|
on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | David Cuberes (Maynooth University); Aitor Lacuesta (Bank of Spain); Carlos Moreno-Pérez (Bank of Spain); Daniel Oto-Peralías (Universidad Pablo de Olavide) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the relationship between land ownership concentration and the likelihood of hosting large green energy facilities, specifically mega-photovoltaic (PV) plants, defined as those exceeding 50 hectares. Focusing on Spain, we find that municipalities with a higher proportion of agricultural land concentrated in large farms are significantly more likely to accommodate mega PV plants. This effect remains robust after accounting for key factors influencing PV deployment, including terrain ruggedness, solar potential, and proximity to transmission lines and urban centers. To further neutralize unobserved factors that jointly influence land concentration and PV plant location, we leverage cadastral (parcel) data to conduct an intra-municipal analysis at the 0.5×0.5 km grid-cell level. Our findings reveal that grid cells with larger cadastral parcels have a substantially higher probability of being part of a mega PV facility. A simple theoretical model explains this pattern by highlighting the coordination challenges faced by small landowners. Unlike large ones, fragmented landholders struggle to meet developers’ land requirements, which are necessary to cover fixed project costs. Consistent with this mechanism, we also show that areas with irrigated agriculture are less likely to host mega PV plants and exhibit more unequal distributions of plant locations by land size. Finally, we provide external validity by confirming a similar positive association between mega PV plants and land concentration across U.S. counties. These findings underscore the implications of land inequality for the spatial distribution of renewable energy projects, shedding light on the limited local benefits of such investments and the growing opposition from rural communities. |
| Keywords: | solar plants; photovoltaic plants; land concentration. . |
| JEL: | O13 Q40 Q15 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pab:wpaper:25.03 |
| By: | Bartlett, Jay (Resources for the Future) |
| Abstract: | Within the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), corporate tax credits are the largest source of clean energy funding, so understanding how these credits function is important to market participants and policymakers. In this report, I focus on the IRA’s authorization for both utility-scale solar and wind projects to choose between the investment tax credit (ITC) and production tax credit (PTC). After reviewing the history of the ITC and PTC, including the changes made by the IRA, I consider how the three primary owners of utility-scale solar and wind projects—project sponsors, tax equity investors, and regulated utilities—will decide between incentives. I find that the PTC, in most cases, will be strongly preferred by regulated utilities and project sponsors, but the latter’s preference must be weighed against the interests of tax equity investors, which may favor the ITC. Next, I assess how the ITC and PTC may distort project decisions, with the ITC leading to higher-cost electricity and the PTC leading to lower-value electricity. Because the PTC is likely to be the incentive chosen by most utility-scale solar and onshore wind projects, I discuss technology and policy options to raise the value of electricity from PTC projects. |
| Date: | 2023–12–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rff:report:rp-23-20 |
| By: | Sarah Fritz; Lorenzo Incoronato; Catherine van der List |
| Abstract: | This paper documents substantial fiscal waste in the context of one the world’s largest regional development programs - the EU Cohesion Policy. We study Italy, and find that 20% of funding commitments are never paid out and funneled into unfinished or never-started projects. In our setting, this happens for reasons unrelated to fiscal constraints - municipalities appear to simply leave money on the table. Foregone spending is more prevalent in Southern regions, but there is also stark variation across municipalities within regions. We show that such under-utilization of available funds is strongly associated with limited administrative capacity of local governments. |
| Keywords: | foregone spending, state capacity, fiscal waste |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12126 |
| By: | Bioret, Lucie (Resources for the Future); Zhu, Yuqi (Resources for the Future); Krupnick, Alan (Resources for the Future); Bergman, Aaron (Resources for the Future) |
| Abstract: | With implementation of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), the US Department of Energy (DOE) will play a central role in driving the technological innovations needed to reach the Biden administration’s net-zero greenhouse gas emissions goal. However, it needs additional capacity in several areas, including how best to pick winners for the demonstration projects it will be funding. We held a workshop on this topic and developed a follow-on white paper (Bergman et al. 2023). Another area, the topic of this paper, is establishing the capacity to operationalize and institutionalize impact evaluations, which includes developing approaches for tracking data to support evidence-building and help evaluate DOE’s research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) programs. Strengthening evaluation capacity is important for two reasons: it permits DOE and other interested parties to evaluate the success of programs in advancing and, ultimately, commercializing technologies; and it provides input to the agency for adaptive learning to improve its guidance to applicants (in the Funding Opportunity Announcements [FOAs]), decision protocols, and data collection.These two key pieces of legislation are not the only motivation for developing better program evaluations within DOE. The Evidence Act of 2018 US Congress, The Foundations for Evidence-Based Policymaking Act of 2018, HR 4174, Pul L 115-435, 115th Congress, signed into law in January 2019. aims to modernize federal government data collection and management processes to better inform policy decisions. It requires agencies to assess their evaluation practices and create a plan to develop evidence-building activities. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is charged with improving these activities and evaluation by providing guidance and resources to agencies and engaging with evaluation officers; at DOE, each individual office is responsible for both functions (DOE 2022), with program managers in charge of conducting evaluations while following program evaluation standards (OMB 2020).This paper builds on a workshop held by Resources for the Future (RFF), informed by government publications and the academic literature, on evaluation and provides recommendations for building evaluation systems for DOE programs. Evaluation systems cover all the operational, organizational, and institutional elements that are needed, including human resources, organizational capacities, and evaluation practices. The report covers three topics: the state of program evaluation at DOE and in other relevant agencies, institutionalization of program evaluation within DOE, and characteristics of robust evaluation methods and their associated metrics and data needs. It closes with a series of recommendations. |
| Date: | 2023–11–16 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rff:report:rp-23-17 |
| By: | Ha Luong; Judit Vall-Castello; Lídia Farré |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the underfunding of female-dominated cancers in Europe and explores the mechanisms underlying the unequal distribution of research grants. Using a novel owned- collected dataset of projects granted by the European Commission under three framework programmes, we show that male-dominated cancers receive 3.7% more funding than female- dominated cancers. Our analysis suggests that this difference is likely driven by the over- representation of male researchers in cancer research and the higher proportion of male members on evaluation panels, which favors funding towards male-dominated cancer projects. We find no suggestive evidence that the funding gap is explained by gender gaps in receiving grants, superior research outputs, or greater disease burden. By uncovering the underfunded situation of female-dominated cancers, this study contributes to our understanding of the allocation of research funding across diseases and its implications for health equity. |
| Keywords: | cancer research, funding, gender |
| JEL: | I10 I14 I19 |
| Date: | 2025–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:1509 |
| By: | Walls, Margaret A. (Resources for the Future); Hines, Sofia; Ruggles, Logan |
| Abstract: | President Biden issued Executive Order (EO) 14008, Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad, during his first week in office in January 2021. The EO includes a directive that 40 percent of the benefits of certain federal climate and energy investments flow to communities that are disadvantaged, marginalized, and overburdened by pollution. Nearly three years after its launch, the Justice40 initiative now covers 518 programs across 16 federal agencies.In this study, we take stock of Justice40 implementation. The report is divided into two parts. In the first part, we describe the basics of how Justice40 works and the timeline of program design and implementation since the EO, followed by a discussion of specific challenges the initiative faces and opportunities it provides. In the second part of the report, we assess the pace of Justice40 progress across 445 programs based on program-level analysis, including reviews of federal funding opportunities and conversations with agency staff.Justice40 TimelineThe White House released interim guidance for Justice40 in July 2021. That guidance delegated many decisions to agencies, including which programs are covered by Justice40 and how to measure and define benefits. Agencies were directed to submit benefits methodologies to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) by December 2021. In February 2022, the White House released a beta version of a new screening tool for identifying disadvantaged communities for the purposes of Justice40. The Climate and Economic Justice Screening Tool (CEJST) was finalized in November 2022 after a public comment period. In January 2023, the White House issued an addendum to the interim guidance, which stated that agencies must fully transition to using the CEJST by October 1, 2023, for the purposes of implementing Justice40. A list of 463 Justice40-covered programs was released in April 2023. A new list of 518 programs was released at the end of November 2023; this list removed a handful of programs that had been on the April list and added programs from the Inflation Reduction Act.Justice40 Implementation ChallengesThe first challenge in Justice40 implementation is related to how federal funding programs work. The federal government sends money to state and local governments and directly to individuals, households, farmers, and other entities. Some funding goes to states in the form of block grants or formula categorical grants, in which money goes to states based on particular rules and formulas and states are given latitude in how and where to spend the money. In these programs, it may be difficult for federal agency staff to ensure that 40 percent of funds (and benefits) ultimately go to disadvantaged communities. With project categorical grants, state and local governments apply for federal funding, usually in a competitive process, to pay for specific projects and activities. In these cases, federal agencies have more control over where the money goes, but the ability to direct it to underserved communities depends on how many of those communities apply for funding. Many underserved communities lack the capacity and resources to undertake what can be an arduous application process. As a result, federal agencies may have a limited pool of applicants that makes it difficult to reach the 40 percent goal. A similar problem can arise in programs that provide financial assistance directly to individuals and households.The second Justice40 challenge is associated with the definition of disadvantaged communities. Agencies are required to use the CEJST to identify which communities are disadvantaged for the purposes of Justice40. Although CEJST has some strengths, it also has some limitations. The first is that it does not include race among its criteria, even though many studies have shown race to be a determining factor—possibly the most important factor—in who bears the burden of environmental injustices. A second is the reliance on national census tract level data to populate the tool. Census tracts are a geography that can be problematic in some areas, especially rural areas, because of the wide heterogeneity in socioeconomic characteristics of the population within the tract. Moreover, some well-recognized environmental problems are not captured in the tool because national data are not available.Defining the benefits of federal investments is the third challenge in Justice40 implementation. The language in the EO explicitly states that the “benefits of certain federal investments”, not the dollar amounts of the investments themselves, should flow to disadvantaged communities. For many federal programs, this aspect of Justice40 is proving the most difficult. In most cases, thus far, the best that is being done is measurement of the investments; in a few programs, other outcomes—contaminated site cleanups, for example—are being measured. The Department of Energy (DOE) has developed a list of eight benefits criteria that must be individually addressed in funding applications.Justice40 OpportunitiesDespite the implementation challenges, Justice40 is also providing some opportunities. We identified five.The first is the improvement in data measurement and collection that the initiative seems to be bringing about. To figure out whether the 40 percent goal is being met, agencies need to be able to track exactly where spending occurs and benefits are delivered. Ultimately, this should allow better program evaluation, even beyond Justice40.The second opportunity is the development of new technical assistance programs in federal agencies. As we stated above, unless agencies receive a pool of funding applicants that includes disadvantaged communities, they may not be able to meet the Justice40 goal, and the technical hurdles in many grant applications are often overwhelming for disadvantaged and underresourced communities. The new programs should help.The third opportunity Justice40 presents is the ability of the federal government to lead by example on justice and equity. Many decisions on environmental policy and infrastructure investments fall to state and local governments, but the federal government has enormous policy influence. It generally brings larger amounts of money to problems than individual states, sets national standards and regulations, provides information and technical assistance, and defines priorities in ways that states often follow. Thus, Justice40 could have a ripple effect at lower levels of government.A fourth opportunity is provided by the setting of a specific numerical target. Compared to procedural requirements, agency strategic plans, equity scorecards, and the like, Justice40 sets a goal based on program outcomes. One may question whether 40 percent is the “right” number, but it provides a quantitative focal point.Finally, the Justice40 initiative is improving community engagement in federal programs. Engagement with disadvantaged communities is a requirement laid out in EO 14008 and in the initial Justice40 guidance released by the White House in July 2021. While stakeholder engagement has long been a part of many federal government programs, the specific focus on engagement with disadvantaged communities is new.A Status UpdateWe began our review of implementation progress with the programs listed on the April 2023 Justice40 covered programs list. We reviewed 445 of the 463 programs on that list. The Department of Energy has the most covered programs at 165. The agencies with the second- through fourth-most programs are, respectively, the Environmental Protection Agency with 73, and the Departments of Agriculture and the Interior with 65 each.We devised a 1-5 scale for measuring the status of implementation. A rating of 1 indicates that we were unable to find any information about Justice40 for the program, including in funding announcements and on program webpages. Programs received a 2 if we found acknowledgement that the program was covered by Justice40 but no additional information. A rating of 3 was assigned to programs that provided preliminary Justice40 implementation guidance but no clear information on funding prioritization methods. A rating of 4 indicates that we found thorough program-specific Justice40 guidance, including clear definitions of prioritization metrics, but no statement (yet) that 40 percent or more of investments (or benefits) currently go to, or definitely will go to, disadvantaged communities. Category 5 indicates full implementation and achievement of the 40 percent goal. We divided 5 into two subcategories: 5A are programs that state that 40 percent or more of investments/benefits are currently going to Justice40 disadvantaged communities or will go to disadvantaged communities through set-asides and specific requirements; 5B are tribal and low-income programs that “automatically” achieve the Justice40 goal. All tribal communities are defined as disadvantaged for purposes of Justice40, and we made a decision to assign programs that are limited to low-income populations also to the 5B category. We could not track down reliable information for 42 programs on the April 2023 covered program list and thus left them uncategorized (U).The following table summarizes our findings. |
| Date: | 2024–01–22 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rff:report:rp-24-01 |
| By: | Rennert, Kevin (Resources for the Future); Palmer, Karen (Resources for the Future); Robertson, Molly (Resources for the Future) |
| Abstract: | The United States has a pressing need to rapidly enhance its energy infrastructure to address domestic and global priorities. The infrastructure needs are broad and varied, including clean electricity generation, pipelines, and electricity transmission. One of the clear drivers for the policy conversation is to meet decarbonization goals on a timescale of decades. Pathways to meet the decarbonization goals for the power sector suggest that US deployment of renewables would need to be well over the peak historical build rate immediately, and that deployment rate would need to be sustained or increased every year for the foreseeable future (Denholm et al. 2022). Success in building a single project, however, requires navigating a complex and interconnected series of hurdles. Bringing a single generation project online, for example, requires navigating not only the supply chain to source materials and finance the project but also processes related to siting, permitting, and interconnection. Any new transmission needed to support the project will require additional process steps. Along the way, the project may interact with government agencies at local, state, and federal levels; is likely to need to work with communities to build support; and may face potential litigation. Increasing the build rates of energy infrastructure to reach the necessary pace and scale to meet policy goals will require making all these contributors to construction timelines as efficient as possible. In light of these challenges and needs, a broad and bipartisan concern about obstacles to energy infrastructure deployment has emerged, along with a general agreement that processes should be improved and coordinated. Dozens of legislative proposals from both parties have been put forward to address different aspects of this problem, but consensus on which obstacles are most important overall, or on the effectiveness of potential policy interventions to address them, has been elusive. It is noteworthy that of the dozens of legislative proposals intended to reform the permitting process or address other obstacles to specific energy infrastructure, few have been supported by any type of analysis. In many cases, even basic questions about the obstacles are unanswered. This stands in contrast to recently enacted energy legislation such as the Inflation Reduction Act or Investment in Infrastructure and Jobs Act, which include many provisions based on analysis using energy system models and a broad academic literature.The relative absence of analysis of policies intended to address obstacles to energy infrastructure is due to multiple factors. In some cases, the obstacles are not well quantified, challenging efforts to design policy interventions. Even when obstacles are quantified, the effects of policy interventions on the obstacles may not be well understood or may be complicated through interactions with other factors not addressed by the intervention. For example, the interconnection queue is an oft-cited obstacle to generation investment that can be affected by inadequate transmission or long permitting timelines, which are obstacles in their own right. And finally, energy system models and other analytic tools are not well equipped to quantify the effects of many policy interventions.The result is bipartisan agreement on the need for more efficient processes to build energy infrastructure, leading the congressional and executive branches to focus on finding a solution. The policy conversation, however, is poorly informed, lacking both basic information and appropriate tools for analyzing policy solutions. The current debate about the relative effects on emissions of the proposed Energy Permitting Reform Act of 2024 exemplifies this issue, with estimates of the effects of specific provisions ranging by an order of magnitude, and in some cases there is even uncertainty about their overall sign. This situation represents a critical opportunity for the research community to inform policymakers’ efforts by working at each of these levels to improve the characterization of obstacles, understanding of the effects of policy proposals, and representation within models. For this purpose, RFF has initiated a project to identify and fill information gaps. The goals of the project are to expand data and analysis on key obstacles to energy infrastructure, develop an improved understanding of current legislative proposals, and improve modeling capabilities to evaluate the impacts of legislative proposals. In the first phase of the project, RFF convened experts on various aspects of deployment of energy infrastructure, including energy system modeling and permitting, for a series of three workshops on obstacles related to energy infrastructure deployment. The objectives of the workshops were to identify the most relevant barriers to deployment of energy infrastructure, determine the best metrics for understanding the impact of those obstacles, and inform the development of a coherent research strategy. The first workshop positioned the project within the current policy context through a discussion with key congressional and administration staff and was intended to refine key research questions and identify the topics for subsequent workshops. The second centered on obstacles to building transmission, improving its representation in models, and identifying analytic approaches to answer key policy questions. The third was on the obstacles to building new generation resources and how to represent them in energy models. Ancillary conversations focused on the challenges associated with analyzing obstacles to industrial decarbonization in models. This report summarizes the key takeaways from the discussions in the RFF workshop series. Insights from policymakers, subject matter experts, and energy modelers are discussed in each section and inform a research agenda to guide a series of commissioned research papers to be completed in 2025. The report is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a summary of existing research. Section 3 assesses challenges representing obstacles in energy models. Section 4 discusses recent policy developments and legislative activity, and Section 5 looks at the role of energy modeling. Section 6 considers takeaways and research priorities, and Section 7 is a concluding discussion of the near-term research agenda. |
| Date: | 2024–09–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rff:report:rp-24-16 |
| By: | Britz, Wolfgang; Jansson, Torbjoern; Schäfer, David |
| Abstract: | Software Quality Management (SQM) for economic simulation models includes different aspects of software development, such as using a version control system, developing, and applying coding guidelines, proper documentation of code, and a testing strategy to systematically locate and remove errors. This paper focuses on testing as the main element of SQM to decrease the probability of incorrect outcomes and reduce debugging costs. Other elements of SQM are discussed more briefly and in relation to testing. Due to differences in developer competence, in software used for coding, and in the organisational structure of research projects, approaches for testing in industry projects are not always applicable to economic models. Based on real-world examples, we show how a testing strategy can be implemented in economic modelling, spanning from automated checks and tests to a release strategy for the economic model. Overall, we recommend developing a test strategy for an economic model as early as possible to save cost and to ensure reliable model outcomes. |
| Keywords: | Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies, Research Research Methods/Statistical Methods, Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession |
| Date: | 2025–09–15 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:ubfred:369109 |
| By: | Slaria, Srishti; Robertson, Molly (Resources for the Future); Palmer, Karen (Resources for the Future) |
| Abstract: | Achieving the ambitious decarbonization goals established by the Biden administration, 100 percent clean electricity by 2035 and a net-zero emissions economy by 2050, requires substantially increasing the share of clean and renewable energy resources in the electricity generation mix. To reach these decarbonization targets cost-effectively, renewable power will need to grow to multiples of current levels. The transmission system is not equipped to handle the anticipated substantial increase in power flows; its lack of capacity and availability leads to grid congestion, which causes higher energy prices and curtails renewables. Moreover, with the anticipated electrification of the economy leading to large increases in future demand, the burden on the power grid is ever increasing. A report from the REPEAT project estimates that to take full advantage of the subsidies offered in the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), transmission capacity must grow by about 2.3 percent per year, more than double the rate of the past 10 years (Jenkins et al. 2022).Nevertheless, getting new projects built can take over a decade due to the complexities involved in their planning, siting, and permitting. State and federal policymakers have acknowledged this challenge and taken steps to support the buildout of new transmission. The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) and IRA carved out support for transmission expansion, allocating $12.5 billion and $5 billion, respectively. Furthermore, the Biden administration recently announced plans to streamline the federal permitting process for transmission lines through the Department of Energy (DOE) to facilitate buildout. Nonetheless, experts are still skeptical that we can build enough new transmission in time to support the shifting generation mix and increasing electrification to meet climate targets.However, building new lines is not the only way to bolster resilience, reliability, and affordability. Several different types of investments can deliver similar outcomes. Grid-enhancing technologies can increase the capacity of existing lines, distributed energy resources can spread out generation resources so they are closer to load centers, and microgrids can use on-site power generation to support pockets of load and insulate campuses or communities from issues on the broader grid. These solutions can deliver benefits, but each is best suited to a specific set of circumstances and faces its own technical and regulatory barriers to implementation.This report surveys the literature on different types of grid solutions. We discuss how the technologies work, in what circumstances they may act as substitutes for transmission expansion, evidence of their impact, and challenges (both technical and regulatory) in implementing them. New lines will undoubtedly be an important piece of the energy transition, but exploring these additional types of investments can help us understand where and when lower-cost and more rapidly deployed alternatives can provide solutions to some of our transmission woes. |
| Date: | 2023–09–21 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rff:report:rp-23-13 |
| By: | Verdolini, Elena; Look, Wesley (Resources for the Future); Belpietro, Chiara; Persico, Giulia |
| Abstract: | The European Union (EU) is strongly committed to steering its economy away from high-carbon and pollution-intensive production and toward climate-neutral technologies and business models by 2050. If this transition is not accompanied by adjustment assistance, however, making deep reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions could disproportionately burden certain segments of society that are dependent on producing or using carbon-intensive energy resources as a primary employer or mainstay of the economy (Vona 2021). Many regional economies in Europe rely on fossil fuel extraction (oil, coal, or gas) or energy- and carbon-intensive production (e.g., steel production and electricity generation). As European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen has frequently stated, the large-scale deployment of low-carbon energy can succeed only if conducted in a fair and inclusive way for all European citizens (European Commission 2019k), what many refer to as just transition.The aim of this report is to distill important lessons learned from the EU experience in promoting just transition to help US policymakers identify key components of a comprehensive and effective energy transition policy package. The report examines EU-level programs implemented over the period 2014–20 and summarizes the policy changes proposed in the European Green Deal for 2020–25.The just transition concept originated in the US labor movement during the 1970s to describe the need for a support system for workers unemployed because of environmental protection policies (Henry et al. 2020). In the EU, the quality of work and life of its citizens has been a policy goal since its founding. One of the guiding principles of European policymaking is a commitment to reduce social, economic, and territorial development disparities among EU regions to promote integration and the economic growth of all member states. This is referred to as cohesion policy, which is enshrined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Art. 174) and plays a crucial role in setting political priorities at the EU level (European Commission 2022g). Cohesion policy is the term used in the EU context to refer to regional policy. In the EU, socioeconomic development is promoted as an expression of solidarity between the EU member states and their regions. Programs and funding targeting socioeconomic development aim to remove economic, social, and territorial disparities across the EU, supporting the restructuring of declining industrial areas and diversification of declining rural areas. The rationale for cohesion policy is to mitigate the negative side effects from the creation of a single market and ensure that all EU citizens can reap the benefits (Samecki 2009). These policies and programs have been used as building blocks to shape EU just transition policy over time, including in the European Green Deal. For discussion of the evolving interpretation of just transition, see ILO (2015); Stevis and Felli (2015); Verdolini (2023).It is important to note that most of the EU programs we discuss are ultimately implemented and used by the member states, which have a fair degree of autonomy in selecting the projects to be funded within the broader design principles set up at the EU level. Other reports in this series have reviewed some of the ways these EU-level programs have been implemented in specific countries. Reports on just transition measures related to reductions in the coal sector in Germany, Poland, and the UK can be found on the RFF website at https://www.rff.org/publications/all-publications/?offset=12&topic=10098. The report on “Just Transition in Poland” examines the topic in the broader context of economic restructuring and increased regional integration of the country.Within the EU, the concept of just transition indicates the need to support and help territories and regions most affected by the transition to a climate-neutral economy, prioritizing those that have less capacity to deal with the costs of transition (European Commission 2019b). The EU currently distinguishes between regions dependent on extraction of coal and fossil fuels and those dependent on carbon-intensive industries (Alves Dias et al. 2021).This report does not present an exhaustive list of all programs and investments at the EU level that have been used to support workers and communities; rather, it identifies the key relevant EU policies and programs, describes their main features, and gives several examples of specific funded projects and activities. Many of these policies and programs have been motivated by other energy and economic issues, such as improving energy efficiency for energy security and enhanced productivity, but they include tools that are also applicable to just transition in the context of decarbonization.Sections 2 and 3 of this report focus on the policies and programs during the full EU long-term budget cycle from 2014 to 2020. Section 4 then discusses more recent EU policy priorities and programs, some of which are still being shaped under the European Green Deal. The report thus provides a broad picture of how the debate around just transition is reshaping and adjusting EU policies and programs. Section 5 concludes by summarizing the relevant lessons learned from the EU experience.The review of EU just transition policies provides several relevant insights for policymakers seeking to address equity and fairness issues in the United States’ energy transition. See Look et al. (2021) for a review of key issues for the US energy transition. We briefly summarize the key points here, with discussion of them in Section 5.The multiannual and investment-focused EU budget provides long-term, stable funding, which supports addressing many of the challenges associated with just transition.The EU Just Transition Mechanism aims to mobilize substantial public and private investment between 2021 and 2027 to support just transition efforts in Europe.The Just Transition Mechanism includes a Just Transition Platform to serve as a single access point for related EU-wide resources and a centralized source for technical assistance. The Biden administration has established a similar resource.The EU just transition policy framework requires EU member states to develop Territorial Just Transition Plans before accessing funds. The Biden administration has established a mechanism for rapid response teams to support local transition planning.One of the three pillars of EU just transition policy in the Green Deal is access to the Public Sector Loan Facility to support the implementation of just transition projects. The United States does not have a financing program explicitly dedicated to supporting transition in energy communities, although the creation of the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund in the Inflation Reduction Act may lead to a green bank that could support just transition efforts.EU R&D policy supports not only technology development but also innovation in the creation of stronger social institutions as a tool for responding to just transition challenges. The US federal government could do more to support research and pilot implementation of innovative approaches for addressing just transition. |
| Date: | 2024–02–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rff:report:rp-24-02 |
| By: | Anna Elffers (Independent researcher); Cecile Wentges (Get Lost Cultural Agency); Marjelle Vermeulen (Erasmus University Rotterdam) |
| Abstract: | The Netherlands is increasingly experiencing cross-sector collaborations between the cultural and creative sectors and industries (CCSI) and the business community. Cross-sector partnerships ‘create more value together for both businesses and non-profits in the arts and cultural sector, than they could have done separately’ (Wang and Holznagel, 2021, p. 95). However, the opportunities for such partnerships in The Netherlands are not yet fully exploited. Cross-sector partnerships can have advantages for both CCSI and businesses. The CCSI is highly dependent on subsidies and very much focused on this money stream. Partnerships with businesses can create new opportunities and spaces for arts and culture and thereby mitigate this dependency on subsidies. Businesses can also benefit from a cross-sector partnership. ESG (Environmental, Social and Governance) reporting guidelines stimulate the business community to drive sustainable and responsible business practices. However, the business community is often still looking for ways to give shape to the ‘S’ of Social. Artists and cultural organizations are often perfectly outfitted to help businesses create social value in the places where they are active, e.g. by making buildings and neighborhoods more lively, easy to navigate or safe, by building communities and strengthening social cohesion or by giving meaning and identity to the past, present and future of certain place. A good partnership concerns a transformative collaboration, in which both parties work together towards a shared goal. As a result of the current hybridization movement, organizations from different sectors are moving towards the ‘social center’. In addition to financial value, businesses increasingly pursue soft values such as diversity and inclusion, employee wellbeing and social impact on local communities. In the CCSI, ‘hybridisation debates point to the presence of social, economic, political and creative and artistic logics/goals, with different mixes’ (Ferreira et al., 2023, p 929). Consequently, CCSI and the business community increasingly use a mix of orientations with shared interests: this offers a good starting point for transformative cross-sector partnerships. This research therefore focuses on the question: in what ways can the CCSI and businesses jointly make a social impact? By studying different projects that were carried out by the Get Lost Foundation in the Netherlands, we analyze how cross-sector partnerships can be successfully formed and built. We thereby pay attention to the important ‘translator’ role of intermediaries. |
| Keywords: | Cross-sector partnerships, cultural and creative sectors and industries, businesses, social impact |
| JEL: | L31 M14 Z11 |
| Date: | 2025–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cue:wpaper:awp-06-2025 |