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on Public Finance |
| By: | Thor O. Thoresen, Jørgen Aasness and Zhiyang Jia (Statistics Norway) |
| Abstract: | Procedures of revenue estimation of changes in the personal income tax are discussed. Using revenue estimates of the 2006 tax cuts in the personal income tax in Norway as an example, we show that estimates of costs of cuts differ substantially when different effects are brought into consideration. Estimates of revenue effects which take labor supply responses and effects through indirect taxation and corporate taxes into account are presented and contrasted with estimates obtained by current procedures. Our estimates indicate that a substantial part of the initial outlay is returned; approximately 56 percent comes back as increased tax revenues from other tax bases and increased personal income tax following from labor supply adjustments. |
| Keywords: | tax revenue estimates; scoring procedures; microsimulation |
| JEL: | H24 H31 |
| Date: | 2008–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ssb:dispap:545&r=pub |
| By: | Johann K. Brunner (Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria); Susanne Pech (Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria) |
| Abstract: | We incorporate the fact that inheritances create a second distinguishing characteristic of individuals, in addition to earning abilities, into an optimum income taxation model with bequests motivated by joy of giving. We show that a tax on inheritances and a uniform tax on all expenditures including bequests are equivalent and that either is desirable, according to an intertemporal social objective, if on average high-able individuals have larger inherited endowments than low-able. We demonstrate that such a situation results as the outcome of a process with stochastic transition of abilities over generations, if all descendants are more probable to have their parent’s ability rank than any other. |
| Keywords: | inheritance tax |
| JEL: | H21 H24 |
| Date: | 2008–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jku:econwp:2008_06&r=pub |
| By: | Aidt, T.; Jensen, P.S. |
| Abstract: | The introduction of income taxation was a landmark in the development of the fiscal state in Western Europe and elsewhere. This paper presents an event history study of the adoption of the income tax in 11 Western European countries between 1815 and 1941. We find evidence that social learning, reductions in tax collection costs and to a lesser extend spending pressures played a significant role for the adoption decision. Surprisingly, we also .nd evidence that the extension of the franchise reduced the likelihood of adoption of the income tax. |
| Keywords: | Voting franchise, social learning, tax collection technology, public finance, income taxation. |
| JEL: | D7 H1 |
| Date: | 2007–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:0766&r=pub |
| By: | Kaplanoglou, G.; Newbery , D.M. |
| Abstract: | Non-uniform indirect taxes treat equals and those unequal differently (horizontal inequity and vertical redistribution). Horizontal inequity is caused by taste differences among similar households, but some excises are designed to reflect social, not revealed, preferences. We apply two methodologies for decomposing the overall redistributive effect of the present and three alternative indirect tax structures into vertical and horizontal effects for Greece, using the Household Expenditure Survey micro-database. In all cases the taste component is considerable, even when we allow for social preferences, while improvements in vertical redistribution can be achieved, albeit at the cost of increased horizontal inequity. |
| Keywords: | distributional effect of taxes, horizontal inequality, vertical redistribution, indirect tax reform, Greece. |
| JEL: | D63 H23 D30 |
| Date: | 2008–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:0806&r=pub |
| By: | Michael D. Grubb; Paul Oyer |
| Abstract: | We use university parking permits to study how firms and employees split the value of employee benefit tax subsidies. Starting in 1998, the IRS allowed employees to pay for parking passes with pre-tax income. This subsidized the parking pass purchases of faculty and staff, but did not affect students. We show that the typical university raised its parking rates by 8-10% extra when it implemented a pre-tax payment system, but that this increase was the same for those affected by the tax change and those that were not affected. We conclude that university employees captured much of the new tax benefit, that faculty and staff that purchase permits benefited relative to those that do not purchase permits, and that students that purchase permits were made worse off relative to those that do not buy permits. We discuss what these results suggest about universities' objectives in setting their parking prices and about the demand for university parking. |
| JEL: | H25 H32 J32 K35 K49 |
| Date: | 2008–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14062&r=pub |