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on Regulation |
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Issue of 2005‒02‒27
five papers chosen by Christian Calmes Université du Québec en Outaouais, Canada |
| By: | Paul Conway; Véronique Janod; Giuseppe Nicoletti |
| Abstract: | This paper describes trends in product market regulation in OECD countries over the period 1998 to 2003. The analysis is based on summary indicators of product market regulation that measure the degree to which policies promote or inhibit competition. The results suggest that regulatory impediments to competition have declined in all OECD countries in recent years. Regulation has also become more homogenous across the OECD as countries with relatively restrictive policies have, in some areas, moved towards the regulatory environment of the more liberalized countries. Within some countries product market policies have become more consistent across different regulatory provisions, although relatively restrictive countries still tend to have a more heterogeneous approach to competition. In general, domestic barriers to competition tend to be higher in countries that have higher barriers to foreign trade and investment, and high levels of state control and barriers to competition tend to be associated with cumbersome administrative procedures and policies that reduce the adaptability of labour markets. Notwithstanding recent progress in product market reform, a 'hard core' of regulations that impede competition still persists in virtually all countries. <p> La réglementation des marchés de produits dans les pays de l'OCDE, 1998-2003 <p> Ce document décrit les évolutions de la réglementation encadrant les marchés de produits dans les pays de l'OCDE sur la période 1998-2003. L'analyse est basée sur des indicateurs synthétiques de la réglementation des marchés de produits qui mesurent l'intensité avec laquelle les politiques favorisent ou restreignent la concurrence. Les résultats suggèrent que les entraves à la concurrence résultant de la réglementation ont décliné dans tous pays de l'OCDE ces dernières années. La réglementation est aussi devenue plus homogène à travers l'OCDE, les pays disposant de politiques relativement restrictives, s'étant ralliés, dans certains domaines, à l'environnement réglementaire des pays plus libéraux. Dans certains pays, les politiques concernant les marchés de produits sont devenues plus cohérentes au regard des différents dispositifs réglementaires, même si les pays relativement restrictifs ont toujours tendance à disposer d'une approche plus disparate de la concurrence. De façon générale, les barrières à la concurrence résultant de politiques à vocation intérieure ont tendance à être plus importantes dans les pays disposant d'importants obstacles aux échanges internationaux et à l'investissement ; de même de hauts niveaux de contrôles étatiques et d'importants obstacles à la concurrence ont tendance à être associés avec d'encombrantes procédures administratives et des politiques qui réduisent la capacité d'adaptation du marché du travail. En dépit des récents progrès accomplis par les réformes des marchés de produits, un 'noyau dur' de règlements, entravant la concurrence, persiste toujours dans pratiquement tous les pays. |
| Keywords: | indicators; product market regulation |
| JEL: | K2 L5 |
| Date: | 2005–02–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oed:oecdec:419&r=reg |
| By: | Hans Pitlik; Friedrich Schneider; Harald Strotmann |
| JEL: | D7 H77 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hoh:hohdip:254&r=reg |
| By: | Jorge Martinez-Vazquez; F. Javier Arze; Jameson Boex |
| Abstract: | This study seeks to assess the current state of knowledge and contribute to the understanding of how fiscal policies and management interact with corruption issues by integrating concrete and practical issues with theoretical and quantitative analysis of their nature and consequences. The study presents a comprehensive analysis of corruption that not only highlights the problems, but also potential solutions for a broad range of fiscal policy and fiscal reform issues. The analysis and discussion is supported and clarified by relevant real-world examples and empirical analysis. In particular, country-specific examples prove to be quite useful to identify key issues or valuable lessons in minimizing corruption. |
| Date: | 2004–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dai:wpaper:fr1003&r=reg |
| By: | Yasuyo Hamaguchi; Toshiji Kawagoe |
| Abstract: | Antitrust authorities of many countries have been trying to establish appropriate competition policies based on economic analysis. Recently an anti-cartel policy called a "leniency program" has been introduced in many countries as an effective policy to dissolve cartels. In this paper, we studied several kinds of leniency programs through laboratory experiments. We experimentally controlled for two factors: 1) cartel size: the number of cartel members in a group, small (two-person) or large (seven-person), 2) schedule of reduced fine: the number of firms that are given reduced fines. The experimental results showed that (1) an increase in the number of cartel members in a group increased the number of cartels dissolved, (2) changing the coverage of reduced fine had no significant effect both in two-player case and in seven-player case. |
| Date: | 2005–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eti:dpaper:05003&r=reg |
| By: | Clara Patricia Martín; Juan Mauricio Ramírez |
| Abstract: | En este trabajo se hace una evaluación cuantitativa de los posibles efectos de un acuerdo de libre comercio (TLC) con Estados Unidos sobre la economía colombiana. Con este objetivo se utiliza un modelo de equilibrio general que representa el funcionamiento de la economía colombiana en condiciones de sustitución imperfecta entre los bienes domésticos y los bienes importados y exportados, rigideces salariales en el mercado laboral, y competencia imperfecta en los sectores industriales. Los resultados muestran que los efectos de un TLC sobre la economía colombiana dependen críticamente del grado en el cual se logren afectar las barreras no arancelarias vigentes en los Estados Unidos. Un TLC con disminución en estas barreras no arancelarias beneficiaría a los más pobres y tendría un efecto progresivo sobre la distribución del ingreso, contrario a lo que sostienen diferentes críticos. Sin embargo, esto depende del alcance del acuerdo. En especial, un TLC que mantenga las BNA sobre el sector agrícola en Estados Unidos tendría efectos negativos sobre los ingresos y el consumo de los trabajadores rurales, y en general sobre el sector agrícola colombiano. |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdr:borrec:326&r=reg |