nep-pub New Economics Papers
on Public Finance
Issue of 2026–08–24
three papers chosen by
Kwang Soo Cheong, Johns Hopkins University


  1. Taxing Labor: Firm R&D, Automation and the Labor Share By Hyejin Ku; Uta Schönberg; Ragnhild C. Schreiner
  2. Fool's gold: The case against the wealth tax, and suggestions for alternatives By Niemietz, Kristian
  3. Payroll Tax, Employment and Labor Market Concentration By Baumgartner, Erick; Corbi, Raphael; Narita, Renata

  1. By: Hyejin Ku; Uta Schönberg; Ragnhild C. Schreiner
    Abstract: This paper provides new micro-level evidence on how labor taxation shapes firm behavior, exploiting an EU-mandated payroll tax reform in Norway. Combining administrative and survey data, we find that firms facing larger tax increases sharply cut employment but also increased R&D spending, implemented labor cost-saving innovations, and adopted more automation. While these responses led to improvements in labor and total factor productivity within the firm, the firm's labor share fell. These effects persisted even after the tax hike was unexpectedly reversed three years later, suggesting a lasting shift toward more capital-intensive production in response to higher labor costs.
    Keywords: payroll taxes, labor costs, firm behavior, technology adoption, inequality
    JEL: J23 J32 H25 H32 O31 O32
    Date: 2026–07
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crm:wpaper:26192
  2. By: Niemietz, Kristian
    Abstract: Wealth taxes have been tried many times. In the early 1990s, about half of Western Europe still had wealth taxes. In the meantime, all but three of these countries have given up on them, including, in some cases, under left-wing governments, and even the three remaining ones have scaled back their wealth taxes. Governments that abolished wealth taxes justified this by pointing to their high administrative and compliance costs, adverse behavioural responses (especially negative effects on investment) and limited revenue-raising potential. These are also the reasons why previous attempts to introduce wealth taxes in Britain were abandoned. This paper mostly draws on the work of economists who are broadly sympathetic to the idea of wealth taxes, as opposed to ideologically hostile critics. Even a lot of their sympathisers concede that wealth taxes have major drawbacks. Britain does not currently have a tax which meets the strict textbook definition of 'a wealth tax', but it does have several wealth-related taxes, which can be considered close-enough substitutes, and it already raises more revenue from such taxes than any other OECD economy. For its supporters, the wealth tax has become an all-purpose tool. They are trying to achieve too many different things, and often mutually incompatible things, with it. The 'wish list' of things that a wealth tax has been promised to finance is simply implausibly long, and then it is also supposed to do many things beyond raising revenue on top of that. Wealth inequality in the UK is not especially high, and it is not rising. The top 1% of the wealth distribution account for about 22% of the total wealth, which is less than the EU average and much less than it used to be for most of the 20th century. Wealth taxes have rarely raised more than 1% of GDP in revenue, with typical figures being much lower than that. Where wealth taxes have existed for long periods, revenue has often tended to decline over time. In recent years, empirical evidence on behavioural responses to wealth taxes has largely confirmed the suspicions of sceptics. Wealth taxes really do reduce and distort investment in a number of ways. None of these effects are catastrophic, but they keep adding up and they tend to get worse over time. There are vastly superior alternatives to wealth taxes, which are based on creating wealth rather than penalising it. In the 20th century, Britain had long periods of falling wealth inequality, which was not explained by the government expropriating the wealthy but simply by more people acquiring pension wealth and housing wealth. Britain could move to a pension system more like the Australian one, where people pay contributions into their own pension fund rather than to a state pension programme. In such a system, the vast majority of people have the opportunity to build up considerable amounts of wealth over time. Wealth inequality in Britain was at its lowest when housing was relatively affordable and home ownership rates were at peak levels. Britain needs a 'YIMBY' revolution to unleash a building boom. This would give millions of people the opportunity to build up housing wealth.
    Date: 2026
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ieadps:342457
  3. By: Baumgartner, Erick (Bocconi University); Corbi, Raphael (University of Sao Paulo); Narita, Renata (PUC-Rio)
    Abstract: How much employment can be generated by decreasing payroll taxes? We examine this question by exploring the staggered rollout of a large payroll tax reform in Brazil. Using administrative matched employer-employee data, we find an increase of 5 percent on employment due to both firm growth and firm entry, no impact on wages and a significant increase in profits. Moreover, employment effects are driven by less concentrated labor markets, consistent with predictions from an oligopsony model.
    Keywords: payroll tax, employment, wages, profits, oligopsony
    JEL: H2 J3 J6 J42
    Date: 2026–07
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18838

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