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on Regulation |
| By: | Michele Moretto; Paola Valbonesi |
| Abstract: | To avoid the extremely high profit levels found in recent experiences with price cap regulation, some regulators have applied a profit-sharing (PS) rule that revises prices to the benefit of consumers. This paper investigates the conditions under which a regulator can implement such a PS scheme, having contract closure as outside option if the firm's profits are excessive. We determine both the level of profits that triggers the PS and the consequent price adjustment endogenously. We then explore the PS dynamic efficiency in the repeated regulator-firm relationship. |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ubs:wpaper:ubs0410&r=reg |
| By: | Daniel C. Hardy |
| Keywords: | Banking , Bank regulations , Capital , Competition , |
| Date: | 2006–02–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:06/34&r=reg |
| By: | Pierre-Paul Lemyre; Richard Willemant |
| Abstract: | The Government of Québec is slowly but surely turning its attention to the issue of free and open source software in response to the interest shown by Québec’s software industry and the attention paid to the phenomenon by governments around the world. This openness is easy to understand given an environment in which online service provision to citizens must be enhanced while minimizing expenditures on technology, curtailing service providers’ control over the administration, and promoting the development of the information society in Québec. Nonetheless, as we see in the news, adoption of this new attitude toward to software development is not always immune to legal challenges. Consequently, the manner in which Québec law interacts with free and open source software, as well as the associated risks, assume a particular significance.<P> The analysis we present here reveals that the law, as it currently stands in Québec, appears adequate to effectively address the various legal issues inherent in the use of free and open source software. First of all, no legal rule seems to be incompatible with the validity of free and open source licences, despite that fact that few of them were designed with the Québec legal system in mind. Moreover, both federal copyright rules and Québec regulations affecting contractual liability allow the authors and users of free and open source software to effectively preserve the freedom of computer code, which is typically the purpose of free and open source licences.<P>Nonetheless, it remains the case that some legal risks are associated with free and open source software. These risks may arise from the formalism requirements included in the Copyright Act, prior violations of intellectual property rights by third parties, or simply from the broader contractual protection afforded to licensors. Consequently, integrating free and open source software into the technology strategy of the Government of Québec requires setting up some initiatives to allow these risks to be mitigated as much as possible and to enable the management of those risks that cannot be completely eliminated. <P> |
| Date: | 2006–02–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cir:cirpro:2006rp-04&r=reg |
| By: | Helge Berger; Stephan Danninger |
| Keywords: | Labor market policy , Employment , Economic models , |
| Date: | 2005–12–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:05/227&r=reg |
| By: | Felix J. J. Vardy; John Morgan |
| Keywords: | Corruption , Competition , Economic models , |
| Date: | 2006–01–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:06/11&r=reg |
| By: | Stefano Comino; Fabio M. Manenti; Alessandro Rossi |
| Abstract: | Governments’ interest in Free/Open Source (F/OS) software is steadily increasing. Several policies aimed at supporting Free/Open Source (F/OS) software have been taken or are currently under discussion all around the world. In this paper, we review the basic (economic) rationales for such policy interventions and we present some summary statistics on policies taken within the European countries. We claim that in order to evaluate correctly the consequences of such interventions one has to consider both the role and the administrative level at which such decision are taken as well as the typology of software which is involved. Moreover, we argue that the level playing field cannot be taken for granted in software markets. Therefore, non-intrusive public policies that currently prevail at the European level in terms, for instance, of the promotion of open standards or in terms of campaigns aimed at informing IT decision–makers, are likely to be welfare enhancing. |
| Keywords: | Free/open source software, public policies, software market |
| JEL: | O38 L51 L63 |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trn:utwpde:0601&r=reg |
| By: | Joseph Doucet; Stephen Littlechild |
| Abstract: | The Federal Power Commission pioneered the use of negotiated settlements in the early 1960s as a means of coping with an increased workload and backlog. Legal scholars have emphasized the importance of settlements in coping with the regulatory load, and in saving time and money, albeit with some concern about transparency and the treatment of non-unanimous settlements. More recently, however, they suggest that settlements better serve the needs of the parties, allow greater flexibility and innovation, and can achieve results that lie beyond traditional regulatory authority. Recent economic research has indicated the high proportion of regulatory cases dealt with by settlements in the US and Canada and confirmed that settlements are not simply a more efficient way of doing the same thing as regulation. Rather, they involve considerable innovation, notably the introduction of price caps and other incentive mechanisms that otherwise would not have been likely or even possible. |
| Keywords: | negotiated settlements, regulation, innovation |
| JEL: | L51 L97 L94 L95 |
| Date: | 2006–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:0622&r=reg |
| By: | Odd-Helge Fjeldstad; Ivar Kolstad; Knut Nygaard |
| Abstract: | This paper analyses the business environment for micro enterprises in Tanzania based on survey data. The primary objective of the study is to identify major constraints facing the firms' business operations. Taxation, corruption, and regulations in the form of licences and permits, are found to be the most important constraints on business operations. Reported constraints vary according to firm characteristics such as age, location, education and gender of the owner. Contrary to previous studies and current policies, financial constraints and property rights are not perceived as important constraints. |
| Keywords: | Small enterprise Business constriants Taxation Corruption Tanzania |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chm:wpaper:wp2006-2&r=reg |
| By: | Kjetil Bjorvatn; Gaute Torsvik; Bertil Tungodden |
| Abstract: | The anti-corruption reform in the Tanzanian tax bureaucracy in the mid-1990s was apparently a short-lived success. In the wake of the reform, a number of "tax experts" established themselves in the market, many of them being laid off tax bureaucrats. We argue that middle-men can undermine the effect of an anti-corruption reform by reducing the uncertainty that firms face vis-à-vis a reformed tax bureaucracy, which in turn may encourage firms to pay bribes rather than taxes. Indeed, under some circumstances, middle-men can cause corruption to be higher after the reform than before the reform. Since the demand for middle-men may increase with the extent of the reform, we also demonstrate that a small reform may be more efficient in combatting corruption than a more radical reform. |
| Keywords: | Corruption Reform Middle-men Institutions Tanzania |
| JEL: | H26 K42 O12 |
| Date: | 2005 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chm:wpaper:wp2005-1&r=reg |
| By: | Odd-Helge Fjeldstad |
| Abstract: | Over the past two decades many developing countries have implemented comprehensive reforms of their tax administrations in order to increase revenue and curb corruption. This paper examines recent experiences in the fight against corruption in the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA). It argues that the technocratic remedies supported by donors have underplayed the degree to which progress in tax administration depends upon a thorough 'cultural change' in the public service. The motives of individual actors are often inextricably tied to the interests of the social groups to which they belong. In the URA patronage runs through networks grounded on ties of kinship and community origin. As such, people recognize the benefits of large extended families and strong kinship ties, even as their social and economic aspirations may be indisputably modern. This implies that such social relations may undermine formal bureaucratic structures and positions. If these problems, which are rooted in social norms and patterns of behavior rather than administrative features, are overlooked, the result may be to distort incentives. As a consequence, the government's commitment to reforming the tax administration may also be undermined. |
| Keywords: | Corruption Incentives Social norms Tax administration Tax evasion Uganda |
| JEL: | D73 H26 H30 J33 K42 Z13 |
| Date: | 2005 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chm:wpaper:wp2005-10&r=reg |