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on Regulation |
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Issue of 2005‒02‒01
seven papers chosen by Christian Calmes Université du Québec en Outaouais, Canada |
| By: | Bell, David (University of Stirling); Heitmueller, Axel (London Business School and IZA Bonn) |
| Abstract: | The enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 1990 triggered a substantial academic debate about its consequences on employment rates of disabled people. In contrast, the employment provision of the 1996 Disability Discrimination Act (DDA) in Britain has received little attention. This paper provides robust evidence that, similar to the ADA in the US, the DDA has had no impact on the employment rate of disabled people or possibly worsened it. Possible reasons for this are low take-up of financial support, low levels of general awareness about the Act among disabled people and employers, and limited knowledge about the true costs of required adjustments. |
| Keywords: | disability, employment, difference-in-difference, discrimination |
| JEL: | J2 I18 J71 J78 |
| Date: | 2005–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1476&r=reg |
| By: | Robert Dekle (University of Southern California); Kenneth Kletzer (University of California Santa Cruz) |
| Abstract: | An endogenous growth model with financial intermediation is used to show how public deposit insurance and weak prudential regulation can lead to banking crises and permanent declines in economic growth. The impact of regulatory forbearance on investment, saving and asset price dynamics under perfect foresight are derived in the model. The assumptions of the theoretical model are based on essential features of the Japanese financial system and its regulation. The model demonstrates how banking and growth crises can evolve under perfect foresight. The dynamics for economic aggregates and asset prices predicted by the model are shown to be generally consistent with the experience of the Japanese economy and financial system through the 1990s. We also test our maintained hypothesis of rational expectations using asset price data for Japan over the 1980s and 1990s. An implication of our analysis is that delaying the resolution of banking crises adversely affects future economic growth. |
| Date: | 2004–03–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:ucscec:1019&r=reg |
| By: | Nirvikar Singh (University of California, Santa Cruz) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the functioning of some of India's institutions of governance, namely, the legislative and executive branches of government, the judiciary, and the bureaucracy, from an instrumental, economic perspective. Governance is analyzed along three dimensions: (1) the degree of commitment or durability of laws and rules, (2) the degree of enforcement of these laws, and (3) the degree of decentralization of jurisdictions with respect to local public goods. It is suggested that India's experience of governance reflects insufficiencies in all three dimensions: of durability, enforcement, and decentralization, with adverse consequences for economic efficiency. The paper concludes with a brief normative discussion of collective action in general, and alternative structures of institutions of governance. |
| Keywords: | governance, commitment, durability, enforcement, decentralization, |
| Date: | 2003–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:ucscec:1030&r=reg |
| By: | Berggren, Niclas (Ratio Institute); Jordahl, Henrik (Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We present new evidence on how generalized trust is formed. Unlike previous studies, we look at the explanatory power of economic institutions, we use newer data, we incorporate more countries, and we use instrumental variables to handle the causality problem. A central result is that legal structure and security of property rights (area 2 of the Economic Freedom Index) increase trust. The idea is that a market economy, building on voluntary transactions and interactions with both friends and strangers within the predictability provided by the rule of law, entails both incentives and mechanisms for trust to emerge between people. |
| Keywords: | social capital; trust; economic freedom; rule of law; property rights; legal system |
| JEL: | K42 O40 Z13 |
| Date: | 2005–01–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:uunewp:2005_002&r=reg |
| By: | Jonathan Conning (Hunter College, Department of Economics); James A. Robinson (Harvard University, Department of Government) |
| Abstract: | The modern theory of agrarian organization has studied how the economic environment determines organizational form under the assumption of stable property rights to land. The political economy literature has modelled the endogenous determination of property rights. In this paper we propose a model in which the economic organization of agriculture and the political equilibrium determining the distribution of property rights are jointly determined. In particular, because the form of organization may affect the probability and distribution of benefits from agrarian reform, it may be determined in anticipation of this impact. The model offers a reason for why tenancy, despite its economic advantages, has been so little used in countries where agrarian reform is a salient political issue. We test the implications of the model using a five-decade panel of data from Indian states and discuss how it may help explain cross-national variations in the incidence of tenancy. |
| Keywords: | Agrarian Organization, Political Economy, Property Rights Reforms. |
| JEL: | J42 J43 L1 Q12 Q15 F11 |
| Date: | 2005 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:htr:hcecon:405&r=reg |
| By: | Edward Cartwright |
| Abstract: | We consider a dynamic model of conformity that permits both a conformist and a non-conformist equilibrium. We provide conditions under which conformity can 'invade' a population. More precisely, starting from a non-conformist equilibrium, we show that the conformity of an arbitrarily small proportion of the popultion can lead to the spread of conformism and the ultimate emergence of the conformist equilibrium. This occurs independently of whether or not the non-conformist equilibrium Pareto dominates the conformist equilibrium. |
| Keywords: | Conformity; best reply; coordination; norm. |
| JEL: | C70 C72 |
| Date: | 2005–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ukc:ukcedp:0501&r=reg |
| By: | Ernst Fehr; Susanne Kremhelmer; Klaus M. Schmidt |
| Abstract: | We report on several experiments on the optimal allocation of ownership rights. The experiments confirm the property rights approach by showing that the ownership structure affects relationship-specific investments and that subjects attain the most efficient ownership allocation despite starting from different initial conditions. However, in contrast to the property rights approach, the most efficient ownership structure is joint ownership. These results are neither consistent with the self-interest model nor with models that assume that all people behave fairly, but they can be explained by the theory of inequity aversion that focuses on the interaction between selfish and fair players. |
| Keywords: | Ownership Rights, Double Moral Hazard, Fairness, Reciprocity, Incomplete Contracts |
| JEL: | C7 C9 J3 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:iewwpx:224&r=reg |