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on Public Finance |
| By: | Hans Jarle Kind; Marko Köthenbürger; Guttorm Schjelderup |
| Abstract: | This paper shows that consumers may buy more of a taxed good if it is sold by a two-sided platform firm. Two-sided platform industries serve distinct customer groups that are connected through interdependent demand, and include major businesses such as the media industry (newspapers/magazines and advertisers), banking (cardholder and merchant), and the software industry (users and application developers). The paper compares ad-valorem and specific taxes and shows that they may have opposite effects on quantities sold, and that the ad-valorem tax - the most commonly used tax throughout the OECD - has effects on prices and quantities not previously recognized. |
| Keywords: | two-sided markets, ad-valorem taxes, specific taxes |
| JEL: | D40 D43 H21 H22 L13 |
| Date: | 2005 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1635&r=pub |
| By: | Stefan Bach; Giacomo Corneo; Viktor Steiner |
| Abstract: | We analyze the distribution and taxation of top incomes in Germany during the 1990s on the basis of individual tax returns data. We derive a measure of economic income from taxable gross income as reported in the tax returns. Thanks to complete sampling, we can deliver a very precise description of very high incomes, in terms of both distribution and composition by source. We also provide a measure of the effective average rate of taxation for various income groups. Our main findings are as follows: (i) incomes are highly concentrated in Germany, more than commonly thought; (ii) the German economic elite relies much less than elites in France or the US upon income from wages and salaries; (iii) income taxes are highly concentrated in Germany, more than commonly thought; (iv) although effective tax rates are significantly lower than statutory ones, the income tax is effectively progressive; (v) income taxation substantially reduces income inequality in Germany. |
| Keywords: | income distribution, personal income tax, taxing the rich |
| JEL: | D31 H24 H26 |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1641&r=pub |
| By: | Johann K. Brunner; Susanne Pech |
| Abstract: | The market for private life annuities is characterised by adverse selection, that is, contracts offer lower than fair payoffs to individuals with low life expectancy. Moreover, life expectancy and income have been found to be positively correlated. The paper shows that a linear tax on annuity payoffs, which raises more revenues from long-living individuals than from short-living, represents an appropriate instrument for redistribution, in addition to an optimally designed labour income tax. Further, we find that a nonlinear tax on annuity payoffs can be directly employed to correct the distortion of the rate of return caused by asymmetric information. These results are contrasted with theoretical findings concerning the role of a tax on capital income. |
| Keywords: | optimum taxation, life annuities, adverse selection |
| JEL: | G20 H20 |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1642&r=pub |