|
on Public Finance |
| By: | Ablyatifov, Emin; Lukyanov, Georgy |
| Abstract: | We study optimal taxation when the conversion of tax revenue into public goods is uncertain. In a static Ramsey framework with a representative household, a competitive firm, and two broad instruments (a labor-income tax and a commodity/output tax), a simple measure of trust— the perceived likelihood that revenue is actually delivered as public consumption—scales the marginal value of public funds. We show: (i) a trust threshold below which any distortionary taxation reduces welfare; (ii) above that threshold, policy uniquely pins down the scale of taxation but leaves a continuum of tax mixes (an equivalence frontier) that implement the same allocation and welfare; and (iii) tiny administrative or salience wedges select a unique instrument, typically favoring a broad base collected at source. We derive a trust-adjusted Ramsey rule in sufficient-statistics form, establish robustness to mild preference non-separabilities and concave public-good utility, and provide an isoelastic specialization with transparent comparative statics. |
| Keywords: | Optimal taxation; public goods; credibility; marginal value of public funds; tax; mix; administration. |
| JEL: | E61 H21 H30 C73 |
| Date: | 2026–02–13 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:131432 |
| By: | Sato, Hideki |
| Abstract: | This study addresses the following two questions focusing on state sales tax and the behavior of a monopolist: (1) Under what conditions would a monopolist evade state sales tax even if evasion is costly? and (2) Can tax rates and enforcement be effective deterrents against evasion? The analysis reveals that, under certain conditions, a monopolist facing enforcement may underreport sales rather than not report them at all, even if evasion incurs costs. Furthermore, this study demonstrates that reducing tax rates and strengthening enforcement can effectively prevent tax evasion and that such preventive measures can lead to increased tax revenue. |
| Keywords: | Sales tax, Monopolist, Tax evasion, Tax enforcement. |
| JEL: | D42 H26 H32 H71 |
| Date: | 2025–12–22 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:127426 |
| By: | Brenzel-Weiss, Janosch; Koeniger, Winfried; Valladares-Esteban, Arnau |
| Abstract: | We calibrate a lifecycle portfolio-choice model of homeowners facing uninsurable income risk to show that tax deductions for mortgage interest payments and voluntary pension contributions have sizable effects on household portfolios and macroprudential risks. The deductions reduce the after-tax cost of debt and increase the after-tax return of pension savings so that the mortgage incidence increases and portfolios shift from home equity and liquid assets towards pension savings. Because the consumption responses to a house-price decline are heterogeneous, the distribution of household debt shapes the quantitative effect of the tax deductions on the homeowners' resilience after a house price bust. |
| Keywords: | Mortgage amortization, Tax incentives, Household consumption, Portfolio choice, Housing busts, Economic stability, Macroprudential policy |
| JEL: | D14 D15 D31 E21 G11 G21 H24 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cfswop:336755 |
| By: | Tommaso Giommoni; Gabriel Loumeau; Marco Tabellini |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we provide systematic evidence in support of the long-standing hypothesis that taxation was an important driver of the French Revolution. We first document that areas with heavier taxes experienced more riots between 1750 and 1789 and voiced more complaints against taxation in the cahiers de doléances of 1789. After showing that these effects are driven by indirect taxes, we exploit sharp spatial differences in the salt tax and the traites—the two principal indirect levies—to implement a regression discontinuity design (RDD).We find that unrest was higher on the high-tax side of the border. These effects intensified over time, peaking in the 1780s, and were stronger where fiscal disparities were larger and Enlightenment ideas more widespread. We further show that adverse weather shocks amplified unrest in high-tax municipalities. We then document that taxation fueled the spread of unrest during the Grande Peur—the wave of revolts that swept France in July 1789 and culminated in the abolition of feudal privileges. Finally, we link taxation to revolutionary politics in Paris, documenting that deputies from heavily taxed constituencies were more likely to frame the tax system as oppressive, support the Revolution, demand the abolition of the monarchy, and vote for the king’s execution. |
| JEL: | D74 H20 H31 N43 O23 |
| Date: | 2026–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34816 |
| By: | Laetitia Lebihan (CEMOI - Centre d'Économie et de Management de l'Océan Indien - UR - Université de La Réunion) |
| Abstract: | The American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 temporarily provided unconditional monthly cash benefits to most households with children to reduce child poverty during the COVID-19 pandemic. Using the American Time Use Survey and Well-Being Supplement, we examine the effects of the 2021 Child Tax Credit (CTC) expansion on well-being and time-use activities of households with children. We find that the CTC expansion was associated with improved parental well-being and health. The analysis also shows a significant increase in the time the parent spends with the child. The results are robust to several robustness checks and consistent with existing evidence. |
| Keywords: | Child tax credit, Well-being, Health, Time use |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05509374 |
| By: | Nicholas Lacoste (Tulane University); Zehra Farooq (Federal Board of Revenue, Pakistan) |
| Abstract: | This paper bridges welfare economics and machine learning econometrics to develop empirically implementable algorithms for optimal audit targeting. We derive a sufficient statistic-based targeting algorithm that depends on three individualized causal effects: the immediate revenue recovered from an audit, the causal effect of an audit on long-run tax revenue, and the marginal administrative cost of an audit. We estimate these effects with a variety of machine learners comparing causal forests, LASSO, gradient boosted trees, and neural networks using the universe of Pakistani income tax returns, exploiting years in which audits were assigned completely at random. We implement our targeting algorithms in out-of-bag years, comparing them to the real-world policy when audits were partially or entirely targeted. We show that the real world audit program in Pakistan lost almost 173, 000 Rs ($1, 700) in net revenue per-audit, while our optimal policy generates 285, 000 Rs ($2, 800) in expected net revenue per-audit. We also find that targeting audits based on immediate recoup is sub-optimal to targeting on long-run deterrence in this setting. Moving forward, our framework offers a general approach to empirical welfare maximization using machine learning in resource-constrained policy settings. |
| Keywords: | optimal audit policy, tax enforcement, machine learning, sufficient statistics |
| JEL: | H21 H26 C14 C45 |
| Date: | 2026–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tul:wpaper:2603 |