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on Public Finance |
| By: | Ros-Galvez, Alejandro; Rosa-García, Alfonso |
| Abstract: | We run an experiment with users of internet message boards. We find that forum users cooperate more with partners of their own forum than with partners from a different forum but they are equally altruistic when they made a gift to a partner of their forum or from another one. We also find that individuals are more active in the forums, the more altruistic they are; however, we find no relation between activity in the forum and cooperation. These results suggest that the public good provided in internet forums is mainly provided by a group of unconditional altruistic group of users, and that the feeling of community supports the cooperation in that provision. |
| Keywords: | internet forums; public good provision; altruism; cooperation |
| JEL: | C9 C90 H41 H42 L86 |
| Date: | 2014–07–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:57560&r=all |
| By: | Frederic Gonand |
| Abstract: | Redistributing the income of a carbon tax impacts the economic activity and the intergenerational inequality, which both influence the intertemporal social welfare. Thus the way a social planner recycles a carbon tax is influenced by its degree of aversion to intergenerational inequality. This article analyses the effect of social aversion to intergenerational inequality on the social choice as concerns implementing and redistributing a carbon tax. It relies on a detailed computable general equilibrium model with overlapping generations and an energy module, with a parameterisation on empirical data. We use two types of social welfare functionals which both incorporate a variable parameter measuring the degree of aversion of the social planner to intergenerational inequality. Results suggest that the social planner recycles a carbon tax through higher public expenditures if its aversion to intergenerational inequity is relatively high. This holds even if recycling through lower income taxes increases activity. |
| Keywords: | Energy transition, intergenerational redistribution, social choice, overlapping generations, carbon tax, general equilibrium. |
| JEL: | D58 D63 E62 L7 Q28 Q43 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cec:wpaper:1412&r=all |
| By: | Johannes Becker (University of Münster); Ronald B Davies (University College Dublin) |
| Abstract: | We present a new model of tax induced transfer pricing as an alterna- tive to the oft-used concealment model. Inspired by interviews with practi- tioners, we consider a large multinational firm which is audited by the tax authority in the high-tax location. When this country adjusts the transfer prices proposed by the firm, the low-tax location may dispute this decision and initiate negotiations. Since negotiations are costly, the high-tax loca- tion sets a transfer price that prevents the low-tax location from entering negotiations. We compare this model's predictions to those of the conceal- ment model. The negotiation model replicates the predictions on the tax rate effects on transfer pricing, while adding new predictions. Profit shifting is expected to fall in the high-tax country's bargaining power and to rise in firm profits and domestic firm ownership in both countries. Most impor- tantly, profit shifting occurs even if tax enforcement is perfect. We analyze the effects of an introduction of a common consolidated corporate tax base with formula apportionment and conclude that the negotiation model may change the perspective on such a policy. Specifically, strong countries with large bargaining power may find this reform unappealing. |
| Keywords: | transfer pricing, Nash bargaining, tax avoidance, corporate taxation |
| JEL: | H25 H32 H87 |
| Date: | 2014–07–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ucn:wpaper:201411&r=all |
| By: | Mouez Fodha (University Paris 1 and Paris School of Economics. Maison des Sciences Economiques); Thomas Seegmuller (Aix-Marseille University (Aix-Marseille School of Economics), CNRS-GREQAM & EHESS); Hiroaki Yamagami (Seikei University, Tokyo) |
| Abstract: | This article analyzes the consequences of environmental tax policies when the government imposes a constraint on stabilizing public debt. A public sector of pollution abatement is financed by taxation and by issuing public debt. Considering a simple overlapping-generations model, the tax reform stimulates steady-state investment. Then, the environmental quality and the aggregate consumption increase if and only if (i) pollution abatement is large enough and (ii) there is under-accumulation of the per capita capital stock. This arises if environmental taxation allows a decrease of either income taxation or debt-output ratio. |
| Keywords: | environmental tax reform, debt, public emission abatement, double dividend |
| JEL: | Q5 H23 H63 |
| Date: | 2014–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1431&r=all |
| By: | Gluszak, Michal; Marona, Bartlomiej |
| Abstract: | In order to provide a sufficient level of public services, a municipality - as a basic unit of local government in Poland - must be supplied with an adequate level of regular revenues. In a long run the level should rise proportionally to the development of the region. The main purpose of this article is to describe a role of recurrent taxes on immovable property in local government revenues in Poland. In the first part of the paper, we address the problem from international perspective, and examine revenues from recurrent taxes on immovable property in OECD countries. In the second part of the paper, we:(i) explore differences in property tax policy at local level, (ii) analyze similarities between local municipality in Poland with the use of cluster analysis,(iii) analyze relations between tax policy and tax revenues. |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arz:wpaper:eres2014_107&r=all |