|
on Public Finance |
| By: | Gilbert E. Metcalf |
| Abstract: | I measure the industry impacts of an environmental tax reform where a carbon tax is used to finance full or partial corporate tax integration. I find that the industry impacts of such a reform are likely to be modest (in the sense of impacts on returns on equity). |
| Date: | 2005 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tuf:tuftec:0519&r=pub |
| By: | Panu Poutvaara (University of Helsinki, CEBR, CESifo, HECER and IZA Bonn) |
| Abstract: | Migration between countries with earnings-related and flat-rate pay-as-you-go social security systems may change human capital investments in both countries. The possibility of emigration boosts investments in human capital in the country with flat-rate benefits. Correspondingly, those expecting to migrate from the country with earnings-related benefits to a country with flat-rate benefits may reduce their investment in education. With suitably planned transfers between the two countries, allowing for migration may generate a Paretoimprovement for all current and future generations. Without transfers, either country may be unable to pay for promised benefits when labor becomes mobile. |
| Keywords: | social security, education, migration, earnings-related and flat-rate pensions |
| JEL: | H55 I2 F22 |
| Date: | 2005–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1729&r=pub |
| By: | Marte Rønning (Centre for Economic Research and Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology); Jon Hernes Fiva (Centre for Economic Research and Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology) |
| Abstract: | Recent theoretical contributions have emphasized the favorable incentive effects of property taxation. The object of this paper is to confront these theories with Norwegian data on student performance. The institutional setting in Norway is well suited to analyzing the effects of property taxation because we can compare school districts with and without property taxation. In addition, we focus on an alternative incentive mechanism - competition between school districts. The empirical results indicate that students in school districts that levy residential property taxes perform better at the national examination than students in comparable school districts. Strategic interaction in school quality is present, but the magnitude of the interaction effect is modest. |
| Keywords: | Student achievement;efficiency;property taxation;competition;spatial auto-regressive model |
| JEL: | C21 H71 I22 |
| Date: | 2004–08–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nst:samfok:5105&r=pub |
| By: | Jørn Rattsø (Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology); Jon Hernes Fiva (Centre for Economic Research and Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology) |
| Abstract: | Decentralization of government with property tax financing is the standard recipe for public sector reform. Fiscal competition is assumed to stimulate efficiency and hold down the tax level. Property taxation offers additional incentives for efficiency. We study the incentive mechanisms involved using data for decentralized governments and in a setting where they can choose to have property taxation or not. The empirical analysis addresses whether fiscal competition and political control problems influence the choice of having property taxation. The results indicate that both incentive mechanisms are relevant and consequently support the standard advice. Fiscal competition generates a distinct geographic pattern in local taxation and political fragmentation seems to motivate property taxation to control common pool problems. The main methodological challenge handled concerns spatial interaction with discrete choice. |
| Keywords: | property taxation; fiscal competition; political fragmentation; Bayesian analysis; spatial autoregressive model |
| JEL: | C11 C21 D78 H71 |
| Date: | 2005–03–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nst:samfok:5305&r=pub |