nep-ppm New Economics Papers
on Project, Program and Portfolio Management
Issue of 2018‒05‒14
eight papers chosen by
Arvi Kuura
Tartu Ülikool

  1. Entrepreneurship and project management relationships By Cécile Fonrouge; Christophe Bredillet; Charles Fouché
  2. Opportunism and Third-Party Influence on Long-Term Public Contracts By Gonzalo Ruiz D.
  3. Does the Crowd Support Innovation? Innovation Claims and Success on Kickstarter By Yang, Cathy L.; Mukherjee, Anirban; Xiao, Ping; Chattopadhyay, Amitava
  4. It's never too late: funding dynamics and self pledges in reward-based crowdfunding By Paolo Crosetto; Tobias Regner
  5. Social Accountability and Service Delivery: Experimental Evidence from Uganda By Nathan Fiala; Patrick Premand
  6. Environmental valuation and benefit-cost analysis in U.K. policy By Atkinson, Giles; Groom, Ben; Hanley, Nicholas; Mourato, Susana
  7. The Millennium Villages Project: A Retrospective, Observational, Endline Evaluation By Shira Mitchell; Andrew Gelman; Rebecca Ross; Joyce Chen; Sehrish Bari; Uyen Kim Huynh; Matthew W. Harris; Sonia Ehrlich Sachs; Elizabeth A. Stuart; Avi Feller; Susanna Makela; Alan M. Zaslavsky; Lucy McClellan; Seth Ohemeng-Dapaah; Patricia Namakula; Cheryl A. Palm; Jeffrey D. Sachs
  8. Competitive Pay and Excessive Manager Risk-taking By Jen-Wen Change; Simpson Zhang

  1. By: Cécile Fonrouge (IRG - Institut de Recherche en Gestion - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - UPEC UP12 - Université Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne - Paris 12, UQTR - Université du Québec); Christophe Bredillet (UQTR - Université du Québec); Charles Fouché
    Abstract: Purpose – Both project investments and entrepreneurial ventures are considered powerful catalysts of economic prosperity and social progress. But these ventures and investments come with their inherent challenges and risks. Observing this situation, academics have paid close attention to the fields of entrepreneurship and project management (E&PM). Thus, for over 30 years, the two fields have witnessed remarkable developments among management and organization studies. The historical perspective reveals that these two multidisciplinary fields were built in parallel, on very distinct mindsets and cultures. The purpose of this paper is to offer a wider dialogic conversation between two distinct perspectives and related propositions: E&PM should stay separated; and E&PM should converge. Design/methodology/approach – In order to guide the investigation of these propositions, the authors call for Luhmann and a systemic-discursive perspective of both fields discourses. Ultimately, the purpose is to contribute to the debate surrounding the following questions: are E&PM fields so far from each other, and thus, irreconcilable? And, if so, is it so good? Findings – Finally, the authors will suggest that E&PM may stay far from each other as they do not share similar discourses and codes. This may be a good state of affairs, however, as distance generates a fruitful creative tension between them. Originality/value – While many researchers focus on linking E&PM, arguing that they largely agree as to their underlying goal, the paper aims to offer a wider dialogical conversation between the two distinct perspectives and their related propositions: E&PM should stay separate; and E&PM should converge. In order to do so, this paper calls for a Luhmannian and a systemic-discursive perspective.
    Date: 2018–04–16
  2. By: Gonzalo Ruiz D. (Departamento de Economía de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú)
    Abstract: The present paper refers to the influence of interest groups and stakeholders on government and concessionaire contractual behavior in long-term public contracts. In particular, we show how government political commitments with interest groups represent a ‘reputational investment’, which reduces the incentives to enforce the contract and increases the willingness to accept renegotiation proposals. This situation, particularly in the case of “high profile” or “politically sensitive” projects, when observed by the private concessionaire, can be exploited to capture additional quasi-rents from the exchange relationship. Using a simple model and a case study of the South Interoceanic Road Project in Peru, we show how interactions of the government with influential stakeholders, in the context of weak institutions, can create favorable conditions for private opportunistic behavior. JEL Classification-JEL: D72 , L14 , L33 , L51
    Keywords: Concession, Opportunism, Stakeholder
    Date: 2018
  3. By: Yang, Cathy L.; Mukherjee, Anirban; Xiao, Ping; Chattopadhyay, Amitava
    Abstract: Online crowdfunding is a popular new tool for raising capital to commercialize product innovation. Product innovation must be both novel and useful (1-4). Therefore, we study the role of novelty and usefulness claims on Kickstarter. Startlingly, we find that a single claim of novelty increases project funding by about 200%, a single claim of usefulness increases project funding by about 1200%, and the co-occurrence of novelty and usefulness claims lowers funding by about 26%. Our findings are encouraging because they suggest the crowd strongly supports novelty and usefulness. However, our findings are disappointing because the premise of crowdfunding is to support projects that are innovative, i.e. that are both novel and useful, rather than projects that are only novel or only useful.
    Keywords: Crowdfunding; Entrepreneurship; Innovation
    JEL: L26 M13 O30
    Date: 2017–07–01
  4. By: Paolo Crosetto (INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique); Tobias Regner (Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena)
    Abstract: Crowdfunding recently emerged as an alternative funding channel for entrepreneurs. We use pledge-level data from Startnext, the biggest German platform, to gain insights on funding dynamics and pledgers' motivations. We find that the majority of projects that eventually succeed are not on a successful track at 75% of their funding period. These late successes are boosted by information cascades during the final 25% of the funding duration. We conclude – in contrast with earlier literature – that project success is only partially path-dependent. While early pledges do anticipate project success, a lack of them does not necessarily mean that projects will fail. Interviews and questionnaire responses indicate that projects' communication efforts play a role in making severely under track projects succeed eventually. Moreover, our dataset uniquely allows us to quantify the extent of self funding. Self pledges account for about 10% of all initial pledges and 9% of all pledges that secure funding. Nonetheless, the late surges at severely under track projects are mostly driven by external funders. Furthermore, we find no evidence of subsequent herding triggered by self pledges.
    Keywords: crowdfunding,entrepreneurial finance,donations,pre-selling,innovation,self funding
    Date: 2018–04–01
  5. By: Nathan Fiala (University of Connecticut); Patrick Premand (World Bank)
    Abstract: Corruption and mismanagement of public resources can affect the quality of government services and undermine growth. Can citizens in poor communities be empowered to demand better-quality public investments? We look at whether providing social accountability training and information on project performance can lead to improvements in local development projects. The program we study is unique in its size and integration in a national program. We find that offering communities a combination of training and information on project quality leads to significant improvements in household welfare. However, providing either social accountability training or project quality information by itself has no welfare effect. These results are concentrated in areas that are reported by local officials as more corrupt or mismanaged, suggesting local agents have significant information about where corruption and mismanagement is worse. We show evidence that the impacts come in part from community members increasing their monitoring of local projects, making more complaints to local and central officials and increasing cooperation. We also find modest improvements in people’s trust in the central government. The results suggest that government-led, large-scale social accountability programs can strengthen communities’ ability to address corruption and mismanagement as well as improve services.
    Keywords: Social accountability; community training; scorecards; corruption; service delivery
    JEL: D7 H4 O1
    Date: 2018–04
  6. By: Atkinson, Giles; Groom, Ben; Hanley, Nicholas; Mourato, Susana
    Abstract: This paper presents an evaluation of the use of environmental valuation – techniques to assign monetary values to environmental impacts of policies and projects, especially nonmarket impacts – in U.K. policy. In doing so, we seek to contribute to the debate, more generally, of the use and influence of benefit-cost analysis (BCA) in national policy processes such as Impact Assessment. Specifically, our contribution in this paper is two-fold. First, we identify a number of trends that have characterized U.K. policy use of environmental valuation over the past two or so decades. While this has notably involved development of “sharable values” allowing more widespread uptake, it also seems that different branches of government have developed different traditions of use adding nuance to what, on the face of it, is otherwise a shared endeavor. Second, we evaluate the extent to which the use of environmental valuation can be said to have influenced policy decisions and the degree to which this is embedded by evolving policy processes. As such, we discuss two areas of environmental policy – water quality improvements and natural capital – which have entailed either substantial use of environmental valuation either in determining specific policy and investment project options or where this has helped shape the broader policy agenda. Our evaluation is not exhaustive; nor do our findings suggest that environmental valuation and BCA are necessarily the dominant driver of decisions, as we discuss. However, in recognizing this, we argue it is also important to consider a number of established or evolving cultural and legal institutional processes which broadly appear to support our assessment of such cases.
    JEL: H43 Q51
    Date: 2018–04–05
  7. By: Shira Mitchell; Andrew Gelman; Rebecca Ross; Joyce Chen; Sehrish Bari; Uyen Kim Huynh; Matthew W. Harris; Sonia Ehrlich Sachs; Elizabeth A. Stuart; Avi Feller; Susanna Makela; Alan M. Zaslavsky; Lucy McClellan; Seth Ohemeng-Dapaah; Patricia Namakula; Cheryl A. Palm; Jeffrey D. Sachs
    Abstract: Authors estimate the Millennium Villages Project (MVP)’s impact, target attainment, and on-site spending. The MVP was a 10 year, multisector, rural development project, initiated in 2005, operating across ten sites in ten sub-Saharan African countries to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) aimed at reducing extreme poverty.
    Keywords: Millennium Villages Project, rural development, sub-Saharan African countries, Millennium Development Goals
    JEL: F Z
  8. By: Jen-Wen Change (California State University, Fullerton); Simpson Zhang (Office of Financial Research)
    Abstract: Since the 2007-09 financial crisis, researchers have debated whether compensation plans drove excessive risk-taking or financial managers simply underestimated the risks of various investments. Through a principal-agent model with heterogeneous beliefs, we show that principals offer contracts that incentivize safe behavior when competition for managerial talent is low. However, intense competition results in contracts that incentivize risk-taking. We find that factors that increase the intensity of competition include greater search efficiency, larger project scales, and higher debt funding, all of which may be prevalent during a financial bubble.
    Keywords: competition, compensation constracts, overoptimism
    Date: 2018–04–10

This nep-ppm issue is ©2018 by Arvi Kuura. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.