nep-reg New Economics Papers
on Regulation
Issue of 2006‒03‒25
six papers chosen by
Christian Calmes
Universite du Quebec en Outaouais, Canada

  1. The Regulatory Choice between a Label and a Minimum-Quality Standard By Stephan Marette
  2. Perception of the Risks Associated with Impaired Driving and Effects on Driving Behavior By Georges Dionne; Claude Fluet; Denise Desjardins
  3. Incorporating collateral information using an adaptive management framework for the regulation of transgenic crops By Linacre, Nicholas A.; Burgman, Mark A.; Ades, Peter K.; Stewart-Oaten, Allen
  4. Piracy and competition By Paul, BELLEFLAMME; Pierre, PICARD
  5. Illegal Market of Cigarettes in Estonia By Evelin Ahermaa
  6. Do Attitudes Towards Corruption Differ Across Cultures? Experimental Evidence from Australia, India, Indonesia andSingapore By L. Cameron; A. Chaudhuri; N. Erkal; L. Gangadharan

  1. By: Stephan Marette (Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD))
    Abstract: This paper revisits the issue of the regulatory choice between a mandatory label and a minimum-quality standard. When the cost of regulation is relatively low, we show that the socially optimal choice depends on the producers’ cost structure for complying with regulation and improving quality. Under a marginal cost for improving quality, the mandatory labeling is sufficient for reaching the socially optimal level of quality. Under a fixed cost for improving quality, we show that each instrument or the combination of both instruments may emerge at the equilibrium.
    Keywords: cost of regulation; information; standard
    Date: 2005–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ias:cpaper:05-wp416&r=reg
  2. By: Georges Dionne; Claude Fluet; Denise Desjardins
    Abstract: This research studies the perception of the risks associated with impaired driving-probability of being apprehended or of having an accident-and the relation between the perception of risks and driving behavior. The most important determinants of perceptual biases are age, an accumulation of violations in the year preceding the survey, being a non-drinker, knowledge of the legal alcohol limit for driving, opinion about zero tolerance for impaired driving, and family income. Perceptual biases are shown to influence driving behavior, as captured by drivers' accumulated violations, demerit points and bodily injury accidents, in the years preceding and in the year following the survey. In conclusion, we analyze the results in terms of public policy for road safety.
    Keywords: Risk perception, impaired driving, driving behavior, traffic violation, road accident, regulation, public policy
    JEL: D81 C11 C13 K42
    Date: 2006
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0608&r=reg
  3. By: Linacre, Nicholas A.; Burgman, Mark A.; Ades, Peter K.; Stewart-Oaten, Allen
    Abstract: "A lack of data often makes biological management decisions difficult and has been an area of contention in the debate over the approval of transgenic crops. Our knowledge of agricultural and natural systems is limited and our ability to gain additional information, quickly and effectively, is often handicapped by statistical complexity. To adequately cope with this requires new approaches and models that integrate decision-making and management. This paper describes one possible approach to the integration of decision-making and management, which may have application for the regulatory approval of transgenic crops. In many situations countries wishing to approve transgenic crops will have limited data on the environmental performance of the crop. The approach outlined in this paper looks at how related information, possibly collected from other countries, might be used to help inform decisions about the approval of transgenic crops. This is done within an integrated decision-making and management framework." Authors' Abstract
    Keywords: Transgenic plants ,Collateral data ,Bayesian theory ,Inference ,
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:eptddp:137&r=reg
  4. By: Paul, BELLEFLAMME (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)); Pierre, PICARD
    Abstract: The effects of (private, small-scale) piracy on the pricing behavior of producers of information goods are studied within a unified model of vertical differentiation. Although information goods are assumed to be perfectly differentiated, demands are interdependent because the copying technology exhibits increasing returns to scale. We characterize the Bertrand-Nash equiliria in a duopoly. Comparing equilibrium prices to the prices set by a multiproduct monopolist, we show that competition drives prices up and may lead to price dispersion. Competition reduces total surplus in the short run but provides higher incentives to create in the long run.
    Keywords: Information goods; piracy; copyright; pricing
    JEL: L13 L82 L86 K11 O34
    Date: 2005–09–30
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ctl:louvec:2005057&r=reg
  5. By: Evelin Ahermaa (Estonian Institute of Economic Research)
    Abstract: Tobacco products belong to a group of excise goods and an excise duty is levied on them. The latter increases the price, but there are no changes in the quality of the goods and it leads to tax frauds. There has been regular increase in the excise duties on tobacco products in Estonia; changes in tax rates have influenced legal sales, mostly of cigarettes. Consumption of cigarettes is the largest in the group of tobacco products in Estonia; therefore, the paper is especially focused on cigarettes. The purpose of the paper is to evaluate illegal market of cigarettes in Estonia, using comparison of the net of estimations. The paper introduces the method of analysis where the essential role is given to inhabitants (concerning their expert and individual opinions). Empirical evidence concerning illegal market of cigarettes in Estonia is presented by size on the example of fieldwork carried out in 2003.
    Keywords: cigarettes, excise duty, illegal market, taxation
    JEL: E62 K42
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ttu:wpaper:122&r=reg
  6. By: L. Cameron; A. Chaudhuri; N. Erkal; L. Gangadharan
    Abstract: This paper examines cultural differences in attitudes towards corruption by analysing individual-decision making in a corrupt experimental environment. Attitudes towards corruption play a critical role in the persistence of corruption. Our experiments differentiate between the incentives to engage in corrupt behaviour and the incentives to punish corrupt behaviour and allow us to explore whether, in environments characterized by lower levels of corruption, there is both a lower propensity to engage in corrupt behaviour and a higher propensity to punish corrupt behaviour. Based on experiments run in Australia (Melbourne), India (Delhi), Indonesia (Jakarta) and Singapore, we find that there is more variation in the propensities to punish corrupt behaviour than in the propensities to engage in corrupt behaviour across cultures. The results reveal that the subjects in India exhibit a higher tolerance towards corruption than the subjects in Australia while the subjects in Indonesia behave similarly to those in Australia. The subjects in Singapore have a higher propensity to engage in corruption than the subjects in Australia. We also vary our experimental design to examine the impact of a more effective punishment system and the effect of the perceived cost of bribery.
    Keywords: Corruption, Experiments, Punishment, Cultural Analysis
    JEL: C91 D73 O17 K42
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mlb:wpaper:943&r=reg

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