nep-pub New Economics Papers
on Public Finance
Issue of 2014‒10‒13
seven papers chosen by
Kwang Soo Cheong
Johns Hopkins University

  1. An ACE Model of International Tax Competition By Flavio Cesar; Klimis Vogiatzoglou
  2. Capital Gains Taxation Under Different Tax Regimes, Asset Pricing and Investment Decisions - a Monte-Carlo-Ssimulation of the Influence of Tax Systems on Dividend and Timing Behaviour By Caren SURETH; Dirk LANGELEH
  3. An Empirical Assessment of the Effectiveness of Oil Taxes By Darko JUS; Christian BEERMANN; Markus ZIMMER
  4. Payroll Taxation and the structure of qualications and wages in a segmented frictional labor market with intra-rm bargaining By Clément Carbonnier
  5. Does Incorporation Matter? Quantifying the Welfare Loss of Non-uniform Taxation Across By Michael Stimmelmayr; Doina Radulescu
  6. Tax Compliance and Public Goods Provision -- An Agent-based Econophysics Approach By S. Hokamp; G. Seibold
  7. Does Fiscal Decentralization Promote Fiscal Discipline? By Bilin NEYAPTI; Zafer AKIN; Nida CAKIR

  1. By: Flavio Cesar; Klimis Vogiatzoglou
  2. By: Caren SURETH; Dirk LANGELEH
  3. By: Darko JUS; Christian BEERMANN; Markus ZIMMER
  4. By: Clément Carbonnier (Université de Cergy-Pontoise, THEMA)
    Abstract: The present paper investigates the incidence of payroll taxation - and more generally labor income taxation - in a search and matching model. The model considers a production function with different type of workers, allowing to understand the interactions between segmented labor markets. Furthermore, the equilibrium is reach through a double process of intra-firm wage bargaining ex post and labor demand ex ante. The model is derived analytically for linear tax function differentiated for worker type, and numerically for non-linear tax functions. The bargaining power parameter is interpreted as reflecting the intra-segment substitutability, in parallel to the inter-segment substitutability deriving from the production function and the segment size and productivity. Some standard results are found, such as the wages,unemployment and incidence increasing with respect to bargaining power; or the payroll tax burden falling mainly on workers. Moreover, it is shown that over-shifting of payroll taxes on net wages may happen. It is also shown that a stronger bargaining power induced weaker direct effect of taxes but larger crossed eects on other segments. In addition, marginal incidence decreases with respect to the payroll tax level and is therefore significantly lower than mean incidence, which may induce an underestimation of overall incidence by empirical analyses. This also induces a marginally decreasing eect on loabor costs of payroll tax cuts.
    Keywords: Search and matching; segemented labor market; intra-rm bargaining; tax incidence
    JEL: H22 J31 J38
    Date: 2014
  5. By: Michael Stimmelmayr; Doina Radulescu
  6. By: S. Hokamp; G. Seibold
    Abstract: We calculate the dynamics of tax evasion within a multi-agent econophysics model which is adopted from the theory of magnetism and previously has been shown to capture the main characteristics from agent-based based models which build on the standard Allingham and Sandmo approach. In particular, we implement a feedback of public goods provision on the decision-making of selfish agents which aim to pursue their self interest. Our results imply that such a feedback enhances the moral attitude of selfish agents thus reducing the percentage of tax evasion. Two parameters govern the behavior of selfish agents, (i) the rate of adaption to changes in public goods provision and (ii) the threshold of perception of public goods provision. Furtheron we analyze the tax evasion dynamics for different agent co mpositions and under the feedback of public goods provision. We conclude that policymakers may enhance tax compliance behavior via the threshold of perception by means of targeted public relations.
    Date: 2014–09
  7. By: Bilin NEYAPTI; Zafer AKIN; Nida CAKIR

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