nep-pub New Economics Papers
on Public Finance
Issue of 2009‒12‒05
four papers chosen by
Kwang Soo Cheong
Johns Hopkins University

  1. Confusion and Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Public Good Games By Ralph-C Bayer; Elke Renner; Rupert Sausgruber
  2. Endowments, Fiscal Federalism, and the Cost of Capital for States: Evidence from Brazil, 1891-1930 By André Martínez; Aldo Musacchio
  3. Voluntary Public Goods Provision, Coalition Formation, and Uncertainty By Nicholas E. Burger; Charles D. Kolstad
  4. Pros and Cons of various fiscal measures to stimulate the economy By Carine Bouthevillain; John Caruana; Cristina Checherita; Jorge Cunha; Esther Gordo; Stephan Haroutunian; Amela Hubic; Geert Langenus; Bernhard Manzke; Javier J. Pérez; Pietro Tommasino

  1. By: Ralph-C Bayer (School of Economics, University of Adelaide); Elke Renner (School of Economics, University of Nottingham); Rupert Sausgruber (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen)
    Abstract: We use a limited information environment to mimic the state of confusion in an experimental, repeated public goods game. The results show that reinforcement learning leads to dynamics similar to those observed in standard public goods games. However, closer inspection shows that individual decay of contributions in standard public goods games cannot be fully explained by reinforcement learning. According to our estimates, learning only accounts for 41 percent of the decay in contributions in standard public goods games. The contribution dynamics of subjects, who are identi?ed as conditional cooperators, di®er strongly from the learning dynamics, while a learning model estimated from the limited information treatment tracks behavior for subjects, who cannot be classi?ed as conditional cooperators, reasonably well.
    Keywords: public goods experiments, learning, limited information, confusion, conditional cooperation
    JEL: C90 D83 H41
    Date: 2009–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2009-18&r=pub
  2. By: André Martínez; Aldo Musacchio
    Abstract: In this paper, we contribute to the discussion of what determines country risk by arguing that an important explanatory factor is the impact that commodities have on the capacity to pay. We use a newly created data base with state-level fiscal and risk premium data for Brazil states between 1891 and 1930 to show that Brazilian states with natural endowments that allowed them to export commodities that were in high demand ended up having higher revenues per capita and, thus, lower cost of capital. We also explain that the variation in revenues per capita across states was both a product of the variation in natural endowments and a commodity boom that had asymmetric effects among states. We end by running instrumental variable estimates using indices of export prices for each state to instrument for revenues per capita. Our IV estimates confirm our results that states with commodities that had higher price increases had lower risk premia.
    Keywords: State public debt, fiscal decentralization, endowments, public revenue.
    JEL: H71 H74 N26 N46 N96
    Date: 2009–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdm:wpaper:2009-12&r=pub
  3. By: Nicholas E. Burger; Charles D. Kolstad
    Abstract: The literature on voluntary provision of public goods includes recent theoretical work on the formation of voluntary coalitions to provide public goods. Theory is ambiguous on the equilibrium coalition size and contribution rates. We examine the emergence of coalitions, their size, and how uncertainty in public goods provision affects contribution levels and coalition size. We find that contributions decrease when public good returns are uncertain but increase when individuals can form a coalition to provide the good. Contrary a core theoretical result, we find that coalition size increases when the public good benefits are higher. Uncertainty has no effect on coalition size.
    JEL: C7 C91 C92 H23 H4 H41 Q5 Q54
    Date: 2009–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15543&r=pub
  4. By: Carine Bouthevillain; John Caruana; Cristina Checherita; Jorge Cunha; Esther Gordo; Stephan Haroutunian; Amela Hubic; Geert Langenus; Bernhard Manzke; Javier J. Pérez; Pietro Tommasino
    Abstract: We review the theoretical and empirical literature on the effects of discretionary fiscal policies, against the background of renewed fiscal policy activism. In this sense, we analyze the main pros and cons of various fiscal tools to stimulate the economy. We show that it is extremely difficult to elaborate an unambiguous catalogue of measures defining an ?optimal? fiscal package. Among the requirements that fiscal measures should be ?timely, targeted and temporary? (TTT), the implementation of the first one ? timeliness ? is the least controversial criterion in the current situation. On the basis of the literature review, we provide some hints on the appropriate composition of a fiscal stimulus packages. The review of the pros and cons of short-term fiscal stimulus packages cannot be decoupled from the discussion of the ?exit strategies?, i.e. the means of financing fiscal expansions, and the intertemporal consistency of fiscal plans.
    Date: 2009–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bcl:bclwop:cahier_etudes_40&r=pub

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