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on Public Finance |
| By: | Raj Chetty; Emmanuel Saez |
| Abstract: | Recent empirical studies of dividend taxation have found that: (1) dividend tax cuts cause large, immediate increases in dividend payouts, and (2) the increases are driven by firms with high levels of shareownership among top executives or the board of directors. These findings are inconsistent with existing "old view" and "new view" theories of dividend taxation. We propose a simple alternative theory of dividend taxation in which managers and shareholders have conflicting interests, and show that it can explain the evidence. Using this agency model, we develop an empirically implementable formula for the efficiency cost of dividend taxation. The key determinant of the efficiency cost is the nature of private contracting. If the contract between shareholders and the manager is second-best efficient, deadweight burden follows the standard Harberger formula and is second-order (small) despite the pre-existing distortion of over-investment by the manager. If the contract is second-best inefficient -- as is likely when firms are owned by diffuse shareholders because of incentives to free-ride when monitoring managers -- dividend taxation generates a first-order (large) efficiency cost. An illustrative calibration of the formula using empirical estimates from the 2003 dividend tax reform in the U.S. suggests that the efficiency cost of raising the dividend tax rate could be close to the amount of revenue raised. |
| JEL: | G3 H20 |
| Date: | 2007–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13538&r=pub |
| By: | Patricia Apps |
| Abstract: | Cross country comparisons of lifecycle labour supplies show that female hours of market work are significantly lower in Australia than in other comparable OECD countries, notably, the US, UK and Sweden. This paper argues that an explanation can be found in the rate structure of the Australian family income tax system, in combination with a poorly developed and costly childcare sector. A detailed analysis of marginal and average tax rates shows how various policy instruments are used to set rates on the income of a second earner, typically the female partner, that reduce her net wage to a level that makes it difficult to finance childcare from the additional income. The system is also shown to be unfair. The paper proposes a return to a progressive individual income tax, with universal family benefits, together with the development of a high quality, education oriented, public sector childcare system. |
| Keywords: | Income Taxes, Time Allocation, Labor Supply, Life Cycle Choices |
| JEL: | H24 J22 D91 |
| Date: | 2007–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:auu:dpaper:560&r=pub |