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on Public Finance |
| By: | James R. Hines Jr. |
| Abstract: | Throughout American history, the U.S. federal and state governments have imposed excise taxes on commodities such as alcohol and tobacco (and more recently, gasoline and firearms). Rates of such "sin" taxation, and consumption taxation broadly (including sales taxes and value-added taxes), are currently much lower in the United States than they are in Europe, Japan, and other affluent parts of the world. In part, this reflects relative government sizes, but that is not the whole story, since even controlling for total tax collections, levels of national income, government decentralization, and openness to international trade, the United States imposes unusually low excise and consumption taxes. As a result, the United States relies to a much greater degree than other countries on personal and corporate income taxes, thereby affording fewer opportunities to use the tax system to protect individuals and the environment by discouraging the consumption of "sinful" commodities, and instead simply discouraging saving and investment. |
| JEL: | H20 H23 H71 |
| Date: | 2006–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12730&r=pub |
| By: | Edith Archambault (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - [CNRS : UMR8174] - [Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I]) |
| Abstract: | After a brief overview of the historical background, the main object of this chapter is to analyse the type of relationship that have been developed between the government, at its different levels, and the non-profit organisations, in the recent years, and the consequences of these new relationship on the traditional functions of non-profit organisations |
| Keywords: | nonprofit organisations; public/private partnership; welfare mix; decentralisation; social services; antiselection |
| Date: | 2006–12–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:papers:halshs-00119115_v1&r=pub |
| By: | Lohse, Tim; Julio R. Robledo; Ulrich Schmidt |
| Abstract: | Many public goods like dams, fire departments, and lighthouses do not provide direct utility but act more as insurance devices against floods, fire, and shipwreck. They either diminish the probability or the size of the loss. We extend the public good model with this insurance aspect and generalize Samuelson's efficient allocation rule when self-insurance and self-protection expenditures are pure public goods. Some comparative static results with respect to changes in income and risk behavior are derived. As some of the sketched risks are insurable while some others are not, we introduce further the possibility of risk coverage by private market insurance. We analyze the interaction of such an insurance with the public good level, both for efficient provision and for private provision equilibria. It turns out that the levels of self-insurance and self-protection decrease when being privately provided. Moreover, it appears a strategic substitutability between the public good and market insurance which leads to an additional decline of the provision levels. |
| Keywords: | self-insurance, self-protection, efficient provision of public goods, private provision of public goods, market insurance |
| JEL: | G22 H41 |
| Date: | 2006–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:han:dpaper:dp-354&r=pub |