|
on Public Finance |
| By: | Miguel Faria-e-Castro |
| Abstract: | I use a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to study the effects of the 2019-20 coronavirus pandemic in the United States. The pandemic is modeled as a large negative shock to the utility of consumption of contact-intensive services. General equilibrium forces propagate this negative shock to the non-services and financial sectors, triggering a deep recession. I use a calibrated version of the model to analyze different types of fiscal policies: (i) government purchases, (ii) income tax cuts, (iii) unemployment insurance benefits, (iv) unconditional transfers, and (v) liquidity assistance to services firms. I find that UI benefits are the most effective tool to stabilize income for borrowers, who are the hardest hit, while savers favor unconditional transfers. Liquidity assistance programs are effective if the policy objective is to stabilize employment in the affected sector. |
| Keywords: | fiscal policy; financial stability; pandemic |
| JEL: | E6 G01 H0 |
| Date: | 2020–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedlwp:87616&r=all |
| By: | Gale, William G. |
| Abstract: | To raise revenue in a progressive, efficient, and administrable manner, this chapter proposes a new national consumption tax: a broad-based credit-invoice value-added tax (VAT). The proposal comes with several qualifications: the VAT should complement, not substitute for, new direct taxes on the wealth or income of affluent households; to ensure the policy change is progressive, the VAT should be coupled with adjustments to government means-tested programs to account for price level changes, and with a universal basic income (UBI) program; to avoid having the VAT depress the economy, revenues should be used to raise aggregate demand in the short run and the Federal Reserve should accommodate the tax by allowing prices to rise. A 10 percent federal VAT that funded a UBI equal to 20 percent of the federal poverty line would be highly progressive (with net income rising among the bottom forty percent and not changing in the middle quintile) and would still raise more than 1 percent of GDP in net revenue. VATs are a proven success, existing in 168 countries. VATs have been proposed by both Democrats and Republicans in recent years. Concerns about small businesses, vulnerable populations, and the states can be easily addressed. |
| Keywords: | Consumption Tax, Progressive, Revenue |
| JEL: | D63 H20 H23 H27 |
| Date: | 2020–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:99197&r=all |
| By: | Flagmeier, Vanessa; Gawehn, Vanessa |
| Abstract: | We assess the investor reaction to a potential introduction of public country-by-country reporting (CbCR) into the European Capital Requirements Directive IV. Estimating cumulative abnormal returns with the help of a multivariate regression model, we find weak significant evidence around our event date (February 20th, 2013) that investors perceive the introduction of CbCR as beneficial. In additional tests, we assess investor perceptions relative to different control groups (domestic institutions and non-EU institutions) and in the cross-section (splitting across size, systemically relevant, pre-event level of GAAP ETR and pre-event level of geographic disclosure). The only significant outcome is a negative reaction for large international EU institutions. |
| Keywords: | Country-by-country reporting,CbCR,financial institutions,investor reactions,eventstudy,multivariate regression model |
| JEL: | H25 H26 G21 G28 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:arqudp:254&r=all |
| By: | Clément Carbonnier (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - UCP - Université de Cergy Pontoise - Université Paris-Seine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, LIEPP - Laboratoire interdisciplinaire d'évaluation des politiques publiques [Sciences Po] - Sciences Po - Sciences Po, Centre de recherche de la Banque de France - Banque de France); Clément Malgouyres (IPP - Institut des politiques publiques - PSE - Paris School of Economics, PSE - Paris School of Economics, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Loriane Py (Centre de recherche de la Banque de France - Banque de France, IPP - Institut des politiques publiques - PSE - Paris School of Economics); Camille Urvoy (LIEPP - Laboratoire interdisciplinaire d'évaluation des politiques publiques [Sciences Po] - Sciences Po - Sciences Po) |
| Abstract: | Do workers gain from lower business taxes, and why? We estimate how a large French corporate income tax credit is passed on to wages and explore the firm- and employee-level underlying mechanisms. The amount of tax credit firms get depends on their payroll share of workers paid less than a wage threshold. Exposure to the policy thus varies both across workers depending on their wage and across firms depending on their wage structure. Using exhaustive employer-employee data, we find that half of the surplus generated by the reform falls onto workers. Wage gains load on incumbents in high-skill occupations. The wage earnings of low-skill workers -- nearly all individually eligible -- do not change. This heterogeneous wage incidence is unlikely to be driven by scale effects or skill complementarities. We find that the groups of workers benefiting from wage gains are also more likely to continue working for the same firm. Further, we show that firms do not change their wage-setting behavior in response to the individual eligibility status of workers as there is no bunching in the distribution of entrants' wages. Overall, our results suggest that the wage incidence of firm taxation operates collectively through rent-sharing and benefits workers most costly to replace. |
| Keywords: | business taxation,tax incentives,wage incidence,rent sharing |
| Date: | 2020–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-02495652&r=all |