nep-reg New Economics Papers
on Regulation
Issue of 2005‒12‒20
twelve papers chosen by
Christian Calmes
Université du Québec en Outaouais, Canada

  1. On Strategic Enabling of Product Piracy in the Market for Video Games By Oliver Gürtler
  2. Severance Pay and the Shadow of the Law: Evidence for West Germany By Laszlo Goerke; Markus Pannenberg
  3. Regulation of telecommunication and deployment of broadband By Machiel van Dijk; Machiel Mulder
  4. Regulatory Choice between a Label and a Minimum-Quality Standard, The By Marette, Stèphan
  5. Labour market regulation and retirement age By M. Magnani
  6. Does Stock Market Liberalisation Benefit The Economy? Evidence From Industry-Level Data By Lee Chee Tong
  7. La politica sanitaria in Italia: dalla riforma legislativa alla riforma costituzionale By Pellegrino, Paola
  8. Welfare Reforms and Consumption Among Single Mother Households: Evidence From Canadian Provinces By Matthew Brzozowski
  9. The Case for Managed Judges: Learning from Japan after the Political Upheaval of 1993 By J. Mark Ramseyer
  10. New Anti-Merger Theories: A Critique By Edward J. Lopez
  11. Who’s watching? The market for prostitution services By Marina Della Giusta; Maria Laura Di Tommaso; Steinar Strøm
  12. Law in Transition and Development: The Case of Russia By Dalia Marin

  1. By: Oliver Gürtler
    Abstract: In this paper, we consider the market for video games, where some firms are active in both, the market for video games hardware and software. It is puzzling that hardware can be easily made compatible with duplicated (i.e. pirated) software. We ask, whether there exist strategic reasons explaining this puzzle. Firms may, for example, enable software piracy in order to increase their market shares in the hardware market. This will indeed be true, if hardware prices are fixed and the market is completely covered. With endogenous prices, however, price reactions to enabling of product piracy will offset the increase in market shares and copy protection will be set at the highest possible level. If, on the other hand, the market is only partially covered, copy protection will be strategically reduced. In doing so, hardware firms shift reservation prices from the software to the more important hardware market.
    Keywords: Video Games Market, Product Piracy, Fundamental Transformation
    JEL: D21 L13 L85
    Date: 2005–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse36_2005&r=reg
  2. By: Laszlo Goerke; Markus Pannenberg
    Abstract: Due to the complexity of employment protection legislation (EPL) in Germany, there is notable uncertainty about the outcomes of dismissal conflicts. In this study we focus on severance pay and inquire whether its incidence and level varies in a systematic manner with the legal rules as defined by labour as well as tax law. We start with a theoretical model that generates the main observable outcomes of dismissal conflicts as potential equilibrium situations. Using German panel data (GSOEP), we put our theoretical model to an empirical test. Our main result is that the shadow of the law matters. Criteria regarding the validity of dismissals either found in respective legislation or defined by labour courts significantly affect the incidence and magnitude of severance pay. Moreover, restrictive changes in the taxation of severance pay have a negative causal impact on its incidence.
    Keywords: severance pay, labour law, taxation, sample selection, survey data
    JEL: C23 C24 H24 J65 K31
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1619&r=reg
  3. By: Machiel van Dijk; Machiel Mulder
    Abstract: This paper explores the question whether regulation in telecommunications encourages or hampers the development of new technologies. <P> Contrary to other network industries, the telecommunications industry is more and more characterized by competing network technologies, such as cable, copper, and wireless. Regulation is, however, still needed as in several components of telecommunications sources of market power remain. The key issue in the regulation of access to a network is the possible trade-off between static efficiency and dynamic efficiency. Favourable conditions for access to the network contribute to allocative efficiency and productive efficiency, but can negatively affect incentives for investments in upgrading of existing infrastructures and developing new ones. <P> In the Netherlands, regulation of the telecommunication industry is designed to enhance competition between alternative infrastructures without affecting the technology choice of both incumbents and entrants. In the market for unbundled access to the local loop and the market for high quality wholesale access, a trade-off exists between static efficiency and dynamic efficiency. Regulated access tariffs, which are based on average costs, seem to be a good compromise between static and dynamic efficiency. Tariffs for access to the local loop reflect actual costs of the existing copper infrastructure, giving entrants incentives to make efficient make-or-buy decisions. In addition, the threat of infrastructure competition in the local loop, as well as the service-based competition between providers using different infrastructures, i.e. copper and cable, provide incentives for the incumbent to increase efficiency. <P> Our overall conclusion is that Dutch regulation of the telecommunication industry gives efficient incentives for technological developments such as the deployment of broadband.
    Keywords: telecommunication; telecom; network; network industries; broadband; regulation; market failure
    JEL: L51 O38
    Date: 2005–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpb:memodm:131&r=reg
  4. By: Marette, Stèphan
    Abstract: This paper revisits the issue of the regulatory choice between a mandatory label and a minimum-quality standard. When the cost of regulation is relatively low, we show that the socially optimal choice depends on the producers’ cost structure for complying with regulation and improving quality. Under a marginal cost for improving quality, the mandatory labeling is sufficient for reaching the socially optimal level of quality. Under a fixed cost for improving quality, we show that each instrument or the combination of both instruments may emerge at the equilibrium.
    Keywords: cost of regulation, information, standard.
    Date: 2005–12–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:isu:genres:12486&r=reg
  5. By: M. Magnani
    Abstract: Pension system and labor market reforms are widely debated issues in all industrialized countries and especially in Europe; any change over these two aspects of the Social Security System indeed, can affect heavily the functioning of the whole economy.A preminent role in this sense is played by employment protection regulation and by the mandatory retirement age; in this paper I focus on the political economy of such social policies jointly and consider the interaction between the choice over the protection of the employees in the labour market and that over retirement age. In particular, I look at the effects of the turnover generated either by temporary, selective exits due to the dynamic of the labour market or by permanent, non-selective exits due to retirements. The degree of employment protection and the mandatory retirement age emerge as a result of the political bargaining between three social groups: young, high and low prductivity old. Workforce composition in this setting defines the efficiency of the economy and determine the rise of a social consensus towards different assets of the Social Security System
    Keywords: social security, turnover on the labor market, political equilibria, employment protection, retirement age
    JEL: D72 H55 J63
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:par:dipeco:2005-ep02&r=reg
  6. By: Lee Chee Tong (Singapore Centre for Applied and Policy Economics, Department of Economics, National University of Singapore)
    Abstract: The paper examines the impact of stock market liberalisation on four industry-level economic variables, i) growth in real value added, ii) growth in real wages per worker, iii) growth in the number of employees and iv) growth in the number of firms using data on 18 developing countries for the period between 1981 - 2000. Genetic programming methodology is used to determine the liberalisation dates. Results from difference-in-differences regression indicate that stock market liberalisation has minimal impact on the growth of real value added. On the other hand, growth rates of real wages per worker, number of employees and number of firms are significantly higher for most countries after stock market liberalisation.
    Keywords: stock market liberalisation, genetic programming, difference- indifferences regression
    JEL: G18 J30 O12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sca:scaewp:0516&r=reg
  7. By: Pellegrino, Paola
    Abstract: Dopo le importanti riforme amministrative che hanno segnato la vita politica italiana dell'ultimo decennio, stiamo assistendo a un intenso processo di riforma costituzionale in grado di influire sui contenuti della politica sanitaria. Ma quali sono state le tappe di questo articolato processo normativo? Attraverso le pagine che seguono si procederà ad una sintetica ricostruzione ragionata del percorso seguito in Italia, analizzando i momenti fondamentali del percorso di riforma, legislativo prima e costituzionale poi, degli ultimi anni. Si dedicherà poi un approfondimento ad un aspetto specifico di questo processo di trasformazione, i Livelli Essenziali di Assistenza (LEA), che possono essere considerati come uno strumento chiave alla base della nuova politica sanitaria e dei possibili scenari in tema di rapporti tra lo Stato e le Regioni.
    Date: 2005–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uca:ucapdv:55&r=reg
  8. By: Matthew Brzozowski (University of Western Ontario)
    Abstract: This paper evaluates the impact of the 1995-1998 Ontario welfare reforms on the consumption among single mothers. Because welfare is a provincial responsibility in Canada, this study is able to consider the effects of the welfare reforms in Ontario, in comparison with other Canadian jurisdictions at the same time. By utilizing a difference in difference design I compare the changes in the consumption levels among Ontario single mothers to changes in the consumption levels among three distinct segments of Canadian population. The comparison with demographically identical groups under different provincial administrations and the implementation of difference in difference propensity score matching estimates sets my approach apart from previous similar work. The results indicate an initial decrease in the relative consumption levels among Ontario single mothers. This negative policy impact is not present in the long-term results.
    Keywords: welfare reform; difference in difference; lone mother
    JEL: D31 I31 I38
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uwo:epuwoc:200510&r=reg
  9. By: J. Mark Ramseyer (Harvard Law School)
    Abstract: Although the executive branch appoints Japanese Supreme Court justices as it does in the United States, a personnel office under the control of the Supreme Court rotates lower court Japanese judges through a variety of posts. This creates the possibility that politicians might indirectly use the postings to reward or punish judges. For forty years, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) controlled the legislature and appointed the Supreme Court justices who in turn controlled the careers of these lower-court judges. In 1993, it temporarily lost control. We use regression analysis to examine whether the end of the LDP’s electoral lock changed the court’s promotion system, and find surprisingly little change. Whether before or after 1993, the Supreme Court used the personnel office to 'manage' the careers of lower court judges. The result: uniform and predictable judgments that economize on litigation costs by facilitating out-of-court settlements.
    Keywords: judges, Japan, supreme court, political economy
    JEL: K
    Date: 2005–12–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwple:0512002&r=reg
  10. By: Edward J. Lopez (San Jose State University)
    Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to evaluate two new anti-merger instruments, innovation markets and unilateral effects, on the basis of economic theory and evidence. I first discuss how the economics of antitrust has developed over the years, with the intention of characterizing the intellectual inheritance of 1990s’ antitrust regulators. Within this context, I then discuss each anti-merger instrument, how it has been applied in specific cases, and how it accords with underlying economic science. On the basis of these arguments, antitrust regulators should pause and reconsider the theoretical and empirical bases of applying unilateral effects and innovation markets to merger investigations.
    Keywords: antitrust, mergers, innovation markets, unilateral effects
    JEL: K
    Date: 2005–12–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwple:0512003&r=reg
  11. By: Marina Della Giusta; Maria Laura Di Tommaso; Steinar Strøm
    Abstract: This paper presents an economic model of prostitution, which differs from the existing literature in that it makes no restrictive assumptions regarding the gender, pay, and nature of forgone earning opportunities of prostitutes and clients, and applies the same behavioural hypotheses to both. Our model gives a central role to stigma and reputation effects for both clients and prostitutes. We discuss demand, supply, and equilibrium results, indicating the possible effects of different policies on the industry and its different markets.
    Keywords: Prostitution, Gender, Labour supply and demand, Reputation
    JEL: J16 J22 J23 J24
    Date: 2005–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpc:wplist:wp16_05&r=reg
  12. By: Dalia Marin (University of Munich and CEPR)
    Abstract: The rise of barter and non-cash payments has become a dominant feature of the Russian transition to a market economy. This paper confronts with empirical evidence two approaches to explain barter in Russia: the ’illusion view’ and the ’trust view’ of barter. The ’illusion view’ suggests that barter allows the parties to pretend that the manufacturing sector in Russia is producing value added by enabling this sector to sell its output at a higher price than its market value. The ’trust view’ sees barter as an institution to deal with the absence of trust and liquidity in the Russian economy. We confront the prediction of both explanations with actual data on barter in Ukraine in 1997. The data reject the ’illusion view‘ in favor of the ‘trust view‘ of barter.
    Keywords: imperfect input and capital markets, the virtual economy, trade credit, trust, contract enforcement
    JEL: D20 G30 O10 P30
    Date: 2004–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trf:wpaper:78&r=reg

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