nep-reg New Economics Papers
on Regulation
Issue of 2005‒11‒12
twenty-two papers chosen by
Christian Calmes
Université du Québec en Outaouais, Canada
  1. Cooperation in transactions and disputes : a problem-solving legal system? By Barendrecht,M.
  2. Structural remedies in merger regulation in a Cournot framework By Medvedev,A.
  3. Unification of the private law in Germany in the nineteenth century : an economic perspective By Kanning,A.
  4. Codification of the common law in the United States : an economic perspective By Kanning,A.
  5. Dynamic regulation and entry in telecommunications markets : a policy framework By Bijl,P.W.J. de; Peitz,M.
  6. Three principals of transnational corporate bankruptcy law : a review By Franken,S.F.
  7. Determination of optimal penalties for antitrust violations in a dynamic setting By Motchenkova,E.
  8. The changing landscape of EU company law By McCahery,J.A.; Vermeulen,E.P.M.
  9. Is it the law or the lawyers? : Investment fund covernants across countries By Cumming,D.; Johan,S.
  10. Liberalizing the Dutch electricity market 1998-2004 By Damme,E. van
  11. Corporate governance convergence : evidence from takeover regulation reforms in Europe By Goergen,M.; Martynova,M.; Renneboog,L.
  12. Regulatory co-opetition : transcending the regulatory competition debate By Geradin,D.; McCahery,J.A.
  13. Regulating access to stimulate competition in postal markets? By Bijl,P.W.J. de; Damme,E. van; Larouche,P.
  14. Network effects and regulatory competition By Vermeulen,E.P.M.
  15. Underground Gun Markets By Philip J. Cook; Jens Ludwig; Sudhir Venkatesh; Anthony A. Braga
  16. Debiasing through Law By Christine Jolls; Cass R. Sunstein
  17. Strengthening Regulation in Chile: The Case of Network Industries By Luiz de Mello; Alexander Galetovic
  18. Price regulation of plastic money: A critical assessment of Spanish rules By Benito Arruñada
  19. INTERACTION OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL CREDIT MARKETS IN BACKWARD By Sarbajit Chaudhuri
  20. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN TWO INFORMAL SECTOR LENDERS AND INTEREST RATE DETERMINATION IN THE INFORMAL CREDIT MARKET: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS By Sarbajit Chaudhuri
  21. Screening markets for cartel detection - collusive marker in the CFD cartel-audit By Christian Lorenz
  22. Job Security Laws and Structural Change in the Japanese Labor Market By Kenji Azetsu; Mototsugu Fukushige
  1. By: Barendrecht,M. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2004
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200403&r=reg
  2. By: Medvedev,A. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    JEL: D43 K21 L51
    Date: 2004
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200406&r=reg
  3. By: Kanning,A. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2004
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200408&r=reg
  4. By: Kanning,A. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2004
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200409&r=reg
  5. By: Bijl,P.W.J. de; Peitz,M. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2004
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200410&r=reg
  6. By: Franken,S.F. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2004
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200417&r=reg
  7. By: Motchenkova,E. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2004
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200419&r=reg
  8. By: McCahery,J.A.; Vermeulen,E.P.M. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2004
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200423&r=reg
  9. By: Cumming,D.; Johan,S. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200505&r=reg
  10. By: Damme,E. van (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200509&r=reg
  11. By: Goergen,M.; Martynova,M.; Renneboog,L. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200517&r=reg
  12. By: Geradin,D.; McCahery,J.A. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200520&r=reg
  13. By: Bijl,P.W.J. de; Damme,E. van; Larouche,P. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200526&r=reg
  14. By: Vermeulen,E.P.M. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200528&r=reg
  15. By: Philip J. Cook; Jens Ludwig; Sudhir Venkatesh; Anthony A. Braga
    Abstract: This paper provides an economic analysis of underground gun markets drawing on interviews with gang members, gun dealers, professional thieves, prostitutes, police, public school security guards and teens in the city of Chicago, complemented by results from government surveys of recent arrestees in 22 cities plus administrative data for suicides, homicides, robberies, arrests and confiscated crime guns. We find evidence of considerable frictions in the underground market for guns in Chicago. We argue that these frictions are due primarily to the fact that the underground gun market is both illegal and “thin” -- the number of buyers, sellers and total transactions is small and relevant information is scarce. Gangs can help overcome these market frictions, but the gang’s economic interests cause gang leaders to limit supply primarily to gang members, and even then transactions are usually loans or rentals with strings attached.
    JEL: K42 L1
    Date: 2005–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11737&r=reg
  16. By: Christine Jolls; Cass R. Sunstein
    Abstract: In many settings, human beings are boundedly rational. A distinctive and insufficiently explored legal response to bounded rationality is to attempt to "debias through law," by steering people in more rational directions. In many important domains, existing legal analyses emphasize the alternative approach of insulating outcomes from the effects of boundedly rational behavior, often through blocking private choices. In fact, however, a large number of actual and imaginable legal strategies are efforts to engage in the very different approach of debiasing through law by reducing or even eliminating people's boundedly rational behavior. In important contexts, these efforts to debias through law can avoid the costs and inefficiencies associated with regulatory approaches that take bounded rationality as a given and respond by attempting to insulate outcomes from its effects. This paper offers a general account of how debiasing through law does or could work to address legal questions across a range of areas, from consumer safety law to corporate law to property law. Discussion is also devoted to the risks of government manipulation and overshooting that are sometimes raised when debiasing through law is employed.
    JEL: K00 K11 K13 K22
    Date: 2005–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11738&r=reg
  17. By: Luiz de Mello; Alexander Galetovic
    Abstract: Chile’s regulatory framework is working reasonably well. The country’s structural reforms since the 1980s, with the privatisation of utilities and deregulation of product and labour markets, have improved resource allocation and increased the population’s access to basic services, while calling for a comprehensive upgrading of regulatory institutions. At the same time, public-private partnerships (PPPs) are contributing to closing Chile’s infrastructure deficit, particularly in transport. The recurrent cuts in shipments of natural gas from Argentina since 2004 have put additional strain on regulation in the electricity sector to encourage investment in generation and ensure the security of supply. This paper reviews regulatory reform in three network industries (electricity, gas and telecoms), where further liberalisation, particularly in electricity retailing, and improvements in the regulation of telecoms would do much to further improve the business climate. The governance of public-private partnerships can be improved by increasing transparency and accountability in the concession process. In doing so, the government’s exposure to contingent liabilities can be contained. This Working Paper relates to the 2005 OECD Economic Survey of Chile (www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/chile). <P>Renforcer la réglementation au Chili Le cadre de la règlementation chilienne fonctionne assez bien. Les réformes structurelles depuis les années 80, avec la privatisation des services et la réglementation des marchés des produits et du travail, ont amélioré l'allocation des ressources et augmenté l'accès de la population aux services de base, en même temps que modernisé les institutions de réglementation. Parallèlement, les partenariats public-privé ont contribué à réduire le déficit d'infrastructure du Chili, particulièrement dans les transports. Les coupures récurrentes dans les exportations de gaz naturel de l'Argentine depuis 2004 ont ajouté une contrainte sur la réglementation du secteur d'électricité, qui a encouragé l'investissement dans la production et garanti la sécurité de l'offre. Ce document passe en revue les réformes de la réglementation dans trois industries de réseau (électricité, gaz et télécommunication), dans lesquelles plus de libéralisation, particulièrement concernant la vente de détail de l'électricité, et des progrès dans la réglementation des télécommunications, amélioreraient grandement le climat des affaires. La gouvernance des partenariats public-privé peut-être améliorée en augmentant la transparence et la responsabilité du processus de concession. En faisant ainsi le gouvernement évite de s'exposer à d'éventuels passifs. Ce Document de travail se rapporte à l'Étude économique de l'OCDE du Chili, 2005 (www.oecd.org/eco/etudes/chili).
    Keywords: telecommunications, télécommunications, network industries, réglementation, industrie de réseau, regulations, electricity, gas, électricité, gaz, Chile, Chili
    JEL: D4 H4 K2
    Date: 2005–10–27
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:455-en&r=reg
  18. By: Benito Arruñada
    Abstract: Recent decisions by the Spanish national competition authority (TDC) mandate payment systems to include only two costs when setting their domestic multilateral interchange fees (MIF): a fixed processing cost and a variable cost for the risk of fraud. This artificial lowering of MIFs will not lower consumer prices, because of uncompetitive retailing; but it will however lead to higher cardholders’ fees and, likely, new prices for point of sale terminals, delaying the development of the immature Spanish card market. Also, to the extent that increased cardholders’ fees do not offset the fall in MIFs revenue, the task of issuing new cards will be underpaid relatively to the task of acquiring new merchants, causing an imbalance between the two sides of the networks. Moreover, the pricing scheme arising from the decisions will cause unbundling and underprovision of those services whose costs are excluded. Indeed, the payment guarantee and the free funding period will tend to be removed from the package of services currently provided, to be either provided by third parties, by issuers for a separate fee, or not provided at all, especially to smaller and medium-sized merchants. Transaction services will also suffer the consequences that the TDC precludes pricing them in variable terms.
    Keywords: Credit cards, payment systems, regulation, interchange fees
    JEL: K21 K23 L14 L41
    Date: 2005–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:upf:upfgen:899&r=reg
  19. By: Sarbajit Chaudhuri (Dept. of Economics, Calcutta University)
    Abstract: In this paper, a model of interaction of formal and informal credit markets has been developed where the bank official (the ultimate provider of formal credit) faces a lending constraint. The bank official takes a bribe from the borrowers to disburse formal credit and he deliberately debars some potential borrowers from getting bank credit. Inadequate supply of formal credit and exclusion of a few borrowers by the official create a market for informal credit. The bank official and the moneylender (the supplier of informal credit) play a non-cooperative game in determining the bribing rate and the informal interest rate simultaneously. The central objective of the paper is two-fold. First, it shows that an agricultural credit subsidy policy may be counterproductive even when formal and informal credits are substitutes. This is contrary to the Gupta and Chaudhuri (1997) result that a credit subsidy policy is counterproductive only when the two types of credit are complementary to each other. Secondly, the paper considers two alternative ways of formulating a credit subsidy policy: (1) through an increase in the aggregate volume of formal credit supplied to the borrowers, keeping the formal sector interest rate at a reasonable level; and, (2) through a decrease in the rate of interest charged on this type of credit. The paper shows that if a credit subsidy policy is undertaken via the first path, it is actually able to lower the informal sector interest rate and improve both the agricultural productivity and welfare of the farmers. This result is crucial because all the earlier papers in this line have analyzed the effects of a credit subsidy policy through the second route and found it to be counterproductive in the presence of corruption in the distribution of formal credit.
    Keywords: Farmer; moneylender; bank official; formal credit; non- cooperative game; informal interest rate; credit subsidy policy
    JEL: Q15 D89
    Date: 2005–11–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0511001&r=reg
  20. By: Sarbajit Chaudhuri
    Abstract: The paper provides a theory of interest rates determination in the informal credit market in backward agriculture highlighting the interactions between two informal sector lenders (a professional moneylender and a trader-interlocker) and explains the prevalence of different interest rates in the rural credit market. The trader and the moneylender play a non-cooperative game in choosing the extent of interlinkage and the non-interlinked informal interest rate, respectively. In the interlinked credit-product contract, the trader offers the interlockees a product price equal to the open market price and his entire surplus comes from his activities in the credit market. These results are completely opposite to those found in the existing literature on interlinkage. A price subsidy policy reduces the extent of interlinkage chosen by the trader while a credit subsidy policy may raise it. Besides, the subsidy policies unequivocally raise the non- interlinked informal interest rate of the moneylender but may lower the welfare of the farmers and the agricultural productivity. In this context, an alternative credit policy of forging a vertical linkage between the formal and informal credit markets has been considered. It has been found that a credit subsidy policy under the new system is able to raise the agricultural productivity and improve the welfare of the farmers by ameliorating their borrowing terms in the credit market.
    Keywords: Trader, Moneylender, Formal credit, Informal credit, Interlinkage, Interest rate, Nash equilibrium, Subsidy policy, Vertical linkage
    JEL: Q14 D89
    Date: 2005–11–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0511002&r=reg
  21. By: Christian Lorenz (Institute of Public Economics, Muenster University)
    Abstract: Coordination Failure Diagnostics (CFD) is a model that analyses real market processes with the help of time pattern analysis and investigates whether they operate efficiently (See www.wiwi.uni-muenster.de/cfd). The CFD cartel-audit should enable the detection of cartels via characteristic market process patterns. This is based on the assumption that existing cartels cause failures in the observed process patterns. The CFD cartel-audit attempts to draw conclusions from these process patterns in order to find hidden cartels and to engage antitrust agencies into additional more detailed audits.
    Keywords: cartel, cement, collusive marker, market screening, price fixing
    JEL: L13 L41 L61 D43
    Date: 2005–11–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0511003&r=reg
  22. By: Kenji Azetsu (Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University); Mototsugu Fukushige (Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University)
    Abstract: There are a number of indications that Japanese job security laws have been relaxed since the end of the 1990s. The purpose of this paper is to establish causality between job security laws and firing costs in the Japanese labor market. The analysis first investigates when and how firing costs changed, and then compares the timing of these changes in firing costs with those of job security laws. The results indicate that gradual changes in firing costs began in about 1992, lagging one or two years behind the bursting of the bubble economy, while job security laws started to change towards the end of the 1990s.
    Keywords: Adjustment costs for labor; Gradual switching model; Job security laws
    JEL: J23 J32
    Date: 2005–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osk:wpaper:0531&r=reg
This nep-reg issue is ©2005 by Christian Calmes. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at http://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.
This page is being maintained by Thomas Krichel. It was last updated on 2023‒07‒08 at 13:05.