nep-reg New Economics Papers
on Regulation
Issue of 2005‒04‒30
five papers chosen by
Christian Calmes
Université du Québec en Outaouais, Canada

  1. The Effect of Capital Requirement Regulation on the Transmission of Monetary Policy: Evidence from Austria. By Philipp Engler,Terhi Jokipii,Christian Merkl; Pablo Rovira Kaltwasser,Lúcio Vinhas de Souza
  2. Impact of Financing Sources and Regulatory Business Costs on National Entrepreneurial Propensity By Yuen Ping Ho; Poh Kam Wong
  3. Hayek Reads the Literature on the Emergence of Norms By L. Andreozzi
  4. Legislative Malapportionment and the Politicization of Germany’s Intergovernmental Transfer System By Hans Pitlik; Friedrich Schneider; Harald Strotmann
  5. Reforms and Productivity Dynamics in Chinese State-Owned Enterprises By Peter McGoldrick; Patrick Paul Walsh

  1. By: Philipp Engler,Terhi Jokipii,Christian Merkl; Pablo Rovira Kaltwasser,Lúcio Vinhas de Souza
    Abstract: This paper investigates the existence of a bank lending and a bank capital channel in Austria by applying the dynamic Arellano-Bond GMM-estimator to a quarterly bank level dataset spanning from 1997 to 2003. While we do find evidence that the bank lending channel is in existence, with an important role active for capitalization, we are unable to confirm that the bank capital channel is in force in Austria. Our results indicate some counter-cyclicality in lending activity, a finding that is in line with the existing Austrian literature. Classification-
    Date: 2005–04–20
  2. By: Yuen Ping Ho (Entrepreneurship Centre, National University of Singapore); Poh Kam Wong (Entrepreneurship Centre, National University of Singapore)
    Abstract: In this paper, we focus on two barriers to entry that may hinder the formation of new firms: capital requirements and regulatory business cost. The contribution of this paper is twofold: we compare different types of financing sources to address the issue of capital requirement and we utilise a new measure of business cost by constructing a composite index using data from the World Bank’s Doing Business Database. Using cross-sectional data on 36 countries that participated in the 2002 Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, we attempt to establish if financing sources and business costs have different impact on three different types of entrepreneurial activity: opportunity-driven, necessity driven and high-growth potential entrepreneurship. Three types of financing sources are analysed: traditional debt financing, Venture Capital financing, and informal investments. The findings show that only informal investments significantly influence the propensity to be entrepreneurs.Regulatory business costs were found to deter opportunity driven entrepreneurship, but had no impact on other types of entrepreneurial activity.
    Keywords: entrepreneurial activity, financing, venture capital, informal investment, business cost
    JEL: L
    Date: 2005–04–28
  3. By: L. Andreozzi
    Abstract: Hayek’s approach to cultural and institutional evolution has been frequently criticized because it is explicitly based on the controversial notion of (cultural) group selection. In this paper this criticism is rejected on the basis of recent works on biological and cultural evolution. The paper’s main contention is that Hayek employed group selection as a tool for the explanation of selection among several equilibria, and not as a vehicle for the emergence of out of equilibrium behavior (i.e. altruism). The paper shows that Hayek’s ideas foreshadowed some of the most promising developments in the current literature on the emergence of norms.
    JEL: B31 B41
  4. By: Hans Pitlik; Friedrich Schneider; Harald Strotmann
    Abstract: Legislative bargaining theory suggests that fiscal transfers among member states of a federation are determined to a substantial degree by political bargaining powers. Malapportionment of the states' population in the legislature is claimed to lead to disproportionally higher benefits to overrepresented states. The present paper analyses empirically the distribution of fiscal transfers in Germany's intergovernmental transfer system over the period 1970-2002. It can be shown that overrepresented states in the upper house receive disproportionate shares of transfers, while malapportionment in the lower house does not seem to matter. We also find empirical evidence that overrepresentation became more important over time.
    Keywords: legislative bargaining, overrepresentation, fiscal transfer system, Germany
    JEL: D70 H77
    Date: 2005
  5. By: Peter McGoldrick; Patrick Paul Walsh
    Abstract: Institutional change has taken place incrementally since 1978 for State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in the Industrial Sector of China. We will provide evidence for the notion that this is largely due to increased domestic competitive pressures and the opportunities arising from the integration of international markets. In this paper we estimate the effect of deep reform (the right to hire and fire labour, buy and sell capital and operate on international markets) on the productivity dynamics of entreprises. Using a unique balanced panel of681 SOEs for the period 1980 to 1994, we find consistent production function estimatesusing an algorithm put forward in Olley and Pakes (1996), which estimates using an simultaneity bias. Futhermore, we allow selection bias by formulating an entry that exposure to deep reform hav lead to higher productivity realisations while remaining under state ownership.
    Date: 2004–05–01

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