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on Public Finance |
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Issue of 2009‒06‒10
three papers chosen by |
| By: | François Gourio (Boston University, Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | A capital income tax cut must in general be financed by increasing other taxes, and thus will have redistributive effects. This paper studies analytically the redistribution implied by a capital income tax cut in the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans neoclassical growth model when agents differ in wealth and human capital and markets are frictionless. A few parameters a¤ect the efficiency benefits and redistributive costs of capital taxation, and determine the set of agents who are in favor of a capital income tax cut. For plausible parameter values, a majority would lose from the tax cut, i.e. high capital taxes may be politically sustainable. |
| Date: | 2008–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2008-001&r=pub |
| By: | Yili Chien; Junsang Lee |
| Abstract: | We study optimal capital income taxation with a Ramsey problem and relate this optimal taxation problem to the question that has been asked in the asset pricing literature, which is why the risk free interest rate is too low. We show that the Ramsey planner chooses the optimal level of capital stock to be one that satisfies the modified golden rule in the steady state under some conditions. The conditions include sufficient government tax instruments and ability to issue bonds. We argue that the optimal capital level is different from that chosen in a competitive equilibrium unless the competitive equilibrium risk free interest rate is same as the time discount rate in the steady state. This difference in the choice of capital motivates imposing a positive capital income tax (or subsidy) on households to induce them to invest at the socially optimal amount. As examples, we investigate optimal capital taxation in a decentralized economy with limited commitment and one with private information. However, the result still holds in various types of economies with risk free interest rate that is too low. |
| JEL: | D86 E23 E44 E62 |
| Date: | 2009–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:acb:camaaa:2009-05&r=pub |
| By: | Yili Chien; Junsang Lee |
| Abstract: | We study optimal capital taxation under limited commitment. We prove that the optimal tax rate on capital income should be positive in steady state provided that full risk-sharing is not feasible. In a limited commitment environment, a one unit increase of capital investment by an agent increases all individuals' autarky values in the economy and generates externality costs in the economy. This externality cost provides a rationale for positive capital taxation even in the absence of government expenditure. Moreover, we show that both this externality cost of capital investment and the optimal tax rate are potentially much bigger than one might expect. |
| Date: | 2009–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:acb:camaaa:2009-06&r=pub |