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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Simshauser, P. |
| Abstract: | This article examines whether zonal average-price wind swaps, more accurately defined as Asian wind swaps, are a 'bankable' instrument. Specifically, can a derivative that references the wind fleet's average price underwrite a bespoke project financed new entrant wind farm in Australia’s National Electricity Market? Prima facie, long -dated Asian swaps referencing the wind fleet’s dispatch-weighted average price present as a material departure from convention, viz. site-specific fixed price (run-of-plant) Power Purchase Agreements. Using South Australia as a deliberately demanding test case, ten years of chronologically matched 30-minute spot-price and wind-production data are block-bootstrapped into 10, 000 synthetic years of market data. This data is the n utilised within a hedge optimisation and stochastic project finance models across heterogeneous wind farms with explicit strike -price calibration and debt-sizing to stress-test the 'bankability' of Asian wind swaps. Results confirm when hedge quantities are optimised, and strike prices calibrated to entry costs, Asian wind swaps reduce revenue volatility and support project finance, with debt sizing at broadly equivalent levels to a conventional PPA. Findings suggest an Asian wind swap can plausibly replace bespoke government-originated CfDs, which in turn raises the prospect of seamless divisible re-trading and the creation of liquid secondary markets – a necessary precondition for a healthy retail supplier market. |
| Keywords: | Renewables, Energy-Only Markets, Project Finance, Asian Wind Derivatives, Asian Swaps |
| JEL: | D52 D53 G12 L94 Q40 |
| Date: | 2026–09–23 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:2676 |
| By: | Bouhid, Laila; Flamand, Marina; Frigant, Vincent |
| Abstract: | Several recent studies on the Technological Innovation System seek to understand the processes underlying the construction of the system. In this article, we explain that two types of process exist: on the one hand, Strategic System Building arising from a proactive approach by System Builders; on the other hand, a process known as Emergent System Formation, in which it is the structural properties of the initial system which, through an organic process, enable agents to develop the system via their spontaneous interactions. We postulate that these two processes may co-exist or follow one another over time for each of the functions traditionally studied within the TIS. We then evaluate this hypothesis with regard to the function of knowledge development and diffusion within the Sustainable Aviation Fuels (SAF) TIS. We analyse 55 research projects on SAFs, involving 442 participants and funded by the European Union between 2008 and 2024. Using a mixed-methods approach combining qualitative analysis and social network analysis, we show that the four periods of development of this function initially rely on a Strategic System Building process, which wanes in the following period, before an Emergence Formation System process takes over. One of the article’s contributions is to propose indicators to characterise these processes when there is a large volume of data to process. |
| Keywords: | Technological innovation system; System building; Sustainable Aviation Fuel; Knowledge development and diffusion function; European research projects; CORDIS |
| JEL: | L23 L62 O33 Q42 |
| Date: | 2026–09–29 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:131159 |
| By: | Metin Uyanik (University of Queensland); Charles Walsh (Adelaide University); Duygu Yengin (Adelaide University) |
| Abstract: | We study how a buyer or project sponsor chooses the order in which to approach capacityconstrained counterparties when assembling a fixed resource requirement. Committing resources early is costly, and the capacity of a counterparty approached later is unknown when the first commitment is chosen. Contracting order determines whose capacity remains unresolved, while the first commitment determines how much the later counterparty must provide. The sponsor therefore trades off the cost of committing more resources early against the risk that the remaining requirement cannot be met. She may optimally choose a first commitment that does not guarantee project completion, even though the counterparties’ combined capacity is sufficient in every realization. Maximizing expected surplus therefore need not maximize the probability of completion. Capacity uncertainty also changes the optimal contracting order. A counterparty with greater expected capacity may be approached first because its capacity is then observed before resources are committed, rather than left as the unresolved constraint on project completion. When the project is not completed, unused capacity held by the first counterparty could have covered the shortfall. Non-completion is therefore ex post inefficient, yet it maximizes expected surplus ex ante among the arrangements available under the one-shot sequential protocol. Learning capacities before contracting or allowing the sponsor to return to the first counterparty after a shortfall at sufficiently low cost eliminates non-completion. Thus, contracting order can affect resource allocation and project completion even when the counterparties, aggregate resources, bargaining power, and project value remain unchanged. |
| Keywords: | Sequential contracting; Contracting order; Capacity uncertainty; Resource assembly; Contract design; Project-completion risk |
| Date: | 2026–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:adl:wpaper:2026-14 |
| By: | Monday Sunday Adiaha (Scientific Department, Institute of Biopaleogeography named under Charles R. Darwin, Zlocieniec,) |
| Abstract: | The global climate finance landscape remains insufficient to meet Paris Agreement targets, with unclear contributions from public, private, and voluntary carbon market flows. This study analyzed the structure and sufficiency of global climate finance flows against those targets using secondary quantitative data from key repositories (CPI, MDB Climate Finance Reports, BNEF, Ecosystem Marketplace), assessed for additionality, concessionally, and Paris alignment. Total tracked climate finance flows for 2019 were approximately $579 billion, comprising $253 billion from public sources and $326 billion from private investment in renewable energy. A detailed breakdown reveals foundational but insufficient public finance: Multilateral Development Bank (MDB) climate finance totalled $61.6 billion, with 67% directed to low-and middle-income countries. Private investment was concentrated in renewable energy, with combined global wind and solar investment reaching $269 billion in 2019. The analysis identifies the Voluntary Carbon Market (VCM) as a potential bridging mechanism, though one facing severe contraction and integrity challenges. Transaction volume exceeded 100 MtCO₂e in 2020, dominated by forestry projects (52%). However, by 2023 the market value had contracted sharply to $723 million, with a 56% yearon-year volume decline, signalling buyer hesitancy due to pervasive limitations. These include uncertainty regarding additionality, permanence risk, systemic over-crediting (with a significant share of credits failing new integrity benchmarks), and insufficient equity and data governance. The study concludes that while scaling proven mechanisms like green bonds is necessary, it is insufficient alone. Aligning financial flows with climate imperatives requires coupling this scale with rigorous reforms to carbon offset verification, strengthened market governance, and more transparent reporting to address critical integrity and data quality gaps. |
| Keywords: | Climate Finance, Carbon Offsets, Carbon Market, Green Bonds, Public Finance, Climate Finance Carbon Offsets Carbon Market Green Bonds Public Finance |
| Date: | 2026–09–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05741625 |
| By: | Paras Kharel (South Asia Watch on Trade, Economics and Environment); Kshitiz Dahal (South Asia Watch on Trade, Economics and Environment) |
| Abstract: | The deadly floods of 26 August 2026 obliterated the most important route connecting landlocked Nepal with its northern neighbour. This has raised questions over the future of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Nepal, where no project has gotten off the ground since a memorandum of understanding (MoU) was signed in 2017. From the perspective of Nepal's interests, the appropriate yardstick for measuring BRI's relevance and success is not seamless Sino-Indian trade through Nepal but Sino-Nepali connectivity. In the wake of the Himalayan disaster, a situation where significant bilateral initiatives are seen neither for the reconstruction of the corridor to the Rasuwa port nor the building of viable all-season alternative routes will diminish the relevance of BRI to Nepal. The Cooperation Framework, signed in 2024 to operationalize the MoU, has enough space and flexibility for China's flagship international initiative to rise to the occasion. The immediate onus is on the Government of Nepal to assess the physical devastation and determine the way forward to reestablish all-season overland connectivity with China—the Rasuwa route or an alternative or both—and the support it would need from the world's second largest economy to make the restoration quick and durable. This could feed into the " step-by-step implementation plan ", as stipulated in the Cooperation Framework, for the development and execution of the (re)construction project. The new government in Nepal has an opportunity to make (re)building a resilient road link with China its signature project, signaling a decisive shift away from the time and cost overruns that plague infrastructure projects, while also mitigating geological risks and climate-proofing the infrastructure to the extent possible. The BRI rubber is yet to hit the road in Nepal. To the question what has BRI delivered in the Himalayan nation, a well-built, resilient road capped by well-equipped customs facilities could be a simple yet powerful answer. |
| Keywords: | Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Nepal floods, Nepal-China trade, geopolitics, India; transit, infrastructure |
| JEL: | F13 F14 F15 F21 F22 F24 |
| Date: | 2026–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:saw:rpaper:rp/26/01 |
| By: | Nasir Iqbal (Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad) |
| Abstract: | From Labour Export to Contract Export: A Costed, Self-Enforcing National Mission to Operationalise the Exports Pillar of Uraan Pakistan Wars devastate economies, and recovery rewrites economic geography. The relationship between Pakistan and the Gulf is real but asymmetric, grounded in remittances, energy imports, deposits, and goodwill rather than in contracts, firms, and systems. In periods of regional stability, Pakistan breathes, but in periods of instability, the balance of payments, inflation, and external financing tighten. The strategic objective should shift from surviving the Middle East crisis to capitalising on the recovery in the Middle East. There is much at stake, and much of it can be measured. Reconstruction after conflict in Gaza (US$71bn over five years), Syria (US$216bn) and Lebanon (US$11bn) goes hand in hand with the Gulf region's giga-project pipeline, which includes the ambitious Saudi Vision 2030 program, costing up to US$1.1-1.3tn, and US$1.5tn of unawarded construction projects, the largest in the world. Pakistan earns the wages of its workers but nothing close to the project margin, as exports of goods to the GCC amounted to only US$3.79bn, compared with imports worth US$17.9bn. |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pid:pviewp:2026:67 |