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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | M. Rouhani, Omid |
| Abstract: | In this paper, I briefly review the key methods to evaluate transportation projects. These methods are: Financial analysis; Cost benefit (economic analysis); Multi-criteria analysis; Cost-effectiveness analysis; Social welfare analysis; and Risk analysis (Monte Carlo simulation). The importance of understanding these methods lies in the fact that transportation projects offer huge social benefits and costs; some are impossible or very complex to measure in monetary terms. |
| Keywords: | Project evaluation methods, Transport projects, Social cost benefit analysis, Multi-criteria analysis, and Social welfare analysis. |
| JEL: | H43 R42 R58 |
| Date: | 2019–01–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:91451&r=all |
| By: | Alessandro De Chiara (Central European University); Elisabetta Iossa (DEF & CEIS,University of Rome "Tor Vergata") |
| Abstract: | We study how funding agencies should set budget caps for competitive grants. We show that budget caps influence the researchers' submission strategy and, in particular, whether they steer their project choice towards the agencies' favorite projects, and the level of funds they request. The welfare impact of alternative approaches depends on the level of competition, the cost of public funds and the social value of project implementation. |
| Keywords: | Competitive Grants, Procurement of Innovation, Project Choice, Research Funding, Research Tournament |
| JEL: | D8 O25 O30 O31 O38 L2 |
| Date: | 2019–01–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:448&r=all |
| By: | Giuseppe Di Liddo; Annalisa Vinella |
| Abstract: | We investigate yardstick competition between local jurisdictions in which pure rent-seeking incumbents undertake an identical infrastructure project choosing be- tween two contractual arrangements with different financing profiles, namely traditional procurement (TP) and public-private partnership (PPP). We show that a mixed regime, in which TP is used in one jurisdiction and PPP in the other, is likely to arise when projects are mildly lucrative, and/or jurisdictions have a moderate fiscal capacity. We find that, in the mixed equilibrium, incumbents provide different levels of public services, face different probabilities of re-election, and obtain different rents. The adoption of different forms of project governance permits incumbents to disguise themselves and undermine voters' ability to assess their performances. Therefore, yardstick competition is hindered, even if jurisdictions display identical revenue capacities. |
| Keywords: | political yardstick competition, rent seeking, infrastructure projects, traditional procurement, public-private partnership |
| JEL: | D72 H77 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7449&r=all |
| By: | Christoph Beat Stamm (Institut de Géographie et Durabilité, Université de Lausanne - Institut de Géographie et Durabilité - UNIL - Université de Lausanne, Université de Montréal [Montréal]) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the initiation and construction of transnational CSR standards and looks at the case of ISO 26000. By focussing on the actors and by applying the concept of institutional work, the analysis distinguishes between six forms of institutional work which had been undertaken: the creation of the standard (discursive/substantial), the mobilization of support (internal/external), and the organization of an inclusive space for discussion (consultation/negotiation). On the one hand, the social position of the initiators and of the organization that produces the standard as well as the external conjuncture can either hamper or facilitate the construction of a standardization project. On the other hand, certain forms of institutional work can foster the legitimation of the project. Legitimacy, potentially bestowed by an interested audience, is a necessary condition for the recognition and adoption of the standard by corporations. The analysis reveals the legitimation mechanisms in the initial construction of a CSR standard and shows that the amount of the different forms of institutional work varies depending on the specific context of a standardization initiative. |
| Date: | 2019–01–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01972270&r=all |
| By: | Rumen Dobrinsky (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw) |
| Abstract: | The paper presents an analytical assessment of the implementation of European Innovation Partnerships (EIPs) launched as one of the commitments of the EU Flagship Initiative Innovation Union with the aim to achieve innovative breakthroughs addressing major societal challenges. The EU launched five EIPs to address important societal challenges (1) Active & Healthy Ageing; (2) Water; (3) Agricultural Productivity and Sustainability; (4) Raw Materials; and (5) Smart Cities and Communities. The paper reviews the rationale of introducing the EIPs as a policy intervention aimed at promoting innovation in the EU and traces the organic evolution and governance structures of the newly emerging formations. It then provides an analytical evaluation of this EU policy initiative based on factual analysis of its implementation experiences and a comparison of its objectives and actual outcomes. In particular, the paper analyses the role of the EIPs as drivers of systemic change in the European innovation ecosystem and catalysts of new innovation activity in Europe. This critical assessment serves as the basis for drawing some conclusions about the strengths and weaknesses of the EIPs as a new policy approach to foster innovation activity in Europe. One central conclusion is that while the EIPs have been very efficient in promoting collaboration among innovation stakeholders they have fallen short of breeding innovation activity of the expected scope and scale. The paper analyses the reasons for this weakness and formulates some recommendations that could serve as possible remedies. |
| Keywords: | Innovation Union, innovation partnerships, innovation systems and ecosystems, innovation policy, innovation governance |
| JEL: | O25 O32 O38 |
| Date: | 2019–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wii:rpaper:rr:438&r=all |