOMMIER, Antoine; JULLIEN, Bruno |
| JEL: | I18 L11 L15 L51 |
| Date: | 2006–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ide:wpaper:6733&r=reg |
| By: | Ricardo J Caballero; Kevin N Cowan; Eduardo M.R.A. Engel; Alejandro Micco |
| Date: | 2007–04–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000990&r=reg |
| By: | Georg Meran; Reimund Schwarze |
| Abstract: | This papers studies the effects on service quality and consumer surplus of a minimum price which is fixed by a bureaucratic non-monopolistic professional association. It shows that the price set by a Niskanen-type professional assocation will maximize consumer surplus only if consumers demand the highest possible average quality. If consumers demand services of lesser quality, the association’s price will be too high if measured by consumer surplus. Moreover we show that a de-regulated market will always reproduce the favourable result of a uniformly high price in the case of top quality demand while delivering superior results in the case of a mixed demand for high and low quality services. |
| Keywords: | Liberal professions, price regulation, quality, professional association, self-regulation, EU competition policy, intrinsic motivation |
| JEL: | L15 J44 K21 |
| Date: | 2007–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inn:wpaper:2007-07&r=reg |
| By: | Jennifer Hunt |
| Abstract: | Using cross–country and Peruvian data, I show that victims of misfortune, particularly crime victims, are much more likely than non–victims to bribe public officials. Misfortune increases victims’ demand for public services, raising bribery indirectly, and also increases victims’ propensity to bribe certain officials conditional on using them, possibly because victims are desperate, vulnerable, or demanding services particularly prone to corruption. The effect is strongest for bribery of the police, where the increase in bribery comes principally through increased use of the police. For the judiciary the effect is also strong, and for some misfortunes is composed equally of an increase in use and an increase in bribery conditional on use. The expense and disutility of bribing thus compound the misery brought by misfortune. |
| Keywords: | Corruption, bribery, governance |
| JEL: | H1 K4 O1 |
| Date: | 2006–08–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wdi:papers:2006-836&r=reg |
| By: | Andrea Bassanini (OECD, CEPN, University of Paris 13 and ERMES, University of Paris 2); Giorgio Brunello (University of Padova, KIER Kyoto, CESifo and IZA) |
| Abstract: | We develop a theoretical and empirical analysis of the impact of barriers to entry on workplace training. Our theoretical model yields ambiguous predictions on the sign of this relationship. On the one hand, given the number of firms, a deregulation reduces profits per unit of output, and thereby reduces training. On the other hand, the number of firms increases, and so does the output gain from training, which facilitates the investment in training. Our numerical simulation shows that for reasonable values of the parameters a negative relationship prevails. We use repeated cross section data from the European Labour Force Survey to investigate empirically the relationship between product market regulation and training incidence in a sample of 15 European countries and 13 industrial sectors, which we follow for about 7 years. Our empirical results are unambiguous and show that an increase in product market deregulation generates a sizeable increase in training incidence. |
| Keywords: | training, product market competition, Europe |
| JEL: | J24 L11 |
| Date: | 2007–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2746&r=reg |
| By: | Donald J Wright (Department of econoics, University of Sydney) |
| Abstract: | Many countries, including Australia, regulate the price consumers pay for pharmaceuticals. In this paper, the Australian Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) is modelled as a multi-stage game played between the regulator and pharmaceutical firms. Conditions are derived under which vertically differentiated firms are regulated and a number of issues are discussed. These include efficiency, regulated firm profitability, leakage, and price discrimination. An extension examines the introduction of new drugs and concludes that if all the benefits of a new drug are to be realised, then existing agreements and transfers (per-unit subsidies) need to be renegotiated. |
| Keywords: | Pharmaceuticals, Australia |
| JEL: | I11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:her:chedps:51&r=reg |
| By: | Kessides, Ioannis N.; Chisari, Omar O. |
| Abstract: | This paper uses an analytically tractable intertemporal framework for analyzing the dynamic pricing of a utility with an underdeveloped network (a typical case in most developing countries) facing a competitive fringe, short-run network adjustment costs, theft of service, and the threat of a retaliatory regulatory review that is increasing with the price it charges. This simple dynamic optimization model yields a number of powerful policy insights and conclusions. Under a variety of plausible assumptions (in the context of developing countries) the utility will find its long-run profits enhanced if it exercises restraint in the early stages of network development by holding price below the limit defined by the unit costs of the fringe. The utility ' s optimal price gradually converges toward the limit price as its network expands. Moreover, when the utility is threatened with retaliatory regulatory intervention, it will generally have incentives to restrain its pricing behavior. These findings have important implications for the design of post-privatization regulatory governance in developing countries. |
| Keywords: | Ec onomic Theory & Research,Markets and Market Access,Urban Water Supply and Sanitation,Infrastructure Regulation,Access to Markets |
| Date: | 2007–04–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4198&r=reg |
| By: | Laura Beny |
| Abstract: | The article presents a simple agency model of the relationship between corporate valuation and insider trading laws. The article then investigates the model’s three testable hypotheses using firm-level data from a cross-section of developed countries. I find that more stringent insider trading laws and enforcement are associated with greater corporate valuation among the sample firms in common countries, while they are generally irrelevant to corporate valuation for the sample firms in civil law countries. This puzzling dichotomy is robust to various alternative specifications and to controlling for a wide range of potentially omitted variables. The result for the firms in common law countries is consistent with the claim that insider trading laws can help to reduce corporate agency costs. I also find that insider trading laws and cash flow ownership appear to be complementary means to reduce agency costs, contrary to my hypothesis that they are substitute mechanisms for controlling agency costs; however, this result is generally statistically insignificant. Finally, I confirm prior findings of an “incentive effect” of greater cash flow ownership by controlling shareholders. |
| Keywords: | Corporate Finance and Law, Governance, Valuation, Capital Budgeting, Investment policy, Comparative Law, International Business |
| JEL: | G30 G38 K22 |
| Date: | 2006–08–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wdi:papers:2006-837&r=reg |
| By: | Maurizio Bovi (ISAE - Institute for Studies and Economic Analyses); Roberto Dell'Anno (Università di Foggia, DSEMS) |
| Abstract: | As recently suggested, the shadow economy and its determinants (taxation, regulations, corruption, etc.) are linked such that just two stable equilibria are possible. In the good one there is a small hidden sector, large fiscal revenues and honest/appreciated institutions. The other (bad) equilibrium is quite the opposite. Our paper examines the links between these variables in relatively uncorrupt systems. Unlike the mainstream literature, we suggest that a continuum of SE equilibrium rates can emerge and that taxation and underground activities can be positively correlated. Empirical evidence for OECD countries broadly supports the model. |
| Keywords: | shadow economy; multiple equilibria; taxation; rule of law. |
| JEL: | H26 K42 O17 |
| Date: | 2007–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:isa:wpaper:81&r=reg |