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on Regulation |
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Issue of 2006‒03‒18
seven papers chosen by Christian Calmes Universite du Quebec en Outaouais, Canada |
| By: | Henk Kox |
| Abstract: | CPB's contribution to the EU's 2005 Competitiveness Report includes Worldscan simulations for several aspects of the EU’s Lisbon Agenda. One of the simulations concerns the macroeconomic consequences of lowering the administrative burdens for companies throughout the EU. This paper provides data that describe the baseline situation of administrative burdens for companies in the EU member states.<BR> This research note defines the concept of administrative burden for companies, using the concept of a standard information event caused by mandatory information requirements. A systematic comparison is made for most of the present EU countries. Different procedures for quantifying and aggregating the costs of the administrative burden are presented. |
| JEL: | F15 F23 L5 O52 G38 |
| Date: | 2005–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpb:memodm:136&r=reg |
| By: | Iris Bohnet; Stephan Meier |
| Abstract: | We employ experiments to illustrate one factor contributing to the lack of distrust in the recent corporate scandals: Trust rather than no trust was the default. People are more trusting when the default is full trust than when it is no trust. We introduce a new game, the distrust game (DTG), where the default is full trust and find that in it, trust levels are higher than in the Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) trust game (TG), where the default is no trust. At the same time, trustworthiness levels are lower in the DTG than in the TG. Agents (second movers) punish distrust more in the DTG than the lack of trust in the TG, but principals (first movers) do not correctly anticipate this. The distrust game produces more efficient outcomes than the trust game but also more inequality: Principals end up much worse than their agents in the DTG. |
| Keywords: | Trust ; Corporations - Corrupt practices |
| Date: | 2005 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedbpp:05-4&r=reg |
| By: | Giang Ho; Anthony Pennington-Cross |
| Abstract: | Local authorities in North Carolina, and subsequently in at least 23 other states, have enacted laws intending to reduce predatory and abusive lending. While there is substantial variation in the laws, they typically extend the coverage of the Federal Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) by including home purchase and open end mortgage credit, by lowering annual percentage rate (APR) and fees and points triggers, and by prohibiting or restricting the use of balloon payments and prepayment penalties. Empirical results show that the typical local predatory lending law tends to reduce rejections, while having little impact on the flow (application and origination) of credit. However, the strength of the law, measured by the extent of market coverage and the extent of prohibitions, can have strong impacts on both the flow of credit and rejections. |
| Keywords: | Mortgages ; Banking law ; Home equity loans |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedlwp:2006-009&r=reg |
| By: | P R Agénor; K C Neanidis |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the optimal allocation of government spending between health, education, and infrastructure in an endogenous growth framework. In the model, infrastructure a?ects not only the production of goods but also the supply of health and education services. The production of health (education) services depends also on the stock of educated labor (health spending). Transitional dynamics associated with budget-neutral shifts in the composition of expenditure are analyzed, and growth- and welfare-maximizing allocation rules are derived and compared. The discussion highlights the key role played by the parameters that characterize the health and education technologies. |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:man:cgbcrp:69&r=reg |
| By: | Denis Fougère (CNRS, CREST-INSEE, CEPR and IZA Bonn); Francis Kramarz (CREST-INSEE, CEPR and IZA Bonn); Julien Pouget (CREST-INSEE and IZA Bonn) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we examine the influence of unemployment on property crimes and on violent crimes in France for the period 1990 to 2000. This analysis is the first extensive study for this country. We construct a regional-level data set (for the 95 départements of metropolitan France) with measures of crimes as reported to the Ministry of Interior. To assess social conditions prevailing in the département in that year, we construct measures of the unemployment rate as well as other social, economic and demographic variables using multiple waves of the French Labor Survey. We estimate a classic Becker type model in which unemployment is a measure of how potential criminals fare in the legitimate job market. First, our estimates show that in the cross-section dimension, crime and unemployment are positively associated. Second, we find that increases in youth unemployment induce increases in crime. Using the predicted industrial structure to instrument unemployment, we show that this effect is causal for burglaries, thefts, and drug offences. To combat crime, it appears thus that all strategies designed to combat youth unemployment should be examined. |
| Keywords: | crime, youth unemployment |
| JEL: | J19 K42 J64 J65 |
| Date: | 2006–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2009&r=reg |
| By: | Dilip Mookherjee (Department of Economics, Boston University); Pranab Bardhan |
| Abstract: | In summary, the effects of decentralization on corruption and government accountability are complex and cannot be summarized by simple, unconditional statements. This applies equally to theoretical analyses, cross-country regression results and more detailed empirical studies of specific countries. In this essay we reviewed the literature dealing with two principal accountability mechanisms: external competition with other governments, and internal democratic pressures. |
| Date: | 2005–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2005-023&r=reg |
| By: | Ulf von Lilienfeld-Toal (Department of Economics, University of Frankfurt); Dilip Mookherjee (Department of Economics, Boston University) |
| Abstract: | Should the law restrict liability of defaulting borrowers? We abstract from possible benefits arising from limited rationality or risk-aversion of borrowers, contractual incompleteness, or lender moral hazard. We focus instead on general equilibrium implications of liability rules with moral hazard among borrowers with varying wealth. If lenders are on the short side of the market, weakening liability rules lower lender profits, may cause additional exclusion among the poor, but generate additional rents for wealthier borrowers. For certain changes in liability rules (such as a ban on bonded labor, or weakening bankruptcy rules below a wealth threshold) they also raise productivity among borrowers of intermediate wealth. Hence they can be interpreted as a form of efficiency-enhancing redistribution from lenders and poor borrowers to middle class borrowers. Our model provides a possible rationale for why weaker liability rules are observed in wealthier countries. |
| Date: | 2005–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2005-034&r=reg |