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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Asuamah Yeboah, Samuel |
| Abstract: | This review evaluates the effectiveness of public-private partnerships (PPPs) in advancing sustainable building projects in developing countries. It highlights key areas such as resource mobilization, expertise utilization, innovation, risk-sharing, and community impact. Findings show that PPPs attract private investment, complement public funds, and drive large-scale sustainable construction. They enhance technical expertise, foster knowledge transfer, and encourage the adoption of advanced technologies. Risk-sharing mechanisms reduce financial burdens, attracting more investors. Additionally, PPPs improve social outcomes, including job creation and community resilience. The review emphasises the need for supportive policies, capacity-building programs, and monitoring systems to strengthen PPPs in sustainable development. Further research should focus on comparative models and long-term impacts. |
| Keywords: | Green construction, regulatory frameworks, technological innovation, capacity building, risk-sharing, strategic collaboration |
| JEL: | L32 O18 Q01 Q56 |
| Date: | 2024–09–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:122643 |
| By: | Hanna Fiegenbaum |
| Abstract: | Carbon credits are a key component of most national and organizational climate strategies. Financing and delivering carbon credits from forest-related activities faces multiple risks at the project and asset levels. Financial mechanisms are employed to mitigate risks for investors and project developers, complemented by non-financial measures such as environmental and social safeguards and physical risk mitigation. Despite these efforts, academic research highlights that safeguards and climate risk mitigation measures are not efficiently implemented in some carbon projects and that specification of environmental safeguards remains underdeveloped. Further, environmental and social risk mitigation capacities may not be integrated into financial mechanisms. This text examines how ecosystem capacities can be leveraged and valued for mitigation of and adaptation to physical risks by complementing carbon credits with biodiversity insurance and resilience value. |
| Date: | 2024–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2411.08452 |
| By: | Amarnath, Giriraj (International Water Management Institute) |
| Keywords: | Sustainable Development Goals; Indicators; Income; Gender equality; Empowerment; Datasets |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iwt:bosers:h052647 |
| By: | FORAY Dominique |
| Abstract: | This paper delves into the exploration of new financial mechanisms to fund scientific research, particularly focusing on its pertinence to societal challenges. Starting with a thought-provoking discussion on the limitations of traditional research grants and the prospect of introducing research impact bonds (RIBs), Foray scrutinizes the potential of financial engineering (FE) tools in the realm of public research tied to sustainable development goals. The paper discusses the complexities of aligning research funding with outcomes, navigating through the intricacies of unhedged uncertainty and the ambiguity of defining success in research. The paper provides a comprehensive review of various FE instruments, such as mega funds and impact bonds, and their applicability to scientific research funding under certain conditions. The author outlines the challenges of preregistered research in the context of RIBs, the diversification of risk through mega funds for projects with commercial potential, and the use of prizes and advanced market commitments to shift the risk from funders to researchers. |
| Date: | 2024–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipt:iptwpa:jrc139559 |
| By: | Boris Ginzburg |
| Abstract: | A committee consisting of two factions is considering a project whose distributive consequences are unknown. This uncertainty can be resolved at some unknown future time. By delaying approval, the committee can gradually learn which faction benefits from the project. Because support of both factions is required for approval, it can only happen when there is sufficient amount of uncertainty about the identities of winners and losers. I show that in many situations, a project is more likely to be approved if it gives a lower payoff to everyone. The probability of approval and expected payoffs of both factions are higher if the project is ex ante less likely to benefit the faction that tends to receive good news faster. Equilibrium amount of learning is excessive, and a deadline on adopting the project is often optimal. |
| Date: | 2024–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2411.06998 |