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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Vooren, N. J. E. Van (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management); Janssen, L. M. S. (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management); Drewes, H. W. (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management); Baan, C. A. (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management); Bongers, I. M. B. (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management) |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tiu:tiutis:69c55ab8-3e60-4745-afdd-03a352a4fa8c&r=ppm |
| By: | Caroline Flammer; Thomas Giroux; Geoffrey Heal |
| Abstract: | The use of private capital to finance biodiversity conservation and restoration is a new practice in sustainable finance. This study sheds light on this new practice. First, we provide a conceptual framework that lays out how biodiversity can be financed by i) pure private capital and ii) blended financing structures. In the latter, private capital is blended with public or philanthropic capital, whose aim is to de-risk private capital investments. The main element underlying both types of financing is the “monetization” of biodiversity, that is, the extent to which investments in biodiversity can generate a financial return for private investors. Second, we provide empirical evidence using deal-level data from a leading biodiversity finance institution. We find that projects with higher expected returns tend to be financed by pure private capital. Their scale is smaller, however, and so is their expected biodiversity impact. For larger-scale projects with a more ambitious biodiversity impact, blended finance is the more prevalent form of financing. While these projects have lower expected returns, their risk is also lower. This suggests that the blending—and the corresponding de-risking of private capital—is an important tool for improving the risk-return tradeoff of these projects, thereby increasing their appeal to private investors. Finally, we examine a set of projects that did not make it to the portfolio stage. This analysis suggests that, in order to be financed by private capital, biodiversity projects need to meet a certain threshold in terms of both their financial return and biodiversity impact. Accordingly, private capital is unlikely to substitute for the implementation of effective public policies in addressing the biodiversity crisis. |
| JEL: | G11 G23 G3 Q14 Q2 Q5 Q57 |
| Date: | 2023–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:31022&r=ppm |
| By: | Benjamin Le Pendeven (Audencia Recherche - Audencia Business School); Armin Schwienbacher (SKEMA Business School) |
| Abstract: | This article examines the impact of perceived innovativeness on the success of equity crowdfunding campaigns. Building on the investor perspective, we hypothesize a positive impact of perceived innovativeness on the campaign outcome. Our database covers 191 campaigns launched in France on different platforms, drawing on over 2, 000 individual assessments of the perceived innovativeness of the start-ups involved, carried out by 176 participants with diverse backgrounds. We find support for our hypothesis from the investor perspective in that highly innovative projects attract more crowd investors and, in turn, raise more capital. We contribute to the understanding of how the crowd makes investment choices. |
| Keywords: | equity crowdfunding, entrepreneurial finance, start-ups, innovativeness |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03948381&r=ppm |
| By: | Mariano Moszoro; Luciano Greco |
| Abstract: | The economic debate underlines the reasons why discount rates of infrastructure projects should be similar, regardless the public or private source of financing, during the forecast period when flows are risky but predictable. In contrast, we show that the incompleteness of contracts between governments and private firms beyond the forecast period (i.e., when flows of net social benefits are state-contingent) entails expected terminal values that are systematically larger under government rather than private financing. This effect provides a new rationale for applying a lower discount rate in the assessment of projects under public financing as compared to private financing. |
| Keywords: | Social discount rate; public utilities; private financing of infrastructures; public-private partnerships |
| Date: | 2023–03–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2023/056&r=ppm |
| By: | Armine Khachatryan; Ms. Yan M Sun; Yen N Mooi; Ezgi O. Ozturk; Hoda Selim; William Lindquist; Mr. Jan Kees Martijn |
| Abstract: | Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are increasingly an important vehicle for several Western Balkan countries to increase investment to reduce their infrastructure gaps. While there are benefits to well-designed and implemented PPPs, they also carry a potential for large fiscal risks and increased costs if not managed well. Countries with successful PPP programs typically benefit from a clear and well-designed PPP governance framework, which covers all stages of the PPP life cycle. Western Balkan countries need to address gaps in their PPP governance frameworks to fully reap the potential benefits from PPPs. |
| Keywords: | Infrastructure; Public-private partnerships; Western Balkans; governance framework; PPP procurement; PPP life cycle; future of PPP; PPP project; Fiscal risks; Public investment spending; PPP legislation; Risks of public-private partnership; Europe; Global |
| Date: | 2023–02–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2023/031&r=ppm |
| By: | Rochet, Jean-Charles; Biais, Bruno |
| Abstract: | Taxing financial transactions is often advocated for Pigouvian reasons, when financial speculation is supposed to generate inefficiencies. We adopt instead a Mirrleesian approach, and study the optimal taxation of financial transactions when financial markets are efficient, but the tax system is imperfect, due to asymmetric information. In our model, financial transactions are used by entrepreneurs to hedge shocks on their skills, in line with the New Dynamic Public Finance literature. Entrepreneurs privately observe their skills, but trades in financial markets are publicly observable. The optimal mechanism maximizes a convex combination of utilitarian welfare and Rawlsian criterion, subject to feasibility and incentive constraints. Entrepreneurial projects are subject to liquidity shocks, which can be smoothed by conducting financial transactions. Better skilled entrepreneurs’ projects have larger expected profits, but also larger shocks. Trades therefore signal skills, implying it is optimal to tax financial transactions, in addition to capital income and wealth. |
| Date: | 2023–03–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:127931&r=ppm |