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on Public Finance |
| By: | Bastani, Spencer (Uppsala Center for Fiscal Studies) |
| Abstract: | In this paper I perform numerical simulations of the discrete model of optimal income taxation employing a large number of taxpayer types. Moreover, I indicate how the results depend on the number of types used to represent the wage distribution. Finally, I compare simulations of the continuous and discrete optimal tax models under identical circumstances based on US wage data. |
| Keywords: | optimal income taxation; simulations; computational methods |
| JEL: | C63 H21 H24 |
| Date: | 2013–10–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:uufswp:2013_011&r=pub |
| By: | Fabrizio Colonna (Banca d'Italia - Banca d'Italia); Stefania Marcassa (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - CNRS : UMR8184 - Université de Cergy Pontoise) |
| Abstract: | Italy has the lowest labor force participation of women among European countries. Moreover, the participation rate of married women is positively correlated to their husbands' income. We show that a high tax schedule together with tax credits and transfers raise the burden of two-earner households, generating disincentives to work. We estimate a structural labor supply model for women, and use the estimated parameters to simulate the effects of alternative revenue-neutral tax systems. We find that joint taxation implies a drop in the participation rate. Conversely, working tax credit and gender-based taxation boost it, with the effects of the former concentrated on low educated women. |
| Keywords: | female labor force participation, Italian tax system, second earner tax rate, joint taxation, gender-based taxation, working tax credit |
| Date: | 2013–10–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00869315&r=pub |
| By: | Emmanuel Combet (CIRED - Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Développement - Centre de coopération internationale en recherche agronomique pour le développement [CIRAD] : UMR56 - CNRS : UMR8568 - École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales [EHESS] - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) - AgroParisTech); Frédéric GHERSI (CIRED - Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Développement - Centre de coopération internationale en recherche agronomique pour le développement [CIRAD] : UMR56 - CNRS : UMR8568 - École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales [EHESS] - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) - AgroParisTech); Jean-Charles Hourcade (CIRED - Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Développement - Centre de coopération internationale en recherche agronomique pour le développement [CIRAD] : UMR56 - CNRS : UMR8568 - École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales [EHESS] - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) - AgroParisTech); Daniel Théry (CIRED - Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Développement - Centre de coopération internationale en recherche agronomique pour le développement [CIRAD] : UMR56 - CNRS : UMR8568 - École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales [EHESS] - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) - AgroParisTech) |
| Abstract: | This research aims at clearing up misunderstandings about the distributive impacts of carbon taxes, which proved to be a decisive obstacle to their further consideration in public debates. It highlights the gap between partial equilibrium analyses, which are close to the agents' perception of the costs of taxation, and general equilibrium analyses, which better capture its ultimate consequences. It shows that the real impact on households' income inequality is not mechanically determined by the initial energy budgets and their flexibilities but also depends upon the way tax revenues are recycled and its general equilibrium consequences. The comparison of five tax-recycling schemes highlights the existence of trade-offs between maximizing total consumption, maximizing the consumption of the low-income classes and reducing income inequality. |
| Date: | 2013–09–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00866410&r=pub |
| By: | Federico Revelli (University of Torino) |
| Abstract: | Based on a theoretical model where state limits on local government policy elicit a move from private value (position issue) to common value (valence issue) voting, I exploit exogenous variation in tax limitation rules in over 7,000 Italian municipalities during the 2000s to show that fiscal restraints provoke a fall in voter turnout and number of mayor candidates, and a rise in elected mayors’ valence proxy and win margins. The evidence is compatible with the hypothesis of hierarchical tax limitations fading the ideological stakes of local elections and favoring valence-based party line crossing, thus questioning the influential accountability postulate of the fiscal decentralization lore. |
| Keywords: | Local elections, voter turnout, tax and expenditure limitations, fiscal decentralization |
| JEL: | D72 H77 C23 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ieb:wpaper:2013/6/doc2013-29&r=pub |