nep-pub New Economics Papers
on Public Finance
Issue of 2012‒12‒10
five papers chosen by
Kwang Soo Cheong
Johns Hopkins University

  1. Optimal taxation, social contract, and the four worlds of welfare capitalism By Amedeo Spadaro; Lucia Mangiavacchi; Luca Piccoli
  2. What Drives Tax Morale? By Christian Daude; Hamlet Gutiérrez; Ángel Melguizo
  3. Indirect Taxation and Privatization in a Model of Government's Preference By Choi, Kangsik
  4. Effectiveness of Tax and Price Policies for Tobacco Control By WHO
  5. Reciprocal Relationships in Tax Compliance Decisions By Cécile Bazart; Aurélie Bonein

  1. By: Amedeo Spadaro (Universitat de les Illes Balears); Lucia Mangiavacchi (Universitat de les Illes Balears); Luca Piccoli (Universitat de les Illes Balears)
    Abstract: Drawing from the formal setting of the optimal tax theory, the paper identifies the level of Rawlsianism (or aversion to poverty) of the European social planners starting from the observation of real data and redistribution systems and builds a metric that allows measuring the degree of (dis)similarity of the redistribution systems analyzed. The shape of the social welfare function implicit in tax-benefit systems is recovered by inverting the optimal taxation model on actual effective tax rates, assuming that existing systems are optimal for some Mirrleesian social planner. Actual distributions of incomes before and after redistribution are obtained using a European survey on incomes and living conditions of households (EU-SILC 2007). Results are discussed in the light of standard classifications of welfare regimes in Europe. There appears to be a clear coincidence of high decommodification willingness and high Rawlsianism in the Scandinavian, social-democratically influenced welfare states. There is an equally clear coincidence of low decommodification willingness and utilitarianism in the Southern European welfare states. The Continental European countries group closely together in the middle of the scale (except Germany that scores among the highest), as corporatist and etatist. Anglo-Saxon liberal welfare states score close to Continental European countries. Finally the group of Eastern European countries seems to split in two subgroups, one similar to the Continental European countries and one, mostly composed by Baltic countries, with scarce willingness to decommodify citizens, similar to the Southern European model.
    Keywords: Optimal income taxation; tax-benefit policy; comparative social policy analysis; welfare state models
    JEL: H11 H21 D63 C63
    Date: 2012
  2. By: Christian Daude; Hamlet Gutiérrez; Ángel Melguizo
    Abstract: This paper reviews the literature and contributes with some evidence based on the World Values Survey on the drivers of tax morale around the world, with an emphasis on developing countries. It shows that socio-economic factors such as age, religion, gender, employment status and educational attainment have a significant impact on people’s levels of tax morale. In terms of institutional determinants, it finds that the satisfaction with democracy, trust in government and the satisfaction with the quality of public services plays an important role in increasing tax morale. The paper also discusses future directions for research and policy action in this area.<BR>Cet article propose une revue de la littérature existante et apporte de nouveaux éléments empiriques sur la base de données provenant de la World Values Survey, sur les déterminants de la morale fiscale dans le monde, et dans les pays en développement en particulier. Il montre que les facteurs socio-économiques tels que l’âge, la religion, le genre, la situation professionnelle et la réussite scolaire ont un effet significatif sur le degré de morale fiscale des individus. Concernant les déterminants institutionnels, l’article montre que le degré de morale fiscale des individus dépend également du niveau de satisfaction avec le système démocratique, de confiance dans le gouvernement et de satisfaction quant à la qualité des services publics. L’article conclut en proposant des pistes/orientations futures de recherche et des recommandations politiques dans ce domaine.
    Keywords: tax policy, developing countries, tax morale, politique fiscale, pays en développement, morale fiscale
    JEL: E62 I38 P16
    Date: 2012–11–23
  3. By: Choi, Kangsik
    Abstract: By introducing the government's preference for tax revenues into unionized mixed duopolies, this paper investigates how the preference can change the government's choice of tax regimes between ad valorem and specific taxes. Main results are as follows. Given that one of the tax regimes is predetermined, privatization never improves welfare and privatization is preferable for the government when it emphasizes its tax revenue. However, when the tax regime is {\it endogenously} determined by the government, privatization is preferable from the viewpoint of social welfare if the government heavily emphasizes its tax revenue. Thus, there are conflicts of interest between the public firm and the government: If it heavily emphasizes its tax revenue, then the government always has the incentive to levy specific tax, while the public firm has the incentive to be levied by ad valorem. However, there are no conflicts of interest between the public firm and the government when the government levies the specific tax if the government less emphasizes its tax revenue. Interestingly, the government never has the incentive for privatization if the government considers either tax as an option.
    Keywords: Ad Valorem; Specific Tax; Government's Payoff; Social Welfare; Privatization
    JEL: C79 J51 L13 L33 D43 H44
    Date: 2012–11–30
  4. By: WHO
    Abstract: This new volume of the IARC Handbooks of Cancer Prevention in Tobacco Control presents a critical review and evaluation of the evidence by 25 international experts from twelve countries on the economics, epidemiology, public policy and tobacco control aspects of tax and price policies. The working group draws conclusions about the effectiveness of tax and price measures to control tobacco use in the population. The Handbook covers an overview of tobacco taxation; industry pricing strategies and other industry initiatives diluting the effects of taxes on consumption; tax, price and aggregated demand for tobacco, as well as demand at the individual level in adults, young people and the economically disadvantaged; tax avoidance and tax evasion and the economic and health impacts of tobacco taxation. This body of evidence and the consensus evaluation of 18 concluding statements on the impact of interventions to increase the price of tobacco products, can assist policy makers, government officials, evaluators and researchers working in tobacco control and disease prevention, to base their decisions on the latest scientific evidence.
    Keywords: Public Health
    Date: 2012–01–31
  5. By: Cécile Bazart (LAMETA, University of Montpellier I, France); Aurélie Bonein (University of Rennes 1 - CREM UMR CNRS 6211, France)
    Abstract: Reciprocity considerations are important to the tax compliance problem as they may explain the global dynamics of tax evasion, beyond individual tax evasion decisions, toward a downward or upward spiral. To provide evidence on reciprocity in tax compliance decisions, we have conducted a laboratory experiment in which we introduced two types of inequities. The first type of inequity is called vertical, because it refers to inequities introduced by the government when it sets different fiscal parameters for identical taxpayers, while the second type of inequity is called horizontal because it refers to the fact that taxpayers may differ in tax compliance decisions. In this setting, taxpayers may react to a disadvantageous or advantageous inequity through negative or positive reciprocal behaviors, respectively. Our results support the existence of negative and positive reciprocity in both vertical and horizontal cases. When both inequities come into play and may induce reciprocal behaviors in opposite directions, the horizontal always dominates the vertical.
    Keywords: Behavioral economics; Experimental economics; Fairness; Tax evasion; Tax compliance
    JEL: H26 C91
    Date: 2012–11

This nep-pub issue is ©2012 by Kwang Soo Cheong. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.