nep-ppm New Economics Papers
on Project, Program and Portfolio Management
Issue of 2025–11–10
five papers chosen by
Arvi Kuura, Tartu Ülikool


  1. Economics of Greenfield Urban Planning By J. Vernon Henderson; Francisco Libano-Monteiro; Martina Manara; Guy Michaels; Tanner Regan
  2. Designing Contracts for the Energy Transition By Natalia Fabra; Gerard Llobet
  3. The ‘organic’ — good for your health… but not for competition? By Florent Venayre; Christian Montet
  4. L’Intelligence Artificielle dans un Hôpital à la Croisée des Tensions Paradoxales de la Transformation Digitale By Abdeslem Choukhi
  5. Individual versus Team Production with Social Preferences By Banerjee, Swapnendu; Chakraborty, Somenath

  1. By: J. Vernon Henderson; Francisco Libano-Monteiro; Martina Manara; Guy Michaels; Tanner Regan
    Abstract: Urban planning has shaped cities for millennia, demarcating property rights and mitigating coordination failures, but its rigidities often conflict with market-driven development. Although planning is common in high-income countries, rapidly growing cities in the developing world are characterized by urban informality. Greenfield urban planning is a key option, but we lack economic theory and evidence to evaluate planners’ choices. This paper presents a dynamic model to evaluate the effects of plot sizes and amenities on consumer outcomes. This framework is applied to a flagship project in Dar es Salaam that subdivided peri-urban land into more than 36, 000 formal plots, which people purchased and built homes on. We assemble a novel dataset using administrative records, satellite imagery, and primary surveys. Informed by the model, we study the effects of planning choices using within-neighborhood variation and spatial regression discontinuities. We find that by securing property rights and local road access, the project doubled land values relative to nearby unplanned areas. Connectivity to the city is prized, as evidenced by price appreciation and construction rate differences between and within areas. The price elasticity of bare land to plot size is -0.5, suggesting an oversupply of large plots despite the sorting of highly educated owners into the project and its larger plots. In contrast to connectivity and plot size, other planning choices, such as intended non-residential land uses and plot configurations, matter less. Counterfactual analysis using the estimated structural model shows that while land value maximization provides larger plots, welfare maximization provides smaller plots serving more low-income people.
    Keywords: Urban Planning; Economic Development; Africa.
    JEL: R58 R31 O18 R14 O21
    Date: 2025–10
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gwc:wpaper:2025-007
  2. By: Natalia Fabra (CEMFI, Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros); Gerard Llobet (CEMFI, Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros)
    Abstract: This paper examines the limitations of spot markets in providing adequate investment incentives to support zero-carbon investments in electricity markets. In contrast, properly designed long-term contracts have the potential to mitigate price volatility and facilitate the funding of the investments. A theoretical model is developed to analyze contract design under conditions of moral hazard and adverse selection, emphasizing the trade-offs that arise when exposing firms to price and quantity risk. The findings inform optimal contract design for nuclear and renewable energy projects, offering policy recommendations to enhance investment incentives while minimizing productive inefficiencies and excessive rents.
    Keywords: Contract design, adverse selection, moral hazard, risk aversion, renewable energies, nuclear power plants.
    JEL: L13 L94
    Date: 2025–10
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cmf:wpaper:wp2025_2521
  3. By: Florent Venayre (UPF - Université de la Polynésie Française); Christian Montet (UPF - Université de la Polynésie Française)
    Abstract: This article examines Decision No. 2024-DEC-02 of the New Caledonian Competition Authority (ACNC) regarding the proposed relocation and expansion of a Naturalia store in Dumbéa. The case highlights one of the distinctive features of New Caledonian competition law, which requires prior control on retail development projects, even when they have a very limited scope. In this instance, despite a modest extension of only 102 m², the ACNC reviewed the notification under an exceptional procedure triggered by a market share threshold (25% within the relevant catchment area). By equating the relevant market with the catchment area, the Authority likely overestimated the notifying party's market power and underestimated the substitution options available to consumers. This reasoning led the ACNC to conclude that the planned extension could strengthen a local dominant position. Even if that were true – which is not – it would still need to de demonstrated that this extension is not based on merit. In practice, however, the project was very unlikely to generate significant anticompetitive effects. The risks mentioned – local dominant position or excessive pressure on suppliers – appear overstated, especially since the Authority already has ex post tools to sanction potential abuses. Conversely, blocking the expansion deprives consumers of a broader product offering and risks stifling a dynamic operator in the organic sector. This decision illustrates the potentially counterproductive consequences of ex ante control over retail developments in New Caledonia, and by extension, in French Polynesia. Far from fostering competition, such preventive mechanisms may freeze market structures, discourage investment, and send a negative signal to economic stakeholders. A more effective approach would be to refocus the Authority's action on sanctioning actual abuses of dominant position, rather than on hindering normal internal growth dynamics.
    Abstract: Cet article examine la décision n° 2024-DEC-02 de l'Autorité de la concurrence de la Nouvelle-Calédonie (ACNC) concernant le projet de déménagement et d'agrandissement d'un magasin Naturalia à Dumbéa. Cette affaire met en lumière une des spécificités du droit de la concurrence calédonien, qui impose un contrôle préalable des projets d'aménagements commerciaux, y compris lorsqu'ils présentent une portée très limitée. En l'espèce, malgré une extension modeste de seulement 102 m², l'ACNC a examiné la notification dans le cadre d'une procédure dérogatoire déclenchée par un seuil de parts de marché (25% dans la zone de chalandise concernée). En assimilant le marché pertinent à la zone de chalandise, l'Autorité a surestimé le pouvoir de marché de l'entreprise notifiante et sous-estimé les possibilités de substitution offertes aux consommateurs. Ce raisonnement a conduit l'ACNC à conclure que l'extension projetée risquait de renforcer une position dominante locale. Même si cela était vérifié, quod non, encore faudrait-il démontrer que cette extension ne repose pas sur les mérites. En pratique toutefois, l'opération était très peu susceptible de générer des effets anticoncurrentiels significatifs. Les risques évoqués -position dominante locale ou pression excessive sur les fournisseurs apparaissent exagérés, d'autant plus que l'Autorité dispose déjà d'outils ex post pour sanctionner d'éventuels abus. À l'inverse, empêcher cette extension prive les consommateurs d'un élargissement de l'offre et risque de freiner un acteur dynamique du secteur bio. Cette décision illustre les conséquences potentiellement contre-productives du contrôle ex ante des aménagements commerciaux en Nouvelle-Calédonie, et par extension, en Polynésie française. Loin de stimuler la concurrence, de tels mécanismes préventifs peuvent figer les structures de marché, décourager l'investissement et envoyer un signal négatif aux acteurs économiques. Une approche plus efficace consisterait à recentrer l'action des autorités sur la répression des abus effectifs de position dominante plutôt que sur l'entrave aux dynamiques normales de croissance interne.
    Date: 2025–11
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05335900
  4. By: Abdeslem Choukhi (CERGAM - Centre d'Études et de Recherche en Gestion d'Aix-Marseille - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - UTLN - Université de Toulon, AMU - Aix Marseille Université)
    Abstract: Les recherches sur la transformation digitale (DT) signalent des opportunités de nouveaux modèles théoriques. La DT implique la transformation d'une organisation informatique en une organisation digitale basée les ressources digitales, comme l'intelligence artificielle (IA). Cette transformation révèle souvent des paradoxes, mais les recherches n'ont pas abordé les tensions liées à la DT basée sur l'IA en santé. Pour combler cette lacune, nous menons une étude multi-cas dans un hôpital français (CHX) engagé dans un programme de DT basé sur l'IA. Cette étude vise à éclairer les tensions paradoxales de la DT basée sur l'IA.
    Keywords: hôpital, tension paradoxale, intelligence artificielle, Transformation digitale
    Date: 2025–08–14
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05331706
  5. By: Banerjee, Swapnendu; Chakraborty, Somenath
    Abstract: We examine the impact of social preferences on the choice between individual production and team production. An inequity-averse principal can hire a single or a team of two agents to work on a single project. The agents are inequity-averse with respect to the principal. We show that even without ‘synergy’ a moderately inequity-averse principal can opt for team production. Thus we provide an additional rationale for the empirically observed prevalence of team based production in terms of the possible existence of social preferences. For sufficiently inequity-averse principal the incentive for team production remains the same across short-term and long-term relationships.
    Keywords: Social Preferences; Inequity Aversion; Individual Production; Team Production; Synergy.
    JEL: D21 D86 L23
    Date: 2025–08–15
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:125933

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