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on Public Finance |
| By: | Snowdon, Christopher |
| Abstract: | The Laffer curve illustrates a principle understood since Adam Smith: beyond a certain point, raising a tax rate reduces the revenue it brings in. Overall tax revenue in the UK has risen as the tax burden has grown, but several individual taxes now appear to have been pushed into this 'prohibitive range'. Alcohol duty, tobacco duty and landfill tax were all expected to raise more money after rate rises. Instead, alcohol duty receipts fell despite significant inflation, real-terms tobacco duty revenue fell by 40% between 2021 and 2025 as smokers turned to the black market, and landfill tax now raises half as much in real terms as it did at its 2013 peak, while fly-tipping has reached record levels. Together, these three taxes yielded £5.2 billion less than the OBR projected. This points to an over-reliance on static models that fail to anticipate how people respond to excessive taxation. Pushing taxes too far not only loses revenue but creates huge opportunities for criminals, and the cost of dealing with them falls on the public. |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ieadps:344094 |
| By: | Paolo Panteghini |
| Abstract: | The new view of dividend taxation bundles three logically distinct claims: capitalisation, that a permanent dividend tax is impounded in share values; the Auerbach prediction, that the firm's real retention and investment decision is unchanged; and the King criterion, that the tax does not enter the cost of capital. In a frictionless two-period general-equilibrium economy with an all-equity firm and a power production technology, we show that the three claims hold under progressively stronger conditions. Capitalisation always holds, since the tax cancels from the firm's investment first-order condition, and in partial equilibrium Fisher separation delivers the new view in full. The failures are general-equilibrium phenomena that sort by margin: a subsistence level of consumption in otherwise standard HARA preferences breaks the Auerbach prediction for any technology, whereas the King criterion fails only when returns to capital are also decreasing, with a magnitude proportional to the product of technological curvature and the subsistence level. These breaks are uncompensated income effects, not substitution distortions: a revenue-neutral lump-sum rebate restores neutrality for any preferences and any technology. No friction is needed, only the curvature of preferences and technology and the breakdown of Fisher separation when the firm is the sole store of value. The all-equity assumption is inessential; under risk, by contrast, an asymmetric loss offset distorts the price of risk, a substitution distortion that no lump-sum rebate can repair. |
| Keywords: | new view, dividend taxation, general equilibrium, preferences, decreasing returns, tax neutrality |
| JEL: | H24 H25 H32 E21 E62 G35 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_13055 |
| By: | Lundberg, Jacob (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the efficiency cost of pay-as-you-go pension systems. The return on pension contributions – typically average income growth – is lower than the market return on capital. Because the gap between these returns compounds over the life cycle, early-career contributions have a higher implicit tax rate. I develop a sufficient-statistics framework in which the deadweight loss depends on the age profile of implicit tax rates. Deadweight loss is minimized when the implicit tax rate is constant, mirroring the logic of tax smoothing. I then propose an implementation within a notional defined contribution design: contributions are valorized at a higher, market-based rate of return, while a lower fraction of contributions is credited to notional accounts and the remainder treated as a pure tax. Finally, I apply my deadweight loss formula to OECD PAYGO pension systems. Under the assumed parameter values, the deadweight loss averages 19 percent. I find that only 0.2 percentage points is attributable to the uneven timing of implicit taxation. |
| Keywords: | Pensions: Social security; Pay-as-you-go; Implicit taxation; Deadweight loss |
| JEL: | H21 H55 |
| Date: | 2026–10–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:1568 |
| By: | Jakobsen, Katrine; Kleven, Henrik; Kolsrud, Jonas; Landais, Camille; Munoz, Mathilde |
| Abstract: | Using administrative data from Scandinavian countries, we provide evidence on international migration responses to wealth taxes and evaluate their aggregate economic implications. We find significant migration responses among the wealthy: a 1pp increase in the top wealth tax rate decreases the stock of wealthy taxpayers by about 2%. A large fraction of the wealthy are business owners, and their businesses are negatively affected by owner out-migration. The aggregate effects are nevertheless modest: the migration responses to a 1pp increase in the top wealth tax rate reduce employment by 0.02%, investments by 0.07%, and value-added by 0.10%. |
| JEL: | D31 E22 E24 F22 H24 K34 |
| Date: | 2026–10–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:130959 |
| By: | Subhrasil Chingri (Indian Institute of Technology Delhi); Debasis Mondal (Indian Institute of Technology Delhi); Klaus Prettner (Department of Economics, Vienna University of Economics and Business) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies optimal robot taxation in a static model with routine and non-routine workers. Robots substitute for routine workers and complement non-routine workers. In addition, robots are produced in a monopolistic sector that charges a markup over marginal cost. In the absence of monopoly power, the optimal robot tax rate is zero. When robot producers have monopoly power, the optimal policy corrects the markup distortion by aligning the effective robot price with marginal cost, conditional on the labor supply induced by the income tax system. The wage premium rises with the expansion of the tasks that robots can perform and declines with higher robot production costs. The results clarify the conditions under which robot taxation serves as a corrective instrument. |
| Keywords: | Robot taxation, automation, optimal taxation, corrective subsidies, monopoly markups, wage inequality |
| JEL: | H21 H23 O33 |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wiw:wiwwuw:wuwp399 |
| By: | Gundert, Hannah; Spix, Julia |
| Abstract: | A growing number of countries have introduced Digital Nomad Visas (DNVs) to accommodate the rise of location-independent remote work, often paired with tax incentives. Using simulation analysis, this paper examines the effective tax burden of digital nomads under DNVs in the EU. Results show that tax burdens are sensitive to host country choice, double tax treaty provisions, and duration of stay, with the 183-day threshold proving critical. Tax planning can generate substantial tax savings for digital nomads who relocate strategically. This raises tax fairness concerns, as host countries may bear costs associated with digital nomads without proportionate income tax revenue. |
| Keywords: | Digital nomad visas, Digital nomads, Personal income tax, Effective tax rates |
| JEL: | H24 H26 J61 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:344103 |
| By: | Ramona Müller; Matthias Wrede |
| Abstract: | Local governments’ discretion over tax rates may be used strategically when politicians perceive that a tax burden falls differently across voter groups. We study this mechanism in the context of Germany’s property tax reform, which created exogenous variation in the tax across voter groups and municipalities by allowing states to adopt different property valuation models. Some federal states implicitly set a higher tax for rental properties than for comparable owner-occupied units. We show that, over an average post-announcement period of 3.6 years, municipal tax multipliers increased by 15 percentage points more when two conditions were met: municipalities were governed by homeowner-friendly parties and were located in states where tenants will face a higher tax base per square meter. By identifying political drivers behind sharp increases in German property tax multipliers in recent years, we provide causal evidence that higher-level governments’ tax-base choices change the electoral incentives governing local tax rates. |
| Keywords: | property tax reform, local tax setting, voter favoritism, political economy of taxation |
| JEL: | H20 H27 H30 H71 H73 R51 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_13067 |
| By: | Benjamin Jaros; Joshua Rauh |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the revenue and migration impact of the 2026 California Billionaire Tax Act, a one-time 5 percent tax on the worldwide net worth of individuals exceeding $1 billion. Using data from the Forbes Billionaire List, news reports detailing the residential real estate holdings of California billionaires, and public announcements of billionaire departures from the state, we estimate the behavioral response and associated revenue loss to this new tax using several different methodologies. Even before accounting for reductions in other tax bases such as the income tax, we estimate that the Act will collect approximately $30 billion (range $28 to 36 billion), less than a third of the $100 billion projected by Galle et al. (2025). This range accounts for the publicly confirmed taxpayer migration that has already eliminated nearly 30 percent of the Act's wealth tax base, applies a litigation-survival discount to the remaining base, and is validated by the wealth tax base elasticity literature. We estimate that California's billionaires contribute $3.3–5.8 billion annually in state income taxes. The present value of permanently lost income tax collections from departures more than offsets the one-time wealth tax revenue, yielding a net present value of negative $38.9 billion. Across 100, 000 simulated revenue and discount rate combinations, 85 percent of plausible outcomes produce a negative net present value of state revenues. |
| JEL: | H71 H73 R23 |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35899 |