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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Anna Hulda Olafsdottir; Ingunn Gudbrandsdottir; Harald U. Sverdrup; Sigurdur G. Bogason; Gudrun Olafsdottir; Gunnar Stefansson |
| Abstract: | VALUMICS is a Horizon 2020 project funded by the European Commission (2017-2021). The project structure is highly integrated and transdisciplinary, building on the expertise of over 30 specialists in various fields of research including knowledge integration through systems analysis and system dynamics modelling, food science, supply chain management, life cycle assessment, logistics, economics and social science. The aim of the project is to analyze the dynamics of food supply systems using a structural analysis including system analysis and perform system simulations using system dynamics. The VALUMICS research approach and the project design are explained and it is justified why system analysis is needed to obtain an understanding of the complex connections and interactions of the distinct parts of food systems. Patterns will be recognized and thus causes and effects of complex relations within the selected food supply system and networks will be identified. This understanding of the functioning of the system can in turn be used to identify policy interventions. |
| Keywords: | Agribusiness, Agricultural and Food Policy, Agricultural Finance |
| Date: | 2018–10–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:iefi18:276883&r=ppm |
| By: | Saori CHIBA; Kaiwen LEONG |
| Abstract: | A decision maker relies on an agent for decision-relevant information. We consider two dimensions of biases—one over projects (project bias) often assumed in cheap talk models à la Crawford and Sobel (1982) and the other over the outside option (pandering bias) scrutinized in Che, Dessein and Kartik (2013). The two biases counteract each other. This effect is more significant as payoffs to different projects are more highly negatively correlated. As a result, a larger project bias can facilitate cheap talk communications and benefit the players. Due to this correlation-driven countervailing biases, the comparison between vetobased delegation and non-delegation is not trivial. |
| Keywords: | Bias, Cheap Talk, Correlation, Outside Option. |
| JEL: | D82 D83 |
| Date: | 2018–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kue:epaper:e-18-007&r=ppm |
| By: | Philippe Delacote; Gwenolé Le Velly; Gabriela Simonet |
| Abstract: | Since the emergence of the REDD+ mechanism, hundreds of projects have emerged around the globe. Much attention has been given to REDD+ projects in the literature, but the conditions under which they are likely to be efficient ares till not well known. In this article, we study how the location of REDD+ projects is chosen and how those location choices influence project additionality. Based on a sample of six REDD+ projects in Brazil, we propose an empirical analysis of the location choices and estimate additionality in the first years of implementation using impact evaluation techniques. In order to explain the heterogeneity of the empirical results, we present a simple theoretical model and show that project location is strongly influenced by the type of project proponent, which appears to be a good proxy for its objectives, whether oriented toward environmental impacts, development impacts, or external funding. Our results suggest that (1) the incentives behind REDD+ certification mechanisms can lead to low environmental efforts or an investment in areas that are not additional, (2) location biases are dependent on the REDD+ project manager’s type, and (3) the existence of a location bias does not necessarily preclude additionality. |
| Keywords: | additionality, conservation policy, deforestation, REDD+, spatial analysis. |
| JEL: | Q23 Q28 Q56 |
| Date: | 2018–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lam:wpceem:18-19&r=ppm |