nep-reg New Economics Papers
on Regulation
Issue of 2005‒10‒15
twenty-one papers chosen by
Christian Calmes
Université du Québec en Outaouais, Canada

  1. Private v. Public Antitrust Enforcement: A Strategic Analysis By R. Preston McAfee; Hugo Mialon; Sue Mialon
  2. Private Antitrust Litigation: Procompetitive or Anticompetitive? By R. Preston McAfee; Hugo Mialon; Sue Mialon
  3. On Modelling Endogenous Default By Dimitrios Tsomocos; Lea Zicchino
  4. Effects of Employment Protection on Worker and Job Flows: Evidence from the 1990 Italian Reform By Adriana Kugler; Giovanni Pica
  5. A Cure for Discrimination? Affirmative Action and the Case of California Proposition 209 By Caitlin Knowles Myers
  6. Le traitement de la nation la plus favorisée dans le droit international des investissements By OCDE
  7. Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law By OECD
  8. La norme du traitement juste et équitable dans le droit international des investissements By OCDE
  9. "Indirect Expropriation" and the "Right to Regulate" in International Investment Law By OECD
  10. L’ "expropriation indirecte" et le "droit de réglementer" dans le droit international de l’investissement By OCDE
  11. Transparency and Third Party Participation in Investor-State Dispute Settlement Procedures By OECD
  12. Enhancing Brazil's Regulatory Framework for Network Industries: The Case of Electricity, Oil and Gas, and Water and Sanitation By Edmar Almeida; Nanno Mulder
  13. Fifteen Years of Economic Reform in Russia: What has been Achieved? What Remains to be Done? By Rudiger Ahrend; William Tompson
  14. Regulatory Reform in the Russian Federation: Enhancing Trade Openness through Regulatory Reform By Blanka Kalinova
  15. Regulatory Reform and Market Openness: Understanding the Links to Enhance Economic Performance By Peter Czaga
  16. Comprendre la relation entre la réforme de la réglementation et l'ouverture des marchés pour améliorer les performances économiques By Peter Czaga
  17. Deregulation of electricity markets—The Norwegian experience By Torstein Bye and Einar Hope
  18. "Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path" By Joe Chen; Joseph E. Harrington, Jr.
  19. The Impact of Education Finance Litigation Reform on Resource By Matthew G. Springer; Keke Liu; James W. Guthrie
  20. Next in Line – Romanians at the Gates of the EU (emigrants, border control, legislation) By Ovidiu SIMINA
  21. Les théories de la planification et la régulation des systèmes économiques. By Irina Peaucelle

  1. By: R. Preston McAfee; Hugo Mialon; Sue Mialon
    Abstract: We compare private and public enforcement of the antitrust laws in a simple strategic model of antitrust crime and lawsuit. The model highlights the tradeoff that private firms are ex ante more likely than the government to be informed about actual antitrust violations, but are also more likely to use the antitrust laws strategically, to the disadvantage of consumers. With coupled damages (according to which the plaintiff receives what the defendant pays), if the court is sufficiently accurate, adding private to public enforcement always increases social welfare, while if the court is less accurate, it increases welfare only if the government is sufficiently inefficient in litigation. Moreover, pure private enforcement is never strictly optimal. However, in general, achieving the welfare-maximizing outcome requires private enforcement with damages that are both multiplied and decoupled.
    Date: 2005–08
  2. By: R. Preston McAfee; Hugo Mialon; Sue Mialon
    Abstract: The antitrust laws are intended to permit procompetitive actions by firms and deter anticompetitive actions. We consider firms’ incentives to use the antitrust lawsuits for strategic purposes, in particular to prevent procompetitive efficiency-improvement by rival firms. Our main result is that, ceteris paribus, smaller firms in more fragmented industries are more likely to use the antitrust laws strategically than larger firms in concentrated industries.
    Date: 2005–08
  3. By: Dimitrios Tsomocos; Lea Zicchino
    Abstract: Not only in the classic Arrow-Debreu model, but also in many mainstream macro models, an implicit assumption is that all agents honour their obligations, and thus there is no possibility of default. That leads to well-known problems in providing an essential role for either money or for financial intermediaries. So, in more realistic models, the introduction of minimal financial institutions, for example default and banks, becomes a logical necessity. But if default involved no penalties, everyone would do so. Hence there must be default penalties to allow for an equilibrium with partial default. What we show here is that there is an equivalence between a general equilibrium model with incomplete markets (GEI) and endogeneous default, and a model with exogenous probabilities of default (PD). The practical, policy implications are that a key function of regulators (via bankruptcy codes and default legislation), or the markets (through default premia) are broadly substitutable. The balance between these alternatives depends, however, on many institutional details, which are not modelled here, but should be a subject for future research.
    Date: 2005–10
  4. By: Adriana Kugler (University of Houston, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, NBER, CEPR and IZA Bonn); Giovanni Pica (University of Southampton, University of Salerno and CSEF)
    Abstract: This paper uses the Italian Social Security employer-employee panel to study the effects of the Italian reform of 1990 on worker and job flows. We exploit the fact that this reform increased unjust dismissal costs for firms below 15 employees, while leaving dismissal costs unchanged for bigger firms, to set up a natural experiment research design. We find that the increase in dismissal costs decreased accessions and separations for workers in small relative to big firms, especially in sectors with higher employment volatility. Moreover, we find that the reform reduced firms' employment adjustments on the internal margin as well as entry rates while increasing exit rates.
    Keywords: unjust dismissal costs, European unemployment, firms' entry and exit, employment volatility
    JEL: E24 J63 J65
    Date: 2005–09
  5. By: Caitlin Knowles Myers
    Abstract: Proposition 209, enacted in California in 1996 and made effective the following year, ended state affirmative action programs not only in education, but also for public employment and government contracting. This paper uses CPS data and triple difference techniques to take advantage of the natural experiment presented by this change in state law to gauge the labor market impacts of ending affirmative action programs. Employment among women and minorities dropped sharply, a change that was nearly completely explained by a decline in participation rather than by increases in unemployment. This decline suggests that either affirmative action programs in California had been inefficient or that they failed to create lasting change in prejudicial attitudes.
    Keywords: economics of gender and minorities, affirmative action, Proposition 209, discrimination
    JEL: J71 J78
    Date: 2005
  6. By: OCDE
    Abstract: <P>Les accords bilatéraux et régionaux sur l'investissement se sont multipliés au cours des dix dernières années et de nouveaux accords sont actuellement négociés. Les accords sur l'investissement ont en commun leur clause de la nation la plus favorisée (NPF), qui garantit que les parties à un traité octroient un traitement non moins favorable que celui qu'elles accordent en vertu d'autres traités dans les secteurs visés par la clause. Les clauses NPF sont donc devenues un instrument significatif de la libéralisation économique en matière d'investissement. Qui plus est, la clause NPF, en accordant aux investisseurs de toutes les parties bénéficiaires, dans des circonstances similaires, un traitement non moins favorable que les partenaires les plus proches ou les plus influents d'un pays donné peuvent négocier dans des domaines couverts par la clause, permet d'éviter les distorsions économiques qu'entraînerait une libéralisation plus sélective, pays par pays. Ce traitement peut ...</P>
    Date: 2004–09
  7. By: OECD
    Abstract: <P>The obligation to provide “fair and equitable treatment” is often stated, together with other standards, as part of the protection due to foreign direct investment by host countries. It is an “absolute”, “non-contingent” standard of treatment, i.e. a standard that states the treatment to be accorded in terms whose exact meaning has to be determined, by reference to specific circumstances of application, as opposed to the “relative” standards embodied in “national treatment” and “most favoured nation” principles which define the required treatment by reference to the treatment accorded to other investment1. Although some references to the standard can be found in the first negotiating attempts of multilateral trade and investment instruments, it became established as a principle mainly through the increasing network of bilateral investment treaties.</P><P>The obligation of the parties to investment agreements to provide to each other’s investments “fair and equitable treatment” ...</P>
    Date: 2004–09
  8. By: OCDE
    Abstract: <P>L’obligation d’accorder un « traitement juste et équitable » est souvent énoncée concurremment avec d’autres normes visant à assurer la protection de l’investissement direct étranger par les pays d’accueil. Il s’agit d’une norme de traitement à caractère « absolu » et « non contingent », c’est-à-dire une norme qui définit le traitement qui doit être accordé selon des termes dont le sens exact reste à déterminer en fonction d’un contexte spécifique d’application, à l’inverse des normes « relatives » intégrées dans les principes du « traitement national » et de « la nation la plus favorisée », qui définissent le traitement requis eu égard au traitement accordé à d’autres investissements1. Cette norme, à laquelle font parfois référence les toutes premières ébauches d’instruments miltilatéraux de commerce et d’investissement, a été instituée principalement par le biais du réseau de plus en plus important des traités bilatéraux d’investissement ...</P>
    Date: 2004–09
  9. By: OECD
    Abstract: <P>It is a well recognised rule in international law that the property of aliens cannot be taken, whether for public purposes or not, without adequate compensation. Two decades ago, the disputes before the courts and the discussions in academic literature focused mainly on the standard of compensation and measuring of expropriated value. The divergent views of the developed and developing countries raised issues regarding the formation and evolution of customary law. Today, the more positive attitude of countries around the world toward foreign investment and the proliferation of bilateral treaties and other investment agreements requiring prompt, adequate and effective compensation for expropriation of foreign investments have largely deprived that debate of practical significance for foreign investors.</P><P> Disputes on direct expropriation – mainly related to nationalisation that marked the 70s and 80s -- have been replaced by disputes related to foreign investment regulation ...</P>
    Date: 2004–09
  10. By: OCDE
    Abstract: <P>Il est bien établi en droit international que le bien des étrangers ne peut être saisi, même à des fins publiques, sans une indemnisation appropriée. Il y a une vingtaine d’années, les différends portés devant les tribunaux et les analyses menées dans les publications universitaires concernaient principalement le niveau d’indemnisation et l’évaluation des biens expropriés. Les divergences de vues entre les pays développés et les pays en développement soulevaient des questions concernant la formation et l’évolution du droit coutumier. Aujourd’hui, l’attitude plus positive des pays à l’égard de l’investissement étranger, observée dans le monde entier, et la prolifération de traités bilatéraux et d’autres accords relatifs à l’investissement exigeant une indemnisation prompte, adéquate et effective de l’expropriation d’investissements étrangers, ont en grande partie ôté toute signification pratique à ce débat pour les investisseurs étrangers.</P><P>Les différends ne portent plus sur ...</P>
    Date: 2004–09
  11. By: OECD
    Abstract: The present document surveys the issues related to transparency and third party participation in investor-state dispute settlement procedures. Section I examines the way in which the current rules apply to these issues. Section II describes the steps taken to improve the transparency of the system at the governmental level, by the arbitral Tribunals and the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Section III examines the perceived advantages as well as the challenges of additional transparency. The last section sums up.
    Date: 2005–05
  12. By: Edmar Almeida; Nanno Mulder
    Abstract: This paper assesses Brazil’s regulatory framework and agencies for several network industries (electricity, oil and gas, and water and sanitation). Private investment can be encouraged by tackling regulatory uncertainty in many areas. To this end, recent initiatives include a new regulatory model for the electricity sector, and new draft legislation on the role and structure of the regulatory agencies (currently in Congress). The overall approach to regulatory reform in network industries, particularly in electricity, is well thought out but the risk of regulatory failure should not be underestimated. Implementation will be the ultimate test of reform in this area. In natural gas, the dominance of Petrobras, the national oil company, throughout the industry has often been perceived as an obstacle to its development. Private investment in water and sanitation is constrained by a lack of clarity over the assignment of regulatory powers across different levels of government. These reforms are consistent with the government’s agenda for growth, focusing on meeting the challenge of improving the business environment. This Working Paper relates to the 2005 OECD Economic Survey of Brazil ( <P>Améliorer le cadre réglementaire des industries de réseau au Brésil Ce papier évalue le cadre réglementaire ainsi que les agences régulatrices pour plusieurs industries de réseau (électricité, pétrole et gaz, eau et assainissement). L’investissement privé pourrait être encouragé en réduisant l’incertitude réglementaire dans plusieurs domaines. A ce propos, des initiatives récentes incluent un nouveau modèle réglementaire pour le secteur de l’électricité et un projet de loi sur le rôle et la structure des agences régulatrices (actuellement au Congrès). L’approche générale retenue en ce qui concerne la réforme de la réglementation dans les industries de réseau, notamment dans le secteur de l’électricité, est judicieuse, mais le risque de défaillance de la réglementation ne doit pas être sous-estimé. C’est au stade de sa mise en œuvre que la réforme dans ce domaine sera mise à l’épreuve. Pour ce qui est du gaz naturel, la position dominante de la société pétrolière nationale Petrobras dans l’ensemble du secteur a souvent été perçue comme un obstacle au développement de celui-ci. L’investissement privé dans les secteurs de l’eau et de l’assainissement se heurte à un manque de clarté dans la répartition des pouvoirs de réglementation entre les différents niveaux d’administration. Ces réformes se situent dans la lignée du programme de croissance du gouvernement, en mettant l’accent sur l’amélioration de l’environnement des entreprises. Ce Document de travail se rapporte à l`Étude économique de l'OCDE du Brésil, 2005 (
    Keywords: economics of regulation, government policy (energy), réglementation, regulations, Brazil, Brésil, electricity, gas, électricité, gaz, pipelines, oil, pétrole, regulatory agencies, sanitation, water utilities, politique publique (énergie), agence régulatrice, assainissement, eau
    JEL: K23 L51 L94 L95 O54 Q48
    Date: 2005–04–08
  13. By: Rudiger Ahrend; William Tompson
    Abstract: The paper provides an overview of the course of economic reform and the performance of the Russian economy since the early 1990s and an analysis of the structural reform challenges ahead. It assesses the contribution of institutional and structural reforms to economic performance over the period, before turning to the question of where further structural reforms could make the biggest contribution to improved performance. Three major conclusions emerge. First, there is still a great deal to be done to strengthen the basic institutions of the market economy. While the Russian authorities have embarked on some impressive – and often technically complex – ‘second-generation’ reforms, many ‘first-generation’ reforms have yet to be completed. Secondly, the central challenges of Russia’s second decade of reform are primarily concerned with reforming state institutions. Thirdly, the pursuit of reforms across a broad front could enable Russia to profit from complementarities that exist among various strands of reform. <P>Quinze ans de réformes économiques en Russie L’article donne un aperçu du déroulement des réformes économiques et des performances de l’économie russe depuis le début des années 90, ainsi qu’une analyse des enjeux des futures réformes structurelles. L’article considère la contribution des réformes institutionnelles et structurelles à la performance économique durant la période, avant d’examiner dans quels domaines des réformes structurelles additionnelles pourraient avoir la plus grande contribution à l’amélioration de la performance économique. Il en résulte trois conclusions majeures. Premièrement, il reste encore beaucoup à faire pour renforcer les institutions de base d’une économie de marché. Bien que les autorités russes aient commencé quelques réformes de « seconde génération » qui sont impressionnantes – et souvent techniquement complexes-, il reste un bon nombre de réformes de « première génération » à achever. Deuxièmement, les défis centraux de la deuxième décennie de réformes concernent en première ligne la réforme des institutions de l’État. Troisièmement, la poursuite des réformes sur un large front permettrait à la Russie de profiter des complémentarités existantes entre les différents axes des réformes.
    Keywords: growth, corruption, croissance, transition, competition, transparency, transparence, concurrence, Russia, economy, state ownership, Russie, économie, entreprise d'État, corruption, reforms, stabilisation, réformes, stabilisation
    JEL: H1 K2 P21 P27 P31 P37
    Date: 2005–05–13
  14. By: Blanka Kalinova
    Abstract: This study forms part of Russia’s regulatory reform review undertaken under the OECD regulatory reform programme. It describes Russia’s trade environment and its recent trade and foreign investment policy developments with a focus on trade-related regulations and their role in supporting Russia’s market openness. It examines in particular to what extent Russia’s trade regulations comply with the principles of transparency and non-discrimination and facilitate foreign trade operations and international competition. The paper proposes a series of policy recommendations to make Russia’s regulatory framework more market-oriented and trade-andinvestment friendly.
    Keywords: trade, transparency, regulations, liberalisation, trade barriers, Russia, customs, non-discrimination, WTO
    Date: 2005–03–01
  15. By: Peter Czaga
    Abstract: This study examines the interconnections between domestic regulatory reform and market openness by drawing on OECD’s earlier work on the regulatory aspects of trade. Part 1 considers how domestic regulations and regulatory reform affect market openness. It shows how with the help of advanced regulatory reform tools and approaches governments can create regulations and regulatory procedures that efficiently meet their policy objectives while at the same time supporting market access. Part 2 demonstrates that international market opening can contribute to facilitating domestic regulatory reform. Trade agreements signed on the multilateral, regional and bilateral levels can promote general principles or specific elements of good regulation and help guide or drive countries' individual regulatory reform efforts. Finally, part 3 analyzes the mutual benefits of regulatory reform and an open multilateral system for trade and investment. It is argued that by increasing domestic economic efficiency, raising the international competitiveness of domestic enterprises and reducing barriers to trade and investment, traderelated regulatory reform enables countries to take better advantage of trade liberalization and of open global markets.
    Keywords: regulatory reforms, domestic regulation, market openness, regionalism
    Date: 2004–12–15
  16. By: Peter Czaga
    Abstract: Cette étude, qui s’appuie sur les travaux antérieurs de l’OCDE relatifs aux aspects réglementaires des échanges, examine les interrelations entre la réforme de la réglementation intérieure et l’ouverture des marchés. La partie 1 traite des effets des réglementations intérieures et de la réforme de la réglementation sur l’ouverture des marchés, montrant comment, à l’aide d’instruments et de méthodes de réforme élaborés, les gouvernements peuvent créer des réglementations et des procédures réglementaires qui servent efficacement les objectifs de leurs politiques tout en favorisant l’accès aux marchés. La partie 2 montre que l’ouverture des marchés internationaux peut contribuer à faciliter la réforme de la réglementation intérieure. Les accords commerciaux signés aux échelons bilatéral, régional et multilatéral peuvent promouvoir des principes généraux ou des pratiques spécifiques de bonne réglementation et aider à guider ou à orienter les efforts des différents pays en matière de réforme de la réglementation. Enfin, la partie 3 analyse les avantages mutuels de la réforme de la réglementation et d’un système multilatéral ouvert pour le commerce et l’investissement. La thèse avancée est qu’en rehaussant l’efficience économique intérieure, en renforçant la compétitivité internationale des entreprises nationales et en réduisant les obstacles aux échanges et à l’investissement, une réforme de la réglementation commerciale permet aux pays de mieux profiter de la libéralisation des échanges et de l’ouverture des marchés mondiaux.
    Keywords: réforme de la réglementation, ouverture des marchés, régionalisme, réglementation intérieure
    Date: 2005–02–14
  17. By: Torstein Bye and Einar Hope (Statistics Norway)
    Abstract: In this paper, we describe the approach to, and experience of, the deregulation and liberalisation of the Norwegian electricity sector from 1991. The Norwegian electricity market was subsequently integrated with the Swedish, Finnish and Danish markets to become the Nordic electricity market: the first common, integrated, intercountry electric power market in the world. We discuss the background to electricity market reform, the analytical and legal foundations for reform, and the chosen market and regulatory design. We find that the market has performed well in terms of economic efficiency and market functionality, even when exposed to severe supply shocks because of water shortages for a power system that relies heavily on hydropower. However, we also identify issues and challenges that must be addressed to improve the performance of the Nordic electricity market and its regulatory system.
    Keywords: Deregulation; Market design; Electricity markets
    JEL: D21 D41 D42 Q4
    Date: 2005–09
  18. By: Joe Chen (Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo); Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. (Department of Economics, Johns Hopkins University)
    Abstract: Previous research exploring the effect of corporate leniency programs has modelled the oligopoly stage game as a Prisoners' Dilemma. Using numerical analysis, we consider the Bertrand price game and allow the probability of detection and penalties to be sensitive to firms' prices. Consistent with earlier results, a maximal leniency program necessarily makes collusion more difficult. However, we also find that par-tial leniency programs - such as in the U.S.- can make collusion easier compared too offering no leniency. We also show that even if cartel formation is not deterred, a leniency program can reduce the prices charged by firms.
    Date: 2005–08
  19. By: Matthew G. Springer (Peabody College of Vanderbilt University); Keke Liu (Peabody College of Vanderbilt University); James W. Guthrie (Peabody College of Vanderbilt University)
    Abstract: Two of the most prominent principles championed in school finance- related policy are equity and adequacy. The thick of empirical literature related to equity and adequacy has focused on the effect of court-mandated reform on resource distribution – a logical bridge considering both are derivatives, legally, of the United States Constitution and the legal system has been a primary driver compelling school finance reform. For example, 36 states had their respective state funding mechanisms challenged on equity grounds, while 37 states had the constitutionality of their respective funding mechanisms challenged on adequacy grounds. And, of these states, state funding mechanisms were ruled unconstitutional on 27 occasions. This article reports the results of a study on the impact of court-mandated reform on resource allocation patterns and whether differences exist between equity versus adequacy rulings. Results of whether there are fundamental resource allocation differences as a consequence of court-mandated reform based on adequacy versus equity grounds are mixed.
    Keywords: education finance reform school finance equalization
    JEL: I22
    Date: 2005–10–13
  20. By: Ovidiu SIMINA (West University of Timisoara, Romania)
    Abstract: The first of May 2004 marked an important date in the history of Europe as a political, geographic, and social entity. After years of negotiations, ten European countries joined the European Union, bringing in their potential and expectations, adding a total population of 75 million people and a territory of 738,000 square kilometres: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Malta, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The EU will continue its enlargement under the Luxembourg Presidency. The membership treaty with Bulgaria and Romania will be finalised with a view to signature in 25 April 2005, in order to join the EU by 2007. Once it has been signed, this will mark the end of the current accession cycle. Membership negotiations with Croatia should commence on 17 March 2005. In mid-December 2004 EU leaders endorsed eventual Turkish entry into the EU, but said that there could be permanent restrictions on freedom of movement for Turkish workers; earlier, the EU Parliament voted 407-262 in favour of Turkey's entry. Romania feels and acts like a European country. You will rather notice a European flag in Bucharest than in London, for example. Romania is not only a country who makes effort to join the European family, by introducing the necessary legal provisions in the national legislation, but it is already part of one, whole Europe, ruled by law, an area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Romania fights against immigration flows targeting Western Countries and guards the external border of European Union. In the same time, Romanians are spread all over Europe, living there alike other Europeans. Until the European Union Member States will decide that Romania truly deserves to join the family, Romanians have to prove that they do not only feel and act as Europeans, but they truly are Europeans
    Keywords: UE Enlargement, external border, Romania, European migration, labour mobility
    JEL: F02 F22 J11 J61 J70
    Date: 2005–10–08
  21. By: Irina Peaucelle
    Abstract: In this text the principles of planning such as they were formulated by the creators of these economic theories are recalled. I analyze also their transformation one century later and new application in production and management. I characterize the mechanisms of macroeconomic forecast, of the companies strategic planning and the regulation of the companies through the financial instruments. ### [résumé : Dans ce texte les principes de planification tels qu'ils ont été formulés par les créateurs de ces théories économiques sont rappelés pour analyser leur transformation et application dans l'organisation de production et la gestion d'aujourd'hui. Il s'agit des mécanismes de prévision macroéconomique, de la planification stratégique des entreprises et de la régulation de l'activité des entrepris à travers les instruments financiers.] ###
    Date: 2005

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