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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Kim, Kang-Soo |
| Abstract: | The contracted internal rate of return (CIRR) of Korea's public-private-partnership (PPP) projects does not properly reflect the risks associated with the different types and characteristics of facilities and government support. Rather, the rates are set at the same level as similar preceding projects. - The characteristics of a project, e.g. facility type, amount of private investment, and operation period, and the ensuing risks are not sufficiently reflected in the decisions over CIRR. Moreover, the construction subsidy―a government risk-sharing and support policy-inadequately contributes to lowering the rate. - The project review period and VfM test do not have a meaningful effect on determining the CIRR, implying that project evaluations and analyses need to be improved. ■ For the seamless execution and invigoration of PPP projects and lower user fees, the CIRR must be fixed at an appropriate level through more active negotiations and efforts in addition to taking the CIRR of similar existing PPP projects into account. - A significantly low CIRR relative to the risks could diminish the incentive to privately invest or could even lead to the bankruptcy of an ongoing project. On the other hand, an excessively high rate could raise the user fee or necessitate larger government subsidies. - To determine the suitable CIRR, the risks and effects of government support must be analyzed. In particular, policies that encourage competition in the PPP market must be developed to lower user fees through policies, e.g. transparent disclosure of information, simplified implementation procedures, increased provision of guarantees, and the provision of compensation for the cost of failed proposals, etc. |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:kdifor:276&r=all |
| By: | Richard Bluhm (SoDa Laboratories, Monash University); Axel Dreher (SoDa Laboratories, Monash University); Andreas Fuchs (SoDa Laboratories, Monash University); Bradley C. Parks (SoDa Laboratories, Monash University); Austin M. Strange (SoDa Laboratories, Monash University); Michael J. Tierney (SoDa Laboratories, Monash University) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the causal effect of transport infrastructure on the spatial concentration of economic activity. Leveraging a new global dataset of geo-located Chinese government-financed projects over the period from 2000 to 2014 together with measures of spatial inequality based on remotely-sensed data, we analyze the effects of transport projects on the spatial distribution of economic activity within and between regions in a large number of developing countries. We find that Chinese-financed transportation projects reduce spatial concentration within but not between regions. In line with land use theory, we document a range of results which are consistent with a relocation of activity from city centers to their immediate periphery. Transport projects decentralize economic activity particularly strongly in regions that are more urbanized, located closer to the coast, and less developed. |
| Keywords: | transport costs, infrastructure, development finance, spatial concentration, China |
| JEL: | F15 F35 R11 R12 P33 O18 O19 |
| Date: | 2020–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajr:sodwps:2020-06&r=all |
| By: | Reinhardt, Karl; Deakin, Elizabeth SM., J.D. |
| Abstract: | This research projects evaluates the social, environmental, and safety impacts of shared electric scooters (e-scooters)’ through a literature review, a nationwide scan of state and local laws and regulations, and a case study of Oakland’s experience with e-scooters, including an analysis of the city’s user survey and our own in-depth interviews. E-scooters offer an enjoyable, low-cost travel option, but are used mainly by young, affluent, white males. To improve equity, cities are requiring e-scooter rental companies to serve low-income and minority communities and some further mandate that a share of the e-scooters accommodate people with disabilities. E-scooters are quiet and produce no tailpipe emissions, but their cumulative environmental impact depends on their manufacture, useful life, disposal, and use. In early applications, rental e-scooters survived less than a year. Some 30-50 percent of e-scooter trips replace short auto trips. Cities and states can improve e-scooter safety by encouraging helmet use, offering rider training, limiting speeds, improving pavements, managing parking, and calming traffic. |
| Keywords: | Social and Behavioral Sciences, Scooters, electric vehicles, vehicle sharing, regulations, travel behavior, traffic safety, equity, environmental impacts |
| Date: | 2020–10–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:itsrrp:qt8x67x360&r=all |
| By: | Juho Lindman; Jamie Berryhill; Benjamin Welby; Mariane Piccinin Barbieri |
| Abstract: | Blockchain remains a hot topic for digital transformation and innovation. In the private sector, blockchain has demonstrated disruptive potential through proven use cases. However, despite strong interest and greater awareness, blockchain has had minimal impact on the public sector, where few projects have moved beyond small pilots. At the same time, there is a growing scepticism and cynicism about public sector blockchain. This paper seeks to understand why this is, by analysing the latest research in the area and identifying and analysing government experiences with successful and unsuccessful projects. It provides early findings on beliefs, characteristics, and practices related to government blockchain projects and the organisations that seek to implement them, with a focus on factors contributing to success or non-success. Although blockchain has yet to affect government in the ways that early hype predicted, government decision makers will nonetheless need to understand and monitor this emerging technology. |
| Date: | 2020–11–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:govaaa:43-en&r=all |
| By: | Béatrice Boulu-Reshef (LEO - Laboratoire d'Économie d'Orleans - UO - Université d'Orléans - Université de Tours - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Nina Rapoport (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne, PSE - Paris School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Voluntary contributions are often solicited in sequential and public settings where information on the quality of the fundraising project unfolds with the sequence of decisions. This paper examines how the different sources of information available to potential donors in such settings influence their decision-making. Contrary to most of the leadership literature, neither leaders nor followers in these settings have certainty about the quality of the fundraising project. We explore whether leaders remain influential, the extent to which they use their influence strategically, and the consequences on followers when leaders are misinformed. We combine an information cascade method with a modified public goods game to create a "Voluntary Contributions in Cascades" paradigm. Participants sequentially receive private signals about the state of the world, which determines the potential returns from the public good, and take two public actions: an incentivized prediction about the state of the world and a contribution to the public good. We find that participants' predictions mostly align with Bayesian predictions, and find no evidence for strategic or misleading predictions. Leaders' contributions are positively correlated with followers', suggesting they remain influential despite their limited informational advantage. This influence takes a tragic turn when leaders happen to be misinformed, as most misinformed leaders end up unintentionally misleading followers. We find that having a misleading leader is associated with a reduction in gains from contributions roughly twice as large as the reduction that stems from dividing the marginal-per-capita-return by two. Our results stress the significance of having well-informed leaders. |
| Keywords: | voluntary contribution,information cascade,fundraising,sequential public good game,leadership |
| Date: | 2020–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-02977853&r=all |
| By: | Fawson, Chris; Cottle, Christopher; Hubbard, Hayden; Marshall, McKlayne |
| Abstract: | A rapidly increasing number of large U.S. companies are reporting use of an internal carbon price, in spite of the struggle to enact environmental regulation or reduction standards on carbon emissions in the United States. Such trends have created a growing interest in both how and why the private sector is using internal carbon pricing and what the implications of these developments will be. This paper examines the precise motives, methods and prices used by the U.S. private sector for incorporating an internal cost of carbon into their organizational strategies for the purpose of reducing carbon emissions. Careful analysis of reports from the CDP (formerly the Carbon Disclosure Project) suggests that the primary motives driving internal carbon pricing initiatives in the United States are investor relations, cost savings opportunities provided by reducing emissions, perceived physical risks associated with climate change (e.g., as severe weather or supply chain interference), and regulatory risk. Furthermore, shadow pricing and carbon offsetting are the most common methods of private-sector carbon pricing, and the average internal carbon price in the private sector is $40.09 per ton as of 2017. These trends are evaluated in the broader context of U.S. political developments, economic policies, and mechanisms for pricing carbon. This research should be particularly pertinent to private-sector shareholders and stakeholders, business owners, and executives—in addition to policy makers—as it provides unique insights into how private initiatives are advancing a commitment to CO2-induced climate change mitigation in the face of an increasingly uncertain public policy landscape. |
| Keywords: | Environmental Economics and Policy, Risk and Uncertainty |
| Date: | 2019–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:cgouta:307178&r=all |