nep-pub New Economics Papers
on Public Finance
Issue of 2013‒09‒26
four papers chosen by
Kwang Soo Cheong
Johns Hopkins University

  1. The Anatomy of the VAT By Michael Keen
  2. How would the design of an alternative minimum tax impact the effective corporate tax rate in Belgium? By Daxbek, Vincent; Estache, Antonio
  3. Carbon Taxes vs. Cap and Trade: A Critical Review By Lawrence H. Goulder; Andrew Schein
  4. How Elastic are Preferences for Redistribution? Evidence from Randomized Survey Experiments By Kuziemko, Ilyana; Norton, Michael I; Saez, Emmanuel; Stantcheva, Stefanie

  1. By: Michael Keen
    Abstract: This paper sets out some tools for understanding the performance of the value added tax (VAT). Applying a decomposition of VAT revenues (as a share of GDP) to the universe of VATs over the last twenty years, it emerges that developments have been driven much less by changes in standard rates than by changes in ‘C-efficiency’ (an indicator of the departure of the VAT from a perfectly enforced tax levied at a uniform rate on all consumption). Decomposing C-efficiency into a ‘policy gap’ (in turn divided into effects of rate differentiation and exemption) and a ‘compliance’ gap (reflecting imperfect implementation), results pieced together for EU members suggest that the former are in almost all cases far larger than the latter, with rate differentiation and exemptions playing roles that differ quite widely across countries.
    Keywords: Value added tax;Tax revenues;Tax rates;Value added tax, tax gaps, tax compliance
    Date: 2013–05–16
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:13/111&r=pub
  2. By: Daxbek, Vincent; Estache, Antonio
    Abstract: The main purpose of this paper is to provide an assessment of the impact of the introduction of an alternative minimum tax (AMT) in Belgium with a focus on the impact on various distortions margins. In the process, we provide an up-to date account of the state of effective corporate taxation in the country. The current ETR is 15.7%. For a 1% of GDP increase in revenue, the ETR of an income based AMT would increase to 24.3% illustrating the potential payoff of a significant simplification of the current system. For a politically viable asset based AMT, it would roughly double the ETR. An income based AMT would somewhat reduce the distortions across sectors and firms sizes while an asset based AMT would increase it. As expected, an asset based AMT would penalize more large firms since they are more capital intensive. Small firms could actually be better off under an asset based AMT than under an income based AMT. But any decision on the AMT in Belgium is likely to be polarizing. Small firms currently represent 84% of the number of businesses, 35% of the jobs and 22.4% of the tax revenue. Large and very large firms represent less than 4% of the number of business but almost 50% of the jobs and over 60% of the tax revenue.
    Keywords: alternative minimum taxes; Belgium; corporate taxes; effective tax rates; presumptive taxation; tax avoidance
    JEL: H20 H25 H26 H32
    Date: 2013–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9481&r=pub
  3. By: Lawrence H. Goulder; Andrew Schein
    Abstract: We examine the relative attractions of a carbon tax, a “pure” cap-and-trade system, and a “hybrid” option (a cap-and-trade system with a price ceiling and/or price floor). We show that the various options are equivalent along more dimensions than often are recognized. In addition, we bring out important dimensions along which the approaches have very different impacts. Several of these dimensions have received little attention in prior literature. A key finding is that exogenous emissions pricing (whether through a carbon tax or through the hybrid option) has a number of attractions over pure cap and trade. Beyond helping prevent price volatility and reducing expected policy errors in the face of uncertainties, exogenous pricing helps avoid problematic interactions with other climate policies and helps avoid large wealth transfers to oil exporting countries.
    JEL: H23 Q50 Q54
    Date: 2013–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19338&r=pub
  4. By: Kuziemko, Ilyana; Norton, Michael I; Saez, Emmanuel; Stantcheva, Stefanie
    Abstract: This paper analyzes the effects of information about inequality and taxes on preferences for redistribution using randomized online surveys on Amazon Mechanical Turk (mTurk). About 5,000 respondents were randomized into treatments providing interactive information on U.S. income inequality, the link between top income tax rates and economic growth, and the estate tax. We find that the informational treatment has very large effects on whether respondents view inequality as an important problem. By contrast, we find quantitatively small effects of the treatment on views about policy and redistribution: support for taxing the rich increases slightly, support for transfers to the poor does not, especially among those with lower incomes and education. An exception is the estate tax---we find that informing respondents that it affects only the very richest families has an extremely large positive effect on estate tax support, even increasing respondents' willingness to write to their U.S. senator about the issue. We also find that the treatment substantially decreases trust in government, potentially mitigating respondents' willingness to translate concerns about inequality into government action. Methodologically, we explore different strategies to lower attrition in online survey platforms and show our main results are robust across methods. A small follow-up survey one month later reveals that our results persist over time. Finally, we compare mTurk with other survey vendors and provide suggestions to future researchers considering this platform.
    Keywords: Inequality; Online survey; Randomized experiment; Taxation
    JEL: D63 H2 I3
    Date: 2013–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9438&r=pub

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