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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Sofianne Messaoudi Escarabajal (MRM - Montpellier Research in Management - UM1 - Université Montpellier 1 - UM3 - Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 - UM2 - Université Montpellier 2 - Sciences et Techniques - UPVD - Université de Perpignan Via Domitia - Groupe Sup de Co Montpellier (GSCM) - Montpellier Business School - UM - Université de Montpellier); Régis Meissonier (CEROG - Centre d'Etudes et de Recherche sur les Organisations et la Gestion - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille 3) |
| Abstract: | In Information Systems, few researchers studied the influence of mimetic practices of project managers. Indeed, IS project managers are observed as trying to apply "standard methods" or "best practices" observed in the business sector or recommended by experts. At the same time, they are forced to consider the specific context of the company they are working for and the needs and requests expressed the stakeholders. In Information Systems, few researchers studied the influence of mimetic practices of project managers. So, the question is raised concerning their autonomy in their way to balance this double influencing phenomenon. The paper reviews neo-institutional theories, enhances their sociological approach and present possible "institutionalized practices" of IS project managers. After it presents a research perspective related to the specific cultural context of our research field: a French educational religious institutions. |
| Keywords: | IS,project manager,institutionalized practices,freedom of action,new institutional theory |
| Date: | 2017–11–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01992787&r=all |
| By: | Claxton, Karl; Asaria, Miqdad; Chansa, Collins; Jamison, Julian; Lomas, James; Ochalek, Jessica; Paulden, Mike |
| Abstract: | The primary focus of this paper is to offer guidance on the analysis of time streams of effects that a project may have so that they can be discounted appropriately. This requires a framework that identifies the common parameters that need to be assessed, whether conducting cost-effectiveness or benefit-cost analysis. The quantification and conversion of the time streams of different effects into their equivalent health, health care cost or consumption effects avoids embedding multiple arguments in discounting policies. This helps to identify where parameters are likely to differ in particular contexts, what type of evidence would be relevant, what is currently known and how this evidence might be strengthened. The current evidence available to support the assessment of the key parameters is discussed and possible estimates and default assumptions are suggested. Reporting the results in an extensive way is recommended. This makes the assessments required explicit so the impact of alternative assumptions can be explored and analysis updated as better estimates evolve. Some projects will have effects across different countries where some or all of these parameters will differ. Therefore, the net present value of a project will be the sum of the country specific net present values rather than the sum of effects across countries discounted at some common rate. |
| Keywords: | health |
| JEL: | I10 O10 O20 |
| Date: | 2019–01–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:100038&r=all |
| By: | Ch. BELLÉGO (Insee, Crest); V. DORTET-BERNADET (Insee); M. TÉPAUT (Direction générale des entreprises) |
| Abstract: | In 2005, two mechanisms were set up to support collaborative research and development (R & D) between companies and research organizations. One carried by the National Research Agency (ANR) subsidizes projects that are more oriented towards basic research. The other supported by the Interministerial Fund (FUI) supports R & D activities that are more applied. This study presents a first exploitation of a database concerning these two schemes over the 2007-2014 period. This analysis allows to describe the selected projects, to examine the determinant of the participation of companies, and to investigate the decision of the two organizations to finance or not a project. This work confirms that the ANR and FUI mechanisms pursued different objectives: on average, the projects supported by the ANR are smaller than those supported by the FUI, they involve relatively more public research organizations, and R & D spending per partner is almost three times lower. In addition, in line with the policy of the competitiveness clusters (‘‘Pôles de Compétitivité’’), the FUI program seems to have favored more projects involving partners of the same territory whereas the ANR has more financed distant collaborations and projects with partners located in Ile-de-France. However, the selection process decreases the difference between the two devices: the ANR selects rather large projects, while the FUI rather retains those granting more to research organizations. In addition, the two schemes are aimed at the same very specific population of companies: companies that are already innovative, that carry out more R & D than others, that are more frequently members of a competitiveness cluster, and that have a better knowledge of the public support system for innovation. This last point raises the question of the redundancy of the other devices supporting collaborative R & D created in 2010, which are addressed in principle to the same population of companies. |
| Keywords: | R&D, Innovation, Collaborative R&D, public subsidizes |
| JEL: | D31 L38 O31 O38 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nse:doctra:g2018-10&r=all |
| By: | Nicholas Ryan |
| Abstract: | Weak contract enforcement may reduce the efficiency of investment in developing countries. I study how contract enforcement affects efficiency in procurement auctions for the largest power projects in India. I gather data on bidding and ex post contract renegotiation and find that the renegotiation of contracts in response to cost shocks is widespread, despite that bidders are allowed to index their bids to future costs like the price of coal. Connected firms choose to index less of the value of their bids to coal prices and, through this strategy, expose themselves to cost shocks to induce renegotiation. I use a structural model of bidding in a scoring auction to characterize equilibrium bidding when bidders are heterogeneous both in cost and in the payments they expect after renegotiation. The model estimates show that bidders offer power below cost due to the expected value of later renegotiation. The model is used to simulate bidding and efficiency with strict contract enforcement. Contract enforcement is found to be pro-competitive. With no renegotiation, equilibrium bids would rise to cover cost, but markups relative to total contract value fall sharply. Production costs decline, due to projects being allocated to lower-cost bidders over those who expect larger payments in renegotiation. |
| JEL: | D44 K12 L94 O14 Q41 |
| Date: | 2019–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25547&r=all |
| By: | ODA Keiichiro |
| Abstract: | We study the scheme of public-private partnerships (PPP) from an incomplete contracting perspective. We show that PPP can implement an efficient level of investment in a public project with externalities through a bargaining game played by the public sector and the delegated private agent, which functions as a device in internalizing the externalities. Also, we analyze the governance role of an infrastructure fund in PPP through its interaction with the financial market. |
| Date: | 2018–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eti:dpaper:18085&r=all |
| By: | Laurent Labrot (Pacte, Laboratoire de sciences sociales - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - UJF - Université Joseph Fourier - Grenoble 1 - IEPG - Sciences Po Grenoble - Institut d'études politiques de Grenoble - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes) |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01980813&r=all |