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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Barthel, Philipp; Perrot, Celine Marie; Benlian, Alexander; Hess, Thomas |
| Date: | 2021–05–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dar:wpaper:126521&r= |
| By: | Lola Duprat (LEST - Laboratoire d'économie et de sociologie du travail - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Christophe Baret (LEST - Laboratoire d'économie et de sociologie du travail - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Ariel Mendez (LEST - Laboratoire d'économie et de sociologie du travail - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | In this article, we analyze how meta-organizations can be able to foster the creativity of cultural and creative organizations. Through the study of a cultural wasteland, we show through three research proposals - dealing with issues of resources, autonomy and reputation - that meta-organizations are a suitable organization for cultural and creative organizations. Meta-organization ensures a contribution of vital resources to creative production, the autonomy necessary for creativity to be expressed and a gain in legitimacy for its members through its creative reputation. The case study carried out also highlights that the strategic dimension of the meta-organization via the collective project and the shared identity plays a much more important role than the organizational dimension via governance and rules does, to ensure its sustainability. |
| Abstract: | Dans cet article, nous analysons comment les méta-organisations peuvent être de nature à favoriser la créativité d'organisations culturelles et créatives. Grâce à l'étude d'une friche culturelle, nous montrons par le biais de trois propositions de recherche – portant sur les questions de ressources, d'autonomie et de réputation – que les méta-organisations sont un organizing adéquat pour les organisations créatives et culturelles. La méta-organisation assure à la fois un apport de ressources vitales à la production créative, l'autonomie nécessaire pour que la créativité puisse s'exprimer et un gain en légitimité pour ses membres par le biais de sa réputation créative. L'étude de cas réalisée met en outre en évidence que la dimension stratégique de la méta-organisation via le projet collectif et l'identité partagée joue un rôle bien plus important que la dimension organisationnelle via la gouvernance et les règles, pour en assurer la pérennité. |
| Date: | 2020–06–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03220827&r= |
| By: | Acharya, Viral V.; Parlatore Siritto, Cecilia; Sundaresan, Suresh M |
| Abstract: | Infrastructure projects involve multiple parties: government, private sector firms that build and manage, and outside investors who supply financing. Private sector firms need incentives to implement and maintain the projects well; governments may lack commitment not to extort cash flows (for instance, by limiting user fees) from projects once implemented. This double moral hazard problem limits the willingness of outside investors to fund infrastructure projects. To ameliorate these two moral hazards, we show that the optimal design of infrastructure financing features (I) government guarantees to investors against project failure; (II) bundling of development rights for the private sector and investors; (III) tax subsidies to the private parties out of infrastructure externalities; and, (IV) "general obligation" financing in the form of cross-guarantees between high-quality projects and "revenue only" financing without cross-guarantees for low-quality projects. These features are found to be relevant in the practice of infrastructure financing. |
| Date: | 2020–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15288&r= |
| By: | Keeyoung Rhee; Myungkyu Shim; Ji Zhang |
| Abstract: | We analyze the optimal strategy for a government to promote large-scale investment projects under information frictions. Specifically, we propose a model where the government collects information on probability of each investment and discloses it to private investors a la Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). We derive the government's optimal information policy, which is characterized as threshold values for the unknown probability of the projects released to the private investors, and study how the underlying features of the economy affect the optimal policies. We find that when multiple projects are available, the government promotes the project with a bigger spillover effect by fully revealing the true state of the economy only when its probability is substantially high. Moreover, the development of the financial/information market also affects the optimal rule. |
| Date: | 2021–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2105.09576&r= |
| By: | Pejman Bahramian (Department of Economics, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6, Canada); Glenn P. Jenkins (Department of Economics, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6, Canada); Frank Milne (Department of Economics, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6, Canada) |
| Abstract: | This study uses an ex-post evaluation of the grid-connected wind projects in Ontario, Canada, to quantify the stakeholder impacts of such renewable energy projects. Our study includes a financial, economic and stakeholder analysis of a sample of three wind farms. The analysis sheds light on the distributional impacts that arise when there is a significant gap between the incentives created by the financial price paid for electricity generation and the economic value of the electricity generated. The analysis shows that the negotiated power purchase agreements (PPAs) have resulted in a negative outcome for the economy in all circumstances. It is found that the present value of the economic costs is at least three times the present value of the economic benefits, including the global benefits from the reduced CO2 emissions. This loss is borne by all the stakeholders of the electricity system, except the private owners of the wind farms. The losers are primarily the electricity consumers followed by the governments. The Ontario Electricity Rebate (OER) programme, which is financed by increased government borrowing, has the effect of transferring a large share of the costs incurred to promote investments in wind power to future generations of taxpayers in Ontario. |
| Keywords: | Economic analysis, electricity, Ontario, wind power |
| JEL: | O55 D61 Q42 |
| Date: | 2021–05–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qed:dpaper:4573&r= |
| By: | Auer, Raphael; Cornelli, Giulio; Frost, Jon |
| Abstract: | Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) are receiving more attention than ever before. Yet the motivations for issuance vary across countries, as do the policy approaches and technical designs. We investigate the economic and institutional drivers of CBDC development and take stock of design efforts. We set out a comprehensive database of technical approaches and policy stances on issuance, relying on central bank speeches and technical reports. Most projects are found in digitised economies with a high capacity for innovation. Work on retail CBDCs is more advanced where the informal economy is larger. We next take stock of the technical design options. More and more central banks are considering retail CBDC architectures in which the CBDC is a direct cash-like claim on the central bank, but where the private sector handles all customer-facing activity. We conclude with an in-depth description of three distinct CBDC approaches by the central banks of China, Sweden and Canada. |
| Keywords: | CBDC; Central bank digital currency; central banks; digital currency; distributed ledger technology; international payments; monetary policy; Payments; technology |
| JEL: | E42 E44 E51 F31 G21 G28 |
| Date: | 2020–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15363&r= |
| By: | Saule Baurzhan (Department of Economics, Eastern Mediterranean University, Famagusta, 99450, TRNC via Mersin 10, Turkey); Glenn P. Jenkins (Department of Economics, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6, Canada); Godwin O. Olasehinde-Williams (School of Economics and Management, Nanchang University, Nanchang, 330031, China) |
| Abstract: | This paper assesses the economic benefits of 57 World Bank Group-sponsored hydropower dam plant investments. Hydropower dams are among the main sources for producing electricity and the largest renewable source for power generation throughout the world. Hydropower dams are often a lower-cost option for power generation in Clean Energy Transition for addressing global climate change. Despite its conspicuous aspects, constructing hydropower dams has been controversial. Considering the World Bank’s long history as the largest hydropower development financier, this study investigates its performance in supporting hydropower dams. The outcomes of this study apply to the wider hydropower development community. Of the projects in this study, 70% experienced a cost overrun, and more than 80% of projects experienced time overruns, incurring potential additional costs as a result. Despite the high cost and time overruns, this hydropower portfolio of dams produced a present value of net economic benefits by 2016 of over half a trillion USD. Based on our findings, the evaluated hydropower portfolio helped avoid over a billion tones of CO2 for an estimated global environmental benefit valued at nearly USD 350 billion. The projects’ additional environmental benefits raise the real rate of return from 15.4% to 17.3%. The implication for hydropower developers is that the projects’ assessment should consider cost and time overrun and factor them into the project-planning contingency scenarios. There is a considerable benefit for developing countries to exploit their hydropower resources if they can be developed according to industry practices and international standards. The case for developing hydropower may be stronger when considering its climate benefits. The net economic benefits of hydropower can be even higher if there is a greater effort to manage cost and time overruns. |
| Keywords: | investment appraisal; carbon emissions; cost overrun; hydropower; dams; World Bank |
| JEL: | D2 O10 |
| Date: | 2021–05–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qed:dpaper:4572&r= |