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on Public Finance |
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Issue of 2011‒04‒09
four papers chosen by |
| By: | Francisco J. Delgado (University of Oviedo); Santiago Lago-Peñas (REDE, IEB and University of Vigo); Matías Mayor (University of Oviedo) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the determinants of local tax rates. For the two main local taxes in Spain - the property tax and the motor vehicle tax - we test the existence of tax mimicking, yardstick competition and political trends in a sample of 2,713 municipalities. Using different spatial models, the results support the hypothesis of tax mimicking, with coefficients over 0.40. We also show the relevance of political variables such as the ideology of the incumbents and political fragmentation. The fact that incumbents with weaker political support display stronger mimicking behaviour is interpreted as evidence in favour of yardstick competition. Finally, we find incumbents mimic neighbouring municipalities ruled by the same political party, confirming the political trends hypothesis. |
| Keywords: | Local taxation, tax mimicking, yardstick competition, political trends |
| JEL: | C31 H71 H77 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ieb:wpaper:2011/3/doc2011-4&r=pub |
| By: | John Freebairn (University of Melbourne); John Quiggin (Department of Economics, University of Queensland) |
| Abstract: | The mining industry in Australia, and in most other countries, pay special taxes for the use of community owned resources in additional to taxes levied on businesses in general. General taxes include the corporate income tax, payroll and transaction taxes, and labour pay personal income taxes. In the states and territories the additional tax in most cases takes the form of a royalty levied as a tax on production, either as a specific tax per unit of production or as an ad valorem percentage of the value per unit mined. Details are in The Treasury (2008). In the case of offshore energy resources, the commonwealth imposes a special tax either as a royalty or as the petroleum resource rent tax (PRRT) (The Treasury, 2008). |
| Date: | 2010–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rsm:pubpol:p10_3&r=pub |
| By: | Mathieu Lefebvre; Pierre Pestieau; Arno Riedl; Marie Claire Villeval |
| Abstract: | In a series of experiments conducted in Belgium (Wallonia and Flanders), France and the Netherlands, we compare behavior regarding tax evasion and welfare dodging, with and without information about others’ behavior. Subjects have to decide between a ‘registered’ income, the realization of which will be known to the tax authority for sure, and an ‘unregistered’ income that will only be known with some probability. This unregistered income comes from self-employment in the Tax treatment and from black labor supplementing some unemployment compensation in the Welfare treatment. Subjects have then to decide on whether reporting their income or not, knowing the risk of detection. The results show that (i) individuals evade more in the Welfare treatment than in the Tax treatment; (ii) many subjects choose an option that allows for tax evasion or welfare fraud but report their income honestly anyway; (iii) examples of low compliance tend to increase tax evasion while examples of high compliance exert no influence; (iv) tax evasion is more frequent in France and the Netherlands; Walloons evade taxes less than the Flemish. There is no cross-country difference in welfare dodging. |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rpp:wpaper:1103&r=pub |
| By: | Diego Lubian (Department of Economics (University of Verona)); Luca Zarri (Department of Economics (University of Verona)) |
| Abstract: | This paper presents empirical evidence that \tax morale" - taxpayers' intrinsic motivation to pay taxes - constitutes a new determinant of happiness, even after controlling for several demographic and socioeconomic factors. Using data on Italian households for 2004, we assess the strength of tax morale by relying on single items as well as composite multi-item indices. Our main result that scal honesty generates a higher hedonic payo than cheating is in line with Harbaugh et al. (2007)'s neuroeconomic nding. Further, it sheds light on the well-known \puzzle of compliance", that is the fact that many individuals pay taxes even when expected penalty and audit probability are extremely low: tax compliance is less puzzling once we show that not only it is materially costly, but also provides sizeable non-pecuniary benets that make it rewarding in itself. |
| Keywords: | Happiness, Tax Morale, Tax Compliance |
| Date: | 2011–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ver:wpaper:04/2011&r=pub |