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on Public Finance |
| By: | Donald , Vandegrift; Michael, Lahr |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the effect of public acquisitions of open space on house prices and the municipal tax base. While a series of studies show that open space acquisitions raise values of nearby properties, no research to date appears to focus upon the effect of open space acquisitions upon local tax base. Existing studies focus on the effect of open space acreage on house prices. We examine the effect of open space expenditures on house prices at the municipal level. We find that a one-dollar increase in open space expenditures per housing unit is associated with average house prices that are about $13 higher and with a tax base that is about $15 lower per acre. Open space expenditures per housing unit also show a consistent positive effect on the percentage change in house prices over the period 1995-2000. However, we find no statistically significant effect from open space expenditures on the percentage change in the tax base over the period 1995-2000. Local funding (rather than state funding) for open space has a smaller impact on house prices but the effect is significant only in some specifications. Despite the negative effect of open space purchases on the tax base, we find that higher open space expenditures are associated with lower tax rates. In addition, we find that while higher tax rates are associated with a lower tax base, a larger tax base does depress tax rates. The percentage change in the general property tax rate over the period 1995-2000 shows a significant negative effect on the percentage change in the tax base per acre over the period. |
| Keywords: | Open Space; Tax Base; Municipality; Tax Rate |
| JEL: | H4 H2 R51 R52 |
| Date: | 2007–09–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:6118&r=pub |
| By: | Arnstein Aassve (Istituto Metodi Quantitavi Quantitativi, Università Bocconi); Maria Grazia Pazienza (Dipartimento Studi sullo Stato, Università degli Studi di Firenze); Chiara Rapallini (Dipartimento Studi sullo Stato, Università degli Studi di Firenze) |
| Abstract: | The possible implications of using the family as opposed to the individual as the unit of taxation are not clear. This applies both to work incentives and distributional outcomes. In this paper we evaluate the effects of a hypothetical reform for Italian income taxation with respect to labour supply. In particular, we analyze potential labour supply effects by considering a shift from the current system of individual taxation to a system of family taxation similar to the French family splitting approach. The analysis is based on an econometric model of labour supply that is embedded in a tax–benefit model. Using data from the Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth, our simulation results show relatively small effects on the total labour supply but a decrease in female labour supply. |
| Keywords: | tax benefit system, fiscal reform, labour supply, microsimulation |
| JEL: | D31 H24 H31 J22 C15 |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inq:inqwps:ecineq2007-77&r=pub |
| By: | Emanuele, Canegrati |
| Abstract: | In this paper I analyse a probabilistic voting model where political candidates choose a direct taxation policy to maximise the probability of winning elections. Society is divided into groups which have di¤erent preferences for consumption of leisure or, in other words, are di¤erently single-minded on the amount of leisure. The use of a probabilistic voting model characterized by the presence of single-minded groups breaks down the classic results obtained by using the median voter theorem, because it is no longer only the level of income which drives the equilibrium policies but also the ability of groups to focus on leisure. The robustness of these results is also demonstrated in the presence of heterogeneity in the labour income. Finally, using data from the Luxemburg Income Study, I demon- strate that the cohort-speci c inequality is signi cantly a¤ected by the structure of the taxation system and that policies chosen by politicians do not seem to be originated by the goal of equality. |
| Keywords: | Probabilistic Voting Theory; Single-mindedness; Direct Tax- ation; Income Distribution |
| JEL: | D63 D31 H24 J22 D78 |
| Date: | 2007–12–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:6117&r=pub |
| By: | Canegrati, Emanuele |
| Abstract: | In this paper I analyse a probabilistic voting model where self-interested governments set their taxation policies in order to maximise the probabil- ity of winning elections. Society is divided into groups which have di¤erent preferences for the consumption of goods. Results show how candidates are captured by the most powerful groups, which not necessarily repre- sent the median voter but may be located at more extreme positions. The introduction of a probabilistic voting model characterized by the presence of single-minded groups overrules the classic results achieved by the me- dian voter theorem, because it is no longer the position on the income scale to drive the equilibrium policy but the ability of groups to focus on their most preferred goods, instead. This ability allows them to achieve a strong political power which candidates cannot help going along with, because they would lose elections otherwise. |
| Keywords: | Probabilistic Voting Theory; Single-mindedness; Indirect Taxation; Public Expenditure |
| JEL: | D11 H24 H53 |
| Date: | 2007–12–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:6116&r=pub |