|
on Regulation |
|
Issue of 2005‒06‒19
four papers chosen by Christian Calmes Université du Québec en Outaouais, Canada |
| By: | S. CLAEYS; G. LANINE; K. SCHOORs |
| Abstract: | We focus on the conflict between two central bank objectives, namely individual bank stability and systemic stability. We study the licensing policy of the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) in 1999-2002. Banks in poorly banked regions, banks that are too big to be disciplined adequately and banks that are active on the interbank market enjoy protection from license withdrawal, showing a tacit concern for systemic stability. The CBR is also reluctant to withdraw licenses from banks that violate the individuals’ deposits to capital ratio, because this conflicts with the tacit CBR objective to secure depositor trust and systemic stability. |
| Keywords: | Bank supervision, bank crisis, Russia |
| JEL: | G2 N2 E5 |
| Date: | 2005–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rug:rugwps:05/307&r=reg |
| By: | Junmin Wan (Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University) |
| Abstract: | The hypotheses of non-addiction, myopia and rational addiction are tested using annual, quarterly and monthly data. Changes in the prices of Japanese cigarettes can be viewed as natural experiments from the point of view of consumer behavior, because the Japanese government controls cigarette prices. The empirical results of this paper support the addiction hypothesis. The short-run and long-run price elasticities range from - 0.338to -0.421, and from -0.679 to -0.686, respectively; thus, increases in tax revenues in the long-run are likely to be smaller than those in the short-run. As a result, tax increases would be an effective means of curbing smoking and reducing its social cost. Furthermore, the debt compensation programs for the Japan Railway and the National Forestry will not go according to plan, unless revenues are increased in the future. |
| Keywords: | smoking, rational addiction, tax revenues |
| JEL: | D12 E21 H29 |
| Date: | 2002–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osk:wpaper:04-11&r=reg |
| By: | A. SCHOLLAERT; D. VAN DE GAER |
| Abstract: | In a game of imperfect information, the paper analyzes whether different types of intervention by third parties can ensure that political (ethnic, religious, social, . . . ) groups within a country will pursue a cooperative strategy and how easy it is to predict their effects. We conclude that a strong boycott is the most effective instrument, then comes a weak boycott, followed by power politics. Finally, apart from requiring very detailed information on the relevant parameters of the economy, the use of confidence building measures has a serious flaw: it is incapable of averting civil war. |
| Keywords: | Non Cooperative Games; Third-party Intervention; Conflict Prevention |
| JEL: | C72 D74 |
| Date: | 2005–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rug:rugwps:05/308&r=reg |
| By: | R. BRACKE; M. DE CLERCQ |
| Abstract: | In order to implement extended producer responsibility in the Flemish waste policy, the Flemish government introduced the duty of acceptance in the Waste Decree. At the moment, the duty applies for paper, batteries, vehicles, tyres and electrical and electronic equipment. Producers are obliged to set up free of charge take-back collection systems for the disposal of their products in the post-consumption phase. As such, market failure is corrected by reconverting social costs into private ones, respecting the polluter pays principle. For the practical execution of the basic rules laid down in the legal framework, negotiated agreements are concluded with sector associations. This sector-based policy approach allows setting up efficient collection and disposal networks taking into account the specific characteristics of each waste product rather than implementing a uniform system. Although the duty of acceptance confronts producers with waste management responsibilities, they have actually succeeded in shifting most of the burden to the recovery sector. As waste management organisations have become the rightful owner of end-of-life products, they were able to create a rivalry amongst waste management companies. This enabled them to impose the recovery targets, to which the producers have engaged themselves in the negotiated agreements, on the recovery sector. On the one hand the monopolistic position of these waste management organisations stimulates market concentration in the recovery sector, setting aside small and medium sized companies, which could lead to negative monopolistic consequences. On the other hand, this entails a positive effect on the environmental performance of the recovery sector. Moreover, a lot of management tasks are passed on from government administrations to these private waste management organisations so that more government resources can be spent to tailor-made waste policy making. Additional resources and learning experiences have significantly improved the quality of more recently concluded negotiated agreements. Convinced that this innovative policy approach contributes to the overall goal of sustainable development, the government has already planned to start up additional sector-based policy programs based on the duty of acceptance. |
| Keywords: | Waste management policy, extended producer responsibility, negotiated agreements, duty of acceptance |
| Date: | 2005–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rug:rugwps:05/302&r=reg |