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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | World Bank |
| Keywords: | Finance and Financial Sector Development-Finance and Development |
| Date: | 2023–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wboper:39854 |
| By: | Qiaoyi Chen (Fudan University); Nicholas Ryan (Yale University); Daniel Yi Xu (Duke University) |
| Abstract: | We study carbon offsets sold by firms in China under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). We find that offset-selling firms, meant to cut carbon emissions, instead increase them by 49% after starting an offset project. In a model of firm investment decisions and offset review, we estimate that CDM firms increase emissions due to both the selection of higher-growth firms into projects (35 pp) and because offset projects themselves boost firm growth and therefore emissions (14 pp). The CDM reduces global surplus by causing damages from increased emissions four times greater than private gains from trade in the offset market. |
| Date: | 2025–03–18 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2434 |
| By: | World Bank |
| Keywords: | Gender-Gender and Development Governance-Non Governmental Organizations Social Development-Social Conflict and Violence Law and Development-Law and Gender |
| Date: | 2023–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wboper:40194 |
| By: | World Bank |
| Keywords: | Poverty Reduction-Equity and Development Gender-Gender and Development |
| Date: | 2023–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wboper:40110 |
| By: | World Bank |
| Keywords: | Gender-Gender and Law Social Development-Social Conflict and Violence Gender-Gender and Health Social Development-Social Inclusion & Institutions Poverty Reduction-Inequality |
| Date: | 2023–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wboper:40185 |
| By: | Kory Kroft; Yao Luo; Magne Mogstad; Bradley Setzler |
| Abstract: | Existing work on imperfect competition typically focuses on either the labor market or the product market in isolation. In contrast, we analyze imperfect competition in both markets jointly, showing theoretically and empirically that focusing on one market in isolation may result in a limited or misleading picture of the degree and impacts of market power. Our empirical setting is the US construction industry. We develop, identify and estimate a model where construction firms imperfectly compete with one another for workers in the labor market and for projects in both the private market and the government market, where government projects are procured through auctions. Our analyses combine the universe of business and worker tax records with newly collected records from government procurement auctions. We use the estimated model to quantify the markdown of wages and the markup of prices, to show that the impacts of an increase in market power in one market are attenuated by the existence of market power in the other market, and to quantify the rents, rent-sharing, and incidence of procurements in the US construction industry. |
| Keywords: | Imperfect Competition; Monopsony; Wage setting; Rent sharing; Procurement auctions; Construction industry |
| JEL: | D44 J31 J42 L11 |
| Date: | 2025–04–15 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-799 |