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on Public Finance |
| By: | Kenneth L. Judd (Hoover Institution); Che-Lin Su (CMS-EMS Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University) |
| Keywords: | optimal income taxation, multidimensional types, adverse selection, nonlinear optimization |
| JEL: | H21 |
| Date: | 2006–07–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sce:scecfa:471&r=pub |
| By: | Javier Diaz-Gimenez (Universidad Carlos III) |
| Keywords: | Flat-tax reforms; Efficiency; Inequality; Earnings distribution; Income distribution |
| JEL: | D31 E62 H23 |
| Date: | 2006–07–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sce:scecfa:400&r=pub |
| By: | Gaobo Pang (Dept. of Economics University of Maryland); University of Maryland |
| JEL: | E21 H55 H31 |
| Date: | 2006–07–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sce:scecfa:31&r=pub |
| By: | Jürgen von Hagen (ZEI, University of Bonn, Indiana University, and CEPR) |
| Abstract: | We discuss two essential problems of the political economy of public finances: The principal agent problem between voters and elected politicians and the common pool problem arising from the fact that money drawn from a general tax fund is used to pay for policies targeting more or less narrow groups in society. Three institutional mechanisms exist to deal with these problems, ex-ante rules controlling the behavior of elected policy makers, electoral rules creating accountability of and competition among policy makers, and budgeting processes internalizing the common pool externality. We review recent theoretical and empirical research and discuss its implications for research and institutional design. |
| Keywords: | electoral systems, fiscal rules, budgeting processes |
| JEL: | H11 H61 H62 |
| Date: | 2005–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trf:wpaper:149&r=pub |
| By: | Jorge Baca-Campodónico; Luiz de Mello; Andrei Kirilenko |
| Abstract: | This paper provides cross-country empirical evidence on the productivity of bank transaction taxes (BTTs). Our data set comprises six Latin American countries that have levied BTTs since the late 1980s: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. We find that, for a given tax rate, revenue declines over time. Therefore, in order to meet a fixed revenue target in real terms, the tax rate needs to be raised repeatedly. However, we also find that successive increases in the tax rate erode the tax base by more than they raise revenue yield and that the higher the increase in the tax rate, the more and faster the tax base is eroded. We conclude that BTTs do not provide a reliable source of revenue, especially over the medium term. <BR>Ce document fournit une étude empirique de comparaison internationale sur la productivité des impôts sur les transactions bancaires (ITB). Notre base de données correspond à 6 pays d’Amérique latine qui ont un impôt sur les transactions bancaires: Argentine, Brésil, Colombie, Équateur, Pérou et Venezuela. Nous trouvons que le revenu diminue au fil du temps pour un taux d’imposition donné. Pour cette raison, le taux d’imposition doit être augmenté régulièrement en vue d’atteindre une cible de revenu en terme réel. Cependant, nous voyons que les augmentations successives des taux d’imposition réduisent l’assiette d’imposition plus que le rendement obtenu, et plus grande est la hausse du taux d’imposition, plus rapide est l’érosion de l’assiette d’imposition. Nous concluons que l’imposition des transactions bancaires ne fournit pas une source de revenu fiable, particulièrement sur le moyen terme. |
| Keywords: | bank transaction tax, bank debit tax , tax productivity, impôts sur les transactions bancaires, impôt sur les retraits bancaires, productivité des impôts |
| JEL: | G28 G29 H21 H22 |
| Date: | 2006–06–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:494-en&r=pub |
| By: | Ugo Albertazzi (Research Department Banca d'Italia) |
| Keywords: | Tax-Shifting, Corporate Income Tax, Bank Profitability |
| JEL: | C53 G20 G21 |
| Date: | 2006–07–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sce:scecfa:364&r=pub |
| By: | Tipparat Pongthanapanich (Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Faculty of Economics, Kasetsart University) |
| Abstract: | “If Thai shrimp farming were taxed, how much should it be?” is the key re-search question of this paper. The dynamic-constraint optimization model in-corporating accumulated nutrient load from farm discharges is applied in the analysis. The model implies some tax has to be imposed on stock externality that is equal to increasing shadow cost of nutrient stock before damage occurs. However, the simulation results show very small shadow costs at the beginning of the paths and indicate that nutrient load in Andaman has a negligible effect on the sea but significant on the Gulf of Thailand. A socially efficient level of production for Thailand would be around 70-80% of private optimal produc-tion. The tax regime ensures a higher net gain from trade than at private opti-mum but it is ambiguous in term of net social welfare. |
| Keywords: | Green tax, stock externality, shrimp farming, Gulf of Thailand, Andaman Sea |
| Date: | 2005–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sdk:wpaper:64&r=pub |