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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Gilles Leo (ESTP - École Spéciale des Travaux Publics, du Bâtiment et de l'Industrie [Paris]); Francis Claude (ESTP - École Spéciale des Travaux Publics, du Bâtiment et de l'Industrie [Paris]); Rani Meouche (ESTP - École Spéciale des Travaux Publics, du Bâtiment et de l'Industrie [Paris]); Ahmed Mebarki (MSME - Laboratoire de Modélisation et Simulation Multi Echelle - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - UPEC UP12 - Université Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne - Paris 12 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Christophe Gobin (ESTP - École Spéciale des Travaux Publics, du Bâtiment et de l'Industrie [Paris]) |
| Abstract: | The thesis work focused on the development of a formal model to quantify the disturbances intrinsically produced by a construction project on the performance of uses of a building. In order to characterize the interaction between these two systems, explanatory parameters have been identified in order to influence the probability of achieving a given level of performance and thus maximize the probability of satisfaction of stakeholders with their preferences. The model positions itself as a decision aid when choosing constructive options and improving the effective performances of use of buildings is the main industrial application expected |
| Abstract: | Les travaux de thèse ont porté sur la confection d'un modèle formel permettant de quantifier les perturbations intrinsèquement produites par un projet de construction sur les performances d'usages d'un bâtiment. Afin de caractériser l'interaction entre ces deux systèmes, des paramètres explicatifs ont été identifiés afin d'influencer la probabilité d'atteindre un niveau de performance donné et ainsi maximiser la probabilité de satisfaction des parties prenantes vis-à-vis de leurs préférences. Le modèle se positionne comme une aide à la décision lors de choix d'options constructives et l'amélioration des performances d'usages effectives des bâtiments est la principale application industrielle attendue. |
| Date: | 2018–10–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02066547&r=all |
| By: | Arjan S. Sidhu (Energy Policy Research Group University of Cambridge); Michael G. Pollitt (Energy Policy Research Group University of Cambridge); Karim L. Anaya (Energy Policy Research Group University of Cambridge) |
| Keywords: | electrical energy storage, battery, social cost benefit analysis |
| JEL: | L94 L98 Q48 D61 |
| Date: | 2017–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:enp:wpaper:eprg1710&r=all |
| By: | Janet Vähämäki; Chantal Verger |
| Abstract: | What have we learned from implementing results-based management in development co-operation organisations? What progress and benefits can be seen? What are the main challenges and unintended consequences? Are there good practices to address these challenges?To respond to these questions this paper reviews and analyses the findings from various evaluations and reviews of results-based management systems conducted by members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the OECD/DAC Results Community Secretariat and other bodies in the past four years (2015-2018). It also draws on emerging lessons from new methods for managing development co-operation results.This analytical work aims to:identify recent trends in results-based management,explore challenges faced by providers when developing their results approaches and systems,select good practices in responding to these challenges that can be useful for the OECD/DACResults Community, considering new approaches, new technologies and evolving contexts.This body of evidence will inform the development of a core set of generic guiding principles for results-based management in development co-operation. |
| Keywords: | adaptive management, Agenda 2030, aggregation, data, development co-operation, evidence-based, payment by results, performance measurement, results framework, results-based management, SDGs, standard indicators |
| JEL: | O19 O2 O20 O21 Z18 |
| Date: | 2019–03–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:dcdaaa:53-en&r=all |
| By: | Spiros Bougheas; Tianxi Wang |
| Abstract: | It is well known that a debt contract provides strong incentives to a borrower who is holding residual claims to exert high levels of effort. This result carries over to the case when the borrower seeks funds for multiple projects where now the lender can use cross-pledging to further enhance incentives. More specifically, the lender can now condition the borrower’s reward on the joint performance of all projects. In this Nottingham School of Economics working paper Spiros Bougheas and Tianxi Wang consider the case of multiple project finance when the borrower also has better information than the lender about the contribution of her effort on each project’s success. The main result of the paper is that when the borrower cannot improve the likelihood of success of some projects by exerting effort cross-pledging can destroy incentives to exert effort even on those projects that can benefit from such effort. Then when at the time when the contract is signed there is a high likelihood that the portfolio of projects might be a mix of both types then the optimal finance response is outside equity which offers incentives to the borrower to exert effort whenever a project can benefit from it. The paper also shows that providing maximal incentives is not always optimal. |
| Keywords: | outside equity, financial contracts, principal agent model |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcfc:19/01&r=all |
| By: | Morris, Sebastian |
| Abstract: | Optimal approaches that recognize the specific kind of market failure/s, in the policy and design of infrastructure, greatly reduce the financing costs and improves the ability of to attract finance in the private provisioning of infrastructure. When state systems are weak organizationally it is first best to strengthen the state capacity so that it can minimally perform the roles of design, regulation, development of frameworks, and of monitoring, for the private provisioning of infrastructure. This is particularly so in the case where there are dual market failures arising out of both the natural monopoly and the appropriability failure aspect. Thus sewerage and water, city roads, multimodal facilities, solid waste, public health care, the challenges have proven beyond the current ability of the state, despite its large commitment to the use of private capital. The challenges in design and policy are large and with many false starts it is only now barely beginning to be considered in India. Thus infrastructure design rather than debilities in financial markets remain the key problem. The need to develop capital markets and institutions to lend long is vital, but much of the challenge is really in having good projects that are financed keeping in mind the capacity limitations within banks and financial institutions. The potential to use of foreign capital to finance infrastructure is often overstated. Reform of financial institutions (FIs) and banks is vital today, as also the necessary incorporation of interest rate (change) risks into the project cost to overcome adverse selection. The forces leading to the current mess-up of the Indian banks and FIs in lending to infrastructure are brought in perspective. The key issues in developing state capacity, and the changes required for getting the design of infrastructure right, as also to bring functionality to the role of financial institutions in the private development of infrastructure are highlighted. |
| Date: | 2019–03–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iim:iimawp:14602&r=all |
| By: | Yamaguchi, Tomoaki; Yahiro, Kentaro; Yokoo, Makoto |
| Abstract: | In this work, we consider a three sided student-project-resource matching-allocation problem, in which students have preferences on projects, and projects on students. While students are many-to-one matched to projects, indivisible resources are many-to-one allocated to projects whose capacities are thus endogenously determined by the sum of resources allocated to them. Traditionally, this problem is divided into two separate problems: (1) resources are allocated to projects based on some expectations (resource allocation problem), and (2) students are matched to projects based on the capacities determined in the previous problem (matching problem). Although both problems are well-understood, unless the expectations used in the first problem are correct, we obtain a suboptimal outcome. Thus, it is desirable to solve this problem as a whole without dividing it in two. In this paper, we first show that a stable (i.e., fair and nonwasteful) matching does not exist in general (nonwastefulness is a criterion related to efficiency). Then, we show that no strategyproof mechanism satisfies fairness and very weak efficiency requirements. Given this impossibility result, we develop a new strategyproof mechanism that strikes a good balance between fairness and efficiency, which is assessed by experiments. |
| Keywords: | two-sided matching, mechanism design, resource allocation, strategyproof |
| JEL: | C78 D61 D63 |
| Date: | 2019–02–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:92720&r=all |
| By: | Tetsuya Kamijo; Guangwei Huang |
| Abstract: | The quality of environmental impact assessment (EIA) reports is fundamental to making good decisions and the low quality of EIA reports is a constraint in developed and developing countries. In developing countries, it appears to be very difficult to improve the quality of reports under present constraints such as limited funding, human resources, and information. The purposes of this study are to identify determinants of the overall quality of EIA reports for development cooperation projects that Japan International Cooperation Agency has supported, and to propose benchmarks for satisfactory quality reports under the present situation in developing countries. The study reviewed the quality of 160 reports from 2001 to 2016 and examined factors influencing the overall quality of reports using statistical tests, cluster analysis, and decision tree analysis. The study clarified that the two processes of alternatives and public involvement were determinants and their linkage affected the quality of reports. The study concludes that the just satisfactory grade of alternatives and public involvement at the scoping and draft reporting are the benchmarks for satisfactory EIA reports. Further verification through comparative studies and case studies, is needed to confirm how two processes have an effect on the quality of reports. |
| Keywords: | EIA report quality, alternatives, public involvement, statistical tests, cluster analysis, decision tree analysis |
| Date: | 2019–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jic:wpaper:183&r=all |