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on Regulation |
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Issue of 2006‒08‒19
three papers chosen by Christian Calmes Universite du Quebec en Outaouais, Canada |
| By: | Philippe Aghion; Robin Burgess; Stephen Redding; Fabrizio Zilibotti |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates whether the effects, on registered manufacturing out- put,employment, entry and investment, of dismantling the .license raja system of central controlsregulating entry and production activity in this sector .vary across Indian states with differentlabor market regulations. The effects are found to be unequal depending on the institutionalenvironment in which industries are embedded. In particular, following de-licensing,industries located in states with pro-employer labor market institutions grew more quicklythan those in pro-worker environments. Our results emphasize how local institutions matterfor whether industry in a region benefits or is harmed by the nationwide delicensing reform. |
| Keywords: | delicensing, economic development, labour regulation |
| JEL: | O14 O18 O21 |
| Date: | 2006–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp0728&r=reg |
| By: | Maureen Lewis |
| Abstract: | What factors affect health care delivery in the developing world? Anecdotal evidence of lives cut tragically short and the loss of productivity due to avoidable diseases is an area of salient concern in global health and international development. This working paper looks at factual evidence to describe the main challenges facing health care delivery in developing countries, including absenteeism, corruption, informal payments, and mismanagement. The author concludes that good governance is important in ensuring effective health care delivery, and that returns to investments in health are low where governance issues are not addressed. |
| Keywords: | governance, corruption, health care, disease, absenteeism |
| JEL: | H0 O0 I1 |
| Date: | 2006–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cgd:wpaper:78&r=reg |
| By: | Theodore H. Moran |
| Abstract: | How effective are G-8 and OECD efforts to combat bribery and corrupt payments when multinational companies bid on concessions in the developing world? Have the rich countries – and the United States, in particular – done what is necessary to restrain multinational investors from paying off daughters of Presidents and cronies of Ministers to secure favors for their activities? This paper argues that the answer is no. Multinational corporations from the US, Europe, and Japan have devised sophisticated payment mechanisms, as documented and described here, to evade home country anti-corruption laws, including the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, with impunity. According to this paper, some US companies have laid these payment arrangements out before the US Department of Justice, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and other US agencies, without arousing any objection whatsoever. Without reforms of the kind spelled out here, the OECD and G-8 campaign to prevent corrupt payments will turn out to be a sham. This working paper provides a preview of research included in a much broader forthcoming CGD monograph entitled Harnessing Foreign Direct Investment for Development: Policies for Developed and Developing Countries. |
| Keywords: | G-8, OECD, corruption, concessions, multinational companies |
| JEL: | E0 O0 |
| Date: | 2006–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cgd:wpaper:79&r=reg |