By: |
Claude Crampes (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement);
Norbert Ladoux (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement);
Jean-Marie Lozachmeur (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
Abstract: |
We analyze a Pareto optimal income tax problem à la Mirrlees (1971) in which
households consume three types of goods: energy goods, energy efficient
investments and non-energy goods. The two main ingredients of our normative
analysis are: i) an indirect relationship between energy and the satisfaction
of energy needs, as energy-efficient investments transform energy into
services such as light, heating, and air conditioning; and, ii) imperfect
information of the policy designer as regards the level of energy efficiency
of households' housing and their labor market productivity. Each household
differs with respect to these two latter characteristics, and the government
designs a non-linear income tax combined with energy and energy efficient
investment non linear pricing that maximizes a weighted sum of households'
utilities. We show that a benevolent social planner should distort energy
prices in a way that depends on the difference between the saturation of
energy needs and the complementarity between energy and the level of energy
efficiency in the provision of energy services. A sufficient condition for
energy consumption to be subsidized is that the rebound effect is small.
Second, when individuals can invest in energy efficiency on top of energy
consumption, these investments should always be subsidized and the marginal
subsidy should always be higher than the one on energy consumption. |
Keywords: |
Optimal income taxation, Indirect taxation, Energy services, Energy efficiency, Energy consumption |
Date: |
2023 |
URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04189094&r=pub |