|
on Regulation |
|
Issue of 2005‒04‒09
three papers chosen by Christian Calmes Université du Québec en Outaouais, Canada |
| By: | Philippe Aghion; Alberto Alesina; Francesco Trebbi |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the choice of electoral rules, in particular, the question of minority representation. Majorities tend to disenfranchise minorities through strategic manipulation of electoral rules. With the aim of explaining changes in electoral rules adopted by US cities (particularly in the South), we show why majorities tend to adopt "winner-take-all" city-wide rules (at-large elections) in response to an increase in the size of the minority when the minority they are facing is relatively small. In this case, for the majority it is more effective to leverage on its sheer size instead of risking to concede representation to voters from minority-elected districts. However, as the minority becomes larger (closer to a fifty-fifty split), the possibility of losing the whole city induces the majority to prefer minority votes to be confined in minority-packed districts. Single-member district rules serve this purpose. We show empirical results consistent with these implications of the model. |
| Date: | 2005–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11236&r=reg |
| By: | Francesco Squintani |
| Date: | 2005–04–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:najeco:172782000000000102&r=reg |
| By: | Gorobets,Alexander; Nooteboom,Bart (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | This article employs Agent-Based Computational Economics (ACE) to investigate whether, and under what conditions, trust is viable in markets. The emergence and breakdown of trust is modeled in a context of multiple buyers and suppliers. Agents develop trust in a partner as a function of observed loyalty. They select partners on the basis of their trust in the partner and potential profit. On the basis of realized profits, they adapt the weight they attach to trust relative to profitability, and their own trustworthiness, modeled as a threshold of defection. Trust turns out to be viable under fairly general conditions. |
| JEL: | C63 D23 L14 L22 L24 |
| Date: | 2005 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200539&r=reg |