nep-reg New Economics Papers
on Regulation
Issue of 2006‒04‒22
24 papers chosen by
Christian Calmes
Universite du Quebec en Outaouais, Canada

  1. The design of post-Kyoto climate schemes: an introductory analytical assessment. A future for Kyoto? By Roger Guesnerie
  2. Institutional Competition, Political Process and Holdup. By Bruno Deffains; Dominique Demougi
  3. On the Constitutionalization of General International Law By Theodor Schilling
  4. Antitrust in the Not-For-Profit Sector By Tomas J. Philipson; Richard A. Posner
  5. Deregulating Sunday Shop Policies By E. Dijkgraaf; R.H.J.M. Gradus
  6. Status-Seeking in Violent Subcultures and the Double Dividend of Zero-Tolerance By Robert Dur
  7. Antitrust in Open Economies By Joseph Francois; Henrik Horn
  8. Competition and Entry in Banking: Implications for Stability and Capital Regulation By Arnoud W.A. Boot; Matej Marinc
  9. New Networks, Competition and Regulation By Pio Baake; Ulrich Kamecke
  10. Legal Theory and the European Union By Neil Walker
  11. Making a World of Difference? Habermas, Cosmopolitanism and the Constitutionalization of International Law By Neil Walker
  12. Scrutinizing Discrimination: a Conceptual and Normative Analysis of Legal Equality By Wojciech Sadurski
  13. Participatory Transnational Governance By Rainer Nickel
  14. The Role of Science in Risk Regulation under the SPS Agreement By Lukasz Gruszczysnki
  15. Privacy, Reputation, and Trust: Some Implications for Data Protection By Giovanni Sartor
  16. The EU Constitutional Treaty and its distinction between legislative and non-legislative acts – Oranges into apples? By Jonas Bering Liisberg
  17. “Soft Law,” “Hard Law,” and European Integration: Toward a Theory of Hybridity By David M. Trubek, Patrick Cottrell, Mark Nance
  18. Judicial Accommodation: NAFTA, the EU and the WTO By N’Gunu N. Tiny
  19. The Notion of Discrimination in Article 1102 of NAFTA By Fernando Gonzalez Rojas
  20. The Legal Regulation of Software Interoperability in the EU By Boris Rotenberg
  21. Product market reforms, labour market institutions and unemployment By Rachel Griffith; Rupert Harrison; Gareth Macartney
  22. Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States By Gordon H. Hanson
  23. Profit Sharing and Investment by Regulated Utilities: A Welfare Analysis By Michele Moretto; Paolo M. Panteghini; Carlo Scarpa
  24. Labeling Regulations and Segregation of First- and Second-Generation Genetically Modified Products: Innovation Incentives and Welfare Effects By GianCarlo Moschini; Harvey E. Lapan

  1. By: Roger Guesnerie
    Abstract: The paper starts from a proposition of institutional design for climate policies made previously by David Bradford and labelled GPGP (Global Public good Purchase). The scheme is compared with other possible post- Kyoto schemes that are, or not, "Kyoto compatible". The comparison puts the emphasis on the participation issue, (free riding, ratchet effect), and on the desirable flexibility of the schemes. It argues that the incidence of climate policies on the final price of fossil fuels is a key and difficult issue which has not received, untill now, the amount of required attention.
    Date: 2006
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pse:psecon:2006-11&r=reg
  2. By: Bruno Deffains; Dominique Demougi
    Abstract: We compare the effect of legal and institutional competition for the design of labor institutions in an environment characterized by holdup problems in human and in physical capital. We compare autarky with the two country case assuming that capital is perfectly mobile and labor immobile. We distinguish two cases. In the first one, the political system is free from capture, while in the second, we examine the case where labor captured the institutional design problem. We find that in the former case, a competition of systems reduces welfare while in the latter case it improves the overall outcome.
    Date: 2006
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2006-13&r=reg
  3. By: Theodor Schilling
    Abstract: Abstract: This article discusses a constitutionalization of general international law which aims at transposing the achieve­ments of the constitutional State system to the in­ter­na­tio­nal level. Constitutionalization is discussed in four steps and two excursus: defining the specific interest of the present research, defining the requirements necessary for a meaningful conception of international law constitutionalization, discussing the dynamism of the in­ter­na­tio­nal legal order, describing the relevant legal facts as found on the ground, discussing a possible model rôle of intra-treaty constitutionalization, and discussing structural possibilities of a further international law constitutionalization. The discussion will center on the structural requirements of an international law constitutionalization and compare it with international law's structural givens.
    Keywords: law; judicial review
    Date: 2005–08–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:erp:jeanmo:p0170&r=reg
  4. By: Tomas J. Philipson; Richard A. Posner
    Abstract: Despite the conceptual differences between for-profit and non-profit firms stressed in conventional economic analyses of the non-profit sector, U.S. antitrust law generally does not distinguish between these two organizational forms. This paper argues that the same incentives to restrain trade exist in the non-profit sector as in the for-profit sector. Altruistic firms benefit from exploiting market power, just as non-altruistic ones do, even when they would price below cost without regard to competition. Therefore, promoting competition is socially valuable regardless of the particular objectives of producers, and the fact that antitrust law does not distinguish between the two sectors is efficient.
    JEL: K2
    Date: 2006–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12132&r=reg
  5. By: E. Dijkgraaf (Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam); R.H.J.M. Gradus (Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, and Ministry of Social Affairs, The Hague, and Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)
    Abstract: Sunday shop opening is deregulated to the municipal level in the Netherlands. Despite positive effects on economic growth and employment, many municipalities restrict Sunday shop opening. Based on 2003 data we show that diverse local characteristics, like the size of municipalities and religious and political affiliation, play a major role in decisions about Sunday shop opening. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that municipal control over Sunday shopping hours results in a considerable variation in policies. As this variation is related to significant differences between municipalities, reasons exist to decentralize the decision on Sunday shopping opening.
    Keywords: Sunday opening; economic regulation; decentralization
    JEL: D78 L51
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20060003&r=reg
  6. By: Robert Dur (Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam)
    Abstract: This paper develops a model in which individuals gain social status among their peers for being 'tough' by committing violent acts. We show that a high penalty for moderately violent acts (zero-tolerance) may yield a double dividend in that it reduces both moderate and extreme violence. The reason is that a high penalty keeps relatively 'gutless' individuals from committing moderately violent acts, which raises the signaling value of that action, and thus makes it more attractive for otherwise extremely violent individuals. Conversely, a high penalty for extremely violent acts may backfire, as it induces relatively 'tough' individuals to commit moderately violent acts and so makes moderate violence more attractive for otherwise nonviolent individuals.
    Keywords: status concerns; violence; subcultures; penalties; zero-tolerance; broken windows policing
    JEL: K14 K42
    Date: 2006–01–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20060005&r=reg
  7. By: Joseph Francois (Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam); Henrik Horn (IIES, Stockholm)
    Abstract: We examine antitrust rules in a two county general equilibrium trade model, contrasting national and multilateral (cooperative) determination of competition policy, exploring the properties of the policy equilibrium. It is not imperfect competition, but variation in competitive stance between sectors that matters for trading partners. Beggar-thy-neighbor competition policies relate to countries' comparative advantages, and hurt the factor intensively used, or specific to, the imperfectly competitive sector. They also create a competitive advantage for export firms. FDI can be pro-competitive in this context, reducing the scope for beggar-thy-neighbor policies and reducing the gains from a multilateral competition agreement.
    Keywords: antitrust; competition policy; merger policy; trade and imperfect competition; FDI
    JEL: L4 F12 F3
    Date: 2006–01–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20060006&r=reg
  8. By: Arnoud W.A. Boot (Faculty of Economics & Econometrics, Universiteit van Amsterdam); Matej Marinc (University of Ljubljana)
    Abstract: We assess the influence of competition and capital regulation on the stability of the banking system. We particularly ask two questions: i) how does capital regulation affect (endogenous) entry; and ii) how do (exogenous) changes in the competitive environment affect bank monitoring choices and the effectiveness of capital regulation? Our approach deviates from the extant literature in that it recognizes the fixed costs associated with banks' monitoring technologies. These costs make market share and scale important for the banks' cost structures. Our most striking result is that increasing (costly) capital requirements can lead to more entry into banking, essentially by reducing the competitive strength of lower quality banks. We also show that competition improves the monitoring incentives of better quality banks and deteriorates the incentives of lower quality banks; and that precisely for those lower quality banks competition typically compromises the effectiveness of capital requirements. We generalize the analysis along a few dimensions, including an analysis of the effects of asymmetric competition, e.g. one country that opens up its banking system for competitors but not vice versa.
    Keywords: Banking; Capital regulation; Competition
    JEL: G21 L13 L50
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20060015&r=reg
  9. By: Pio Baake; Ulrich Kamecke
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp568&r=reg
  10. By: Neil Walker
    Abstract: This paper looks at the way in which the legal theory of the EU has evolved over the last half century. A major theme is the ongoing tension between continuity and change – between EU legal theory as continuous with national legal theory and EU legal theory as something new and sui generis. With both the reductive and the productive aspects of this tension in mind, the major themes of legal theory in the EU are examined, in particular the question of the unity and authority of the EU legal system and the increased burden of law in the process of legitimating a post-state polity.
    Keywords: supranationalism; European Court of Justice; integration theory; legitimacy; sectoral governance; law
    Date: 2005–12–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:erp:euilaw:p0032&r=reg
  11. By: Neil Walker
    Abstract: This paper examines the explicit linkage in the recent work of Habermas between cosmopolitanism and the constitutionalization of international law. Whereas previous thinking on the constitutionalization of international law has tended either towards the utopianism of world government or the modest ambition of attaching the constitutional label to certain material developments in transnational regulation – in particular the human rights regimes and the institutional structure of the UN as developed through state agreement – Habermas looks for an intermediate solution. This would involve a modest range of institutions and functions at the global level, in particular around peace and human rights, but founded on a broader and more popular basis than state agreement. The potential and urgency of the Habermas proposal lies in its opposition less to the other constitutional visions and more to the alternative and increasingly tangible prospect of a lop-sided international regime dominated by American perspectives.
    Keywords: constitution building; legitimacy; international agreements; multilevel governance; law
    Date: 2005–12–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:erp:euilaw:p0033&r=reg
  12. By: Wojciech Sadurski
    Abstract: Legal equality is a particularly troublesome ideal: it is at the same time non-negotiable (occupying a position lexically prior to other legal ideals shared by its proponents) and fundamentally ambiguous. The principal task for a theory of equality is to design a test for non-discriminatory classifications. This paper argues that no version of a “per-se theory”(relying on the belief that certain characteristics of individuals, when used as a basis for classifications, necessarily render a classification discriminatory) can be satisfactory. The main lesson of the critique of “per se” theories developed in this paper is that any test of nondiscriminatoriness of classifications which ignores legislative purpose, and the relationship between classification and purpose, is doomed to fail. But relevance-based tests yield a circularity which results from the temptation of implying a classification’s purpose from the terms of the classification itself. This danger can be overcome by heightening the level of scrutiny applied to the purpose, and to the fit between the classification and the purpose. However, we need some good reasons for heightening the level of scrutiny of the legislation, and these reasons must be embedded in a general theory of what renders a classification discriminatory. Such a theory can be reached by a method of “reflective equilibrium”, that is, by reflecting upon the common evils of those discriminations which we consider intuitively to be particularly invidious. An intuitively justified answer to this question seems to be that a classification is tainted as discriminatory by certain wrongful motives for legislation, in particular, if the legislation is based on prejudice, hostility and stereotyping. But it is not easy to ascertain those motives directly, so that we need some more “objective” indicia of suspectness of classification; those indicia, again, can be gathered in by thinking about the common traits of undoubtedly invidious discriminations.
    Date: 2005–12–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:erp:euilaw:p0035&r=reg
  13. By: Rainer Nickel
    Abstract: In textbooks and in theory, law is a product of democratic procedures. In reality, however, the place of law production has moved to a significant degree from the domestic sphere into an emerging domain of supranational and international institutions, bodies, and organizations, public or private, which constitute and enforce “global law without a state” (G. Teubner). These developments appear to undermine the very foundations of democratic theory and practice. A global democracy is not in sight. But if we still take the concept of law seriously, and, with it, the normative assumption that norms need to be legitimised in order to be called ‘law’, then it is worth examining the possible functional equivalents to the norm-generating setting of the nation-state: participatory arrangements ensuring the involvement of civil society actors, stakeholders, and the public, in the arguing, bargaining, and reasoning processes of transnational regulation, procedural rights safeguarding these procedural positions, and courts or court-like institutions that flank these arrangements. These potential functional equivalents – as elements of a deliberative constitutionalism - do not replace the democratic process necessary for a production of legitimate law, but they might narrow the legitimacy gap between the ongoing process of transnational social regulation and democratic constituencies. This essay focuses on legal patterns of civil society participation in transnational regulation and asks whether the EU, as the most advanced supranational entity with an evolving legal framework in the fields of transparency, accountability, and participation, can be taken as a positive model for global law production.
    Keywords: participation; governance; accountability; legitimacy; transparency; access to documents; European law; international regimes; supranationalism; networks; regulation; NGOs; civil society; democracy
    Date: 2005–12–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:erp:euilaw:p0036&r=reg
  14. By: Lukasz Gruszczysnki
    Abstract: This paper attempts to present a comprehensive and coherent picture of the role performed by science under the SPS Agreement and SPS case law. It argues that the approach adopted by the Appellate Body is predominantly based on a technical paradigm, supplemented, however, with some considerations arising from other paradigms. The paper argues that the approach adopted in the case law is generally compatible with the text of the SPS Agreement and provides a coherent SPS system. However, it also identifies certain areas which lack coherence, as certain standards seem to violate the right of the member states to establish an appropriate level of protection. These are: ascertainability of the risk as a precondition for valid risk assessment; strict specifity of the risk assessment in low-risk situations; the proportionality between the risk identified and the SPS measure; the notion of negligible risks; and the concept of likelihood in the quarantine risk assessments. The paper claims that these standards cannot be generally applied in SPS disputes as, in certain situations, they will result in the violation of the right of member states to establish an appropriate level of SPS protection. Finally, a number of specific issues are highlighted which require further clarification in case law, such as the issue of the quality of minority scientific opinions and the relationship between the insufficiency of scientific evidence and scientific uncertainty. The paper suggests that the ultimate role ascribed to science under the SPS Agreement can be assessed only after an interpretation of those issues is provided by future case law.
    Date: 2006–02–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:erp:euilaw:p0039&r=reg
  15. By: Giovanni Sartor
    Abstract: The present contribution analyses the connection between privacy and trust, with regard to data protection. In particular, it shows how the need to facilitate trust-based relationships may justify some limitations of privacy (in the sense of a right to self-determination over personal data), but may also provide some grounds for the protection of privacy.
    Keywords: fundamental/human rights; law
    Date: 2006–03–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:erp:euilaw:p0040&r=reg
  16. By: Jonas Bering Liisberg
    Abstract: Abstract: The paper examines the introduction of a distinction between legislative and non-legislative acts in the Constitutional Treaty. The drafting history and the possible implications are analyzed. Questions covered include: Was the introduction of the distinction necessary in terms of clarification or was it primarily a lever to strengthen support for more powers to the European Parliament and the Commission? Could the distinction nurture false expectations of what the EU is, or could it undermine efforts at improving transparency and enforcement of subsidiarity? The paper concludes that the distinction probably has little real significance and no serious counterproductive effects. The drafting history and analysis illustrate the pitfalls of analogies to national constitutional orders and the complexity of simplification.
    Date: 2006–01–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:erp:jeanmo:p0164&r=reg
  17. By: David M. Trubek, Patrick Cottrell, Mark Nance
    Abstract: Abstract: This paper develops a conceptual framework for the analysis of hard and soft law that is drawn in part from recent work in the field of international relations. We examine the literature on the role of soft law, noting that scholars have approached this phenomenon in very different ways. We seek to unite insights from constructivist and rationalist theories of integration and apply them to the understanding of the role law and other normative orders and governance processes may play in European integration. We deploy this synthesis to analyze the two case studies, employment policy and fiscal policy coordination, exploring the roles that law plays and paying special attention to the operation of hybrid constellations where hard and soft operate in the same policy domain.
    Keywords: governance; integration theory; open coordination; regulation; European law; stability pact; economic integration; fiscal policy; social policy; political science; law; sociology
    Date: 2005–06–13
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:erp:jeanmo:p0166&r=reg
  18. By: N’Gunu N. Tiny
    Abstract: Abstract: This article explores the normative interplay between systems of regional integration and the WTO. It is intended to provide an analysis of the response of the dispute settlement mechanisms within the NAFTA and the EU to the normative claims and challenges posed by the WTO Appellate Body, such as the claim of normative supremacy. It tries to highlight the way and processes by which such judicial or quasi-judicial institutions mediate claims and conflicts vis-à-vis the WTO. The article starts by focussing on what are considered to be the fundamentals of judicial accommodation. It will be argued that NAFTA arbitrators and EU judges have made a strong case for accommodation or, at least, to the awareness of accommodation, because of their concern with normative coherence and system integrity. Arbitrators and judges alike are driven by the idea of coherence and integrity of law when accommodating competing or conflicting normative claims. This will be followed by a focus on the distinctive character of judicial accommodation. Because of the arbitral nature of NAFTA Panels and the judicial nature of EU courts, the argument continues, arbitrators and judges respectively have a distinct, and perhaps even unique, way of accommodating different claims as compared to other institutions and actors operating within NAFTA and the EU, such as the legislature and trade officials. Two models of judicial accommodation are contrasted. The NAFTA strategy of judicial accommodation as regards WTO law will be described as an attempt to define a common ground between both trading systems. By contrast, the European courts have mainly focused on the determination or assertion of jurisdictional boundaries between the EU and the WTO.
    Keywords: dispute resolution; economic law; GATT; WTO
    Date: 2005–07–22
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:erp:jeanmo:p0168&r=reg
  19. By: Fernando Gonzalez Rojas
    Abstract: Abstract: It is clear that Article 1102 of NAFTA was not intended to prohibit all kinds of differential treatment between foreign and domestic investors. Therefore, what kind of discrimination does Article 1102 outlaw? Many would confidently answer: discrimination aimed at protectionism. However, if Article 1102 makes no reference to the Parties’ intent, how can the apparently ‘objective’ standards of “like circumstances” and “less favorable treatment” be used to identify the protectionist aim? Is the GATT Article III jurisprudence helpful in this task? How have the Chapter 11 panels sorted out this problem? These are some of the questions this paper will address.
    Keywords: regulatory politics; dispute resolution; economic law; GATT; international agreements; non-discrimination; regulations; reverse discrimination; economic integration; foreign direct investment; international trade; liberalization; protectionism; regional development; WTO; law
    Date: 2005–07–22
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:erp:jeanmo:p0169&r=reg
  20. By: Boris Rotenberg
    Abstract: Abstract: The primary aim of this paper is to point to the need for a European debate on the tension between the fundamental right to freedom of expression and the fundamental right to property in European software regulation. The analysis reveals that the analogous application of existing fundamental rights case law of the European Court of Human Rights as in Chassagnou and Appleby would probably unduly favour private property rights in software over other individual and societal interests in the form of software expression. Courts will need more guidance to find the right balance, in view of the unique nature of software, particularly so with regard to the foundational concept of software interoperability.
    Keywords: European law; media; networks; standardisation; fundamental/human rights
    Date: 2005–11–18
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:erp:jeanmo:p0171&r=reg
  21. By: Rachel Griffith (Institute for Fiscal Studies); Rupert Harrison (Institute for Fiscal Studies and University College London); Gareth Macartney (Institute for Fiscal Studies and University College London)
    Abstract: We analyze the impact of product market competition on unemployment and wages, and how this depends on labour market institutions. We use differential changes in regulations across OECD countries over the 1980s and 1990s to identify the effects of competition. We find that increased product market competition reduces unemployment, and that it does so more in countries with labour market institutions that increase worker bargaining power. The theoretical intuition is that both firms with market power and unions with bargaining power are constrained in their behaviour by the elasticity of demand in the product market. We also find that the effect of increased competition on real wages is beneficial to workers, but less so when they have high bargaining power. Intuitively, real wages increase through a drop in the general price level, but workers with bargaining power lose out somewhat from a reduction in the rents that they had previously captured.
    Keywords: Product market regulation; competition; wage bargaining; unemployment.
    JEL: E24 J50 L50
    Date: 2006–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ifs:ifsewp:06/06&r=reg
  22. By: Gordon H. Hanson
    Abstract: In this paper, I selectively review recent literature on illegal migration from Mexico to the United States. I begin by discussing methods for estimating stocks and flows of illegal migrants. While there is uncertainty about the size of the unauthorized population, new data sources make it possible to examine the composition of legal and illegal populations and the time-series covariates of illegal labor flows. I then consider the supply of and demand for illegal migrants. Wage differentials between the United States and Mexico are hardly a new phenomenon, yet illegal migration from Mexico did not reach high levels until recently. An increase in the relative size of Mexico’s working-age population, greater volatility in U.S.-Mexico relative wages, and changes in U.S. immigration policies are all candidate explanations for increasing labor flows from Mexico. Finally, I consider policies that regulate the cross-border flow of illegal migrants. While U.S. laws mandate that authorities prevent illegal entry and punish firms that hire unauthorized immigrants, these laws are imperfectly enforced. Lax enforcement may reflect political pressure by employers and other interests that favor open borders.
    JEL: F2 J6
    Date: 2006–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12141&r=reg
  23. By: Michele Moretto; Paolo M. Panteghini; Carlo Scarpa
    Abstract: We analyse the effects of different regulatory schemes (price cap and profit sharing) on a firm's investment of endogenous size. Using a real option approach in continuous time, we show that profit sharing does not delay a firm's start-up investment relative to a pure price cap scheme. Profit sharing does not necessarily affect total investment either, if the threshold for profit sharing is high enough. Onlya profit sharing intervening for low profit levels may delay further investments. We also evaluate the effects of profit sharing on social welfare, determining the level of profit that should optimally trigger tighter regulation: profit sharing should be less stringent in sectors where investment opportunities are larger.
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ubs:wpaper:ubs0611&r=reg
  24. By: GianCarlo Moschini (Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD)); Harvey E. Lapan
    Abstract: We review some of the most significant issues and results on the economic effects of genetically modified (GM) product innovation, with emphasis on the question of GM labeling and the need for costly segregation and identity preservation activities. The analysis is organized around an explicit model that can accommodate the features of both first-generation and second-generation GM products. The model accounts for the proprietary nature of GM innovations and for the critical role of consumer preferences vis-à-vis GM products, as well as for the impacts of segregation and identity preservation and the effects of a mandatory GM labeling regulation. We also investigate briefly a novel question in this setting, the choice of "research direction" when both cost-reducing and quality-enhancing GM innovations are feasible.
    Keywords: identity preservation, labeling, market failure, product differentiation, welfare.
    Date: 2005–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ias:cpaper:05-wp391&r=reg

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