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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Laura Molinari; Elvira Haezendonck; Katrien Van Rompay; Vincent Mabillard; Michaël Dooms |
| Abstract: | Public authorities are expected to provide a salient infrastructure network, with only limited financial resources. However, many of these infrastructure projects go over budget and, therefore, research about these cost overruns is necessary to better understand the dynamics at work and provide solutions. We conclude that in Belgium, and broader, solutions need to be found for relational issues internal and external to the project core. Before a lot of attention was given to technical and legal project aspects, while our insights show that we should focus more on the relational aspects. |
| Keywords: | causes; cost deviations; cost overruns; explanations; project performance; public infrastructure |
| Date: | 2024–06–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/374781&r= |
| By: | Fernando Acebes; David Poza; Jose M Gonzalez-Varona; Javier Pajares; Adolfo Lopez-Paredes |
| Abstract: | Obtaining a viable schedule baseline that meets all project constraints is one of the main issues for project managers. The literature on this topic focuses mainly on methods to obtain schedules that meet resource restrictions and, more recently, financial limitations. The methods provide different viable schedules for the same project, and the solutions with the shortest duration are considered the best-known schedule for that project. However, no tools currently select which schedule best performs in project risk terms. To bridge this gap, this paper aims to propose a method for selecting the project schedule with the highest probability of meeting the deadline of several alternative schedules with the same duration. To do so, we propose integrating aleatory uncertainty into project scheduling by quantifying the risk of several execution alternatives for the same project. The proposed method, tested with a well-known repository for schedule benchmarking, can be applied to any project type to help managers to select the project schedules from several alternatives with the same duration, but the lowest risk. |
| Date: | 2024–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2406.00077&r= |
| By: | Fabian Alex |
| Abstract: | Using the modelling framework of Stiglitz & Weiss (1981), we show that – perhaps surprisingly – there is no influence of projects’ riskiness on the capital market equilibrium. The savings interest rate fully determines the amount of credit rationing and the nature of an equilibrium (adverse selection, two-prices etc.). This rate is, in turn, fully determined by the relative probabilities of success of firms’ projects (and, thus, repayment of their debt). Hence, making capital markets overall “less risky†, which may for example be the case when financial markets become greener, does not alle- viate concerns of asymmetric information. The result holds both for cases of hidden information and for those of hidden actions. |
| Keywords: | Asymmetric Information, Financial Markets, Green Loans, Hidden Information, Hidden Action, Project Risk |
| JEL: | D82 G14 G21 |
| Date: | 2024–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bav:wpaper:235_fabian_alex&r= |
| By: | Jérôme Massiani (UNIMIB - Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca = University of Milano-Bicocca) |
| Abstract: | This paper reviews the contribution of experts to the appraisal of large infrastructures, looking at the evaluation performed in 2019 in Italy by the Ministry of Infrastructures and Transports on the Lyon-Turin railway project. This evaluation had been initiated in a particular context, linked to a visible policy agenda and while the construction of the tunnel had already begun. The appraisal has produced surprising results, mostly counterintuitive and heavily criticized. We analyse these results and show how they can be valid, in that they would not result from inconsistency in the method but from the peculiar features of the project (low initial demand, high mode transfer compared with initial traffic, high road tax and toll levels). We also check the validity of some paradoxical results of the assessment. Moreover, the public debate has been made more difficult due to an inconsistency in EU evaluation Guidelines. Also, we analyse mechanisms that affect the credibility of experts and we find that the influence of experts in the public debate has little to see with the inherent consistency of the methods used. |
| Abstract: | Cet article examine la contribution des experts à l'évaluation économique des grands projets à la lumière de l'évaluation du Lyon-Turin réalisée en Italie en 2019. Cette évaluation est née dans un contexte particulier caractérisé par une commande politique manifeste et pour un chantier entamé. L'évaluation, globalement négative, a produit des résultats inattendus, contre-intuitifs et fortement critiqués. Nous analysons ces résultats et mettons en évidence qu'ils apparaissent valides et dépendent des caractéristiques extrêmement particulières du projet : faible trafic initial, forte hypothèse de report modal, fiscalité et péages routiers élevés. Nous expliquons aussi certains résultats paradoxaux de l'analyse. En outre, le débat technique a été rendu particulièrement difficile en raison d'une incohérence dans les modalités de calcul préconisées par le Guide méthodologique de l'Union Européenne. Nous analysons ensuite les mécanismes de légitimation et de délégitimation de l'expertise économique à l'œuvre dans cet épisode. Une conclusion est que ce n'est pas la qualité du calcul économique qui en détermine l'acceptation et l'influence dans le débat public. |
| Keywords: | Cost Benefit Analysis, infrastructures, mega projects, analyse coûts-avantages, mégaprojets, analyse couts avantages |
| Date: | 2023–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04159527&r= |
| By: | Pablo Alvarez-Campana; Felix Villafanez; Fernando Acebes; David Poza |
| Abstract: | This paper presents a simulation approach to enhance the performance of heuristics for multi-project scheduling. Unlike other heuristics available in the literature that use only one priority criterion for resource allocation, this paper proposes a structured way to sequentially apply more than one priority criterion for this purpose. By means of simulation, different feasible schedules are obtained to, therefore, increase the probability of finding the schedule with the shortest duration. The performance of this simulation approach was validated with the MPSPLib library, one of the most prominent libraries for resource-constrained multi-project scheduling. These results highlight the proposed method as a useful option for addressing limited time and resources in portfolio management. |
| Date: | 2024–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2406.02102&r= |
| By: | Ludivine Dupont (i3-CRG - Centre de recherche en gestion i3 - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - I3 - Institut interdisciplinaire de l’innovation - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Florence Charue Duboc (i3-CRG - Centre de recherche en gestion i3 - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - I3 - Institut interdisciplinaire de l’innovation - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Christophe Midler (i3-CRG - Centre de recherche en gestion i3 - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - I3 - Institut interdisciplinaire de l’innovation - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Académie des Technologies) |
| Abstract: | This study examines the construction, dynamics and appropriation of Environmental Performance Indicators (EPIs) within an organization, specifically focusing on their development process. Over the course of a year, the author conducted more than 50 interviews and 30 meetings with stakeholders to analyze the development of EPIs in new product development. The research highlights the roles of experts, project teams, and executive management in EPI construction, emphasizing stakeholder learning and compromises. The findings enrich the discussion on stakeholder integration in EPI processes and the roles of eco-design tools, particularly during preliminary development stages, addressing the gap between academic research and practical application. |
| Keywords: | Eco-design, environmental performance indicators, sustainable innovation |
| Date: | 2024–06–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04579468&r= |
| By: | Koukopoulos, Anastasios; Lounis, Stavros; Farmakis, Timoleon; Vrechopoulos, Adam; Doukidis, Georgios |
| Abstract: | In an ever-changing environment, technological progress is at the frontline. Through European-funded projects, research is conducted in various fields, aiming to tackle Europe’s biggest challenges in various sectors. In the course of materializing these new advancements, exploitable outcomes are designed and developed that, in turn, need to be optimally introduced to the market. In order for that to happen, the first thing needed is to make the developments widely known so that they start the journey of diffusion toward adoption, for which Dissemination and Communication is key. However, Dissemination and Communication actions are quite often underperforming. This research proposes a new approach to Dissemination and Communication actions by introducing an Integrated Omnichannel Dissemination and Communication (IODC) Framework relying upon Integrated Communications, capitalizing on and Omnichannel approach to optimally address all potentially interested stakeholders (through the Quintuple helix) that can help European Funded projects’ partners effectively structure their Dissemination and Communication strategy and actions. |
| Keywords: | Dissemination; Communication; Integrated; Omnichannel; Funded Projects |
| JEL: | M3 M31 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:121108&r= |
| By: | Helen Dempster (Center for Global Development); Martha Guerrero Ble (Refugees International); Stéphanie López Villamil (Independent consultant) |
| Abstract: | Economic migrants and refugees can bring both benefits and costs to their hosting countries. If well-integrated, they can support themselves, their families, and their hosting countries as producers and consumers. Both economic migration and forced displacement are therefore integrally linked with development outcomes. Recognizing this, multilateral development banks (MDBs) are supporting their beneficiary member countries to improve outcomes for economic migrants and refugees, in the form of billions of dollars in grants and loans, as well as technical assistance, policy dialogues, and knowledge exchanges. This paper provides an introductory snapshot of some of the financing instruments, projects, and strategies used; particularly innovative approaches; and challenges MDBs face in expanding their engagement. It is hoped this paper will be useful to anyone who engages with MDBs and wants to understand how they engage on economic migration and forced displacement, particularly as these issues continue to grow in importance. |
| Date: | 2024–05–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cgd:ppaper:328&r= |
| By: | Ewa Neska; Maksymilian Bielecki; Anna Kowalska-Pyzalska |
| Abstract: | Renewable energy communities (RECs) are garnering significant interest and stimulating extensive discussions. However, they remain a marginal element of power systems in most countries, confined primarily to pilot projects and small-scale deployments. In Poland, this issue is even more pronounced, as RECs have not yet gained substantial public awareness. To explore why RECs are easier to discuss than to implement, we conducted in-depth interviews with a select group of experts. Utilizing PESTEL analysis to examine macro-environmental factors and investigate their interplay. Our study provides a diagnosis of the current situation and proposes a roadmap for the effective development of RECs. |
| Keywords: | renewable energy community; in-depth interview; PESTEL analysis |
| JEL: | D91 Q20 Q33 Q42 Q55 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ahh:wpaper:worms2402&r= |
| By: | Yingkai Li; Boli Xu |
| Abstract: | A principal can propose a project to an agent, who then decides whether to accept. Their payoffs from launching the project depend on an unknown binary state. The principal can obtain more precise information about the state through a test at no cost, but crucially, it is common knowledge that she can falsify the test result. In the most interesting case where players have conflicted interests, the optimal test is a binary lemon-detecting test. We also find that coordination is possible when the principal is pessimistic but not when the agent is pessimistic. Moreover, when the agent has private information about the state, a single binary lemon-detecting test remains optimal even though the principal has the option to screen the agent by providing a menu of tests. Our finding is consistent with observed tests in real practice. |
| Date: | 2024–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2405.18521&r= |