nep-ppm New Economics Papers
on Project, Program and Portfolio Management
Issue of 2018‒03‒05
five papers chosen by
Arvi Kuura
Tartu Ülikool

  1. The impact of EUREKA projects on the economic performance of R&D SMEs By Michele Cincera; Gilles Eric Fombasso Toyem
  2. R&D in Clean Technology: A Project Choice Model with Learning By Koki Oikawa
  3. Serial Priority in Project Allocation: A Characterisation By Madhav Raghavan
  4. Bridging the rural digital divide By OECD
  5. Matchings with lower quotas: Algorithms and complexity By Ashwin Arulselvan; Agnes Cseh; Martin Groß; David F. Manlove; Jannik Matuschke

  1. By: Michele Cincera; Gilles Eric Fombasso Toyem
    Abstract: While the benefits of innovative activities are universally acknowledged, current research on how and when governments should intervene to assist firms still has substantial knowledge gaps. In this paper, we consider two forms of government intervention, namely EUREKA network and cluster technological collaborative projects, and assess their impact on the performance of beneficiary firms over the period 2005-2015. The methodology implemented consists in comparing the beneficiaries of projects (which are typically R&D SMEs) with a similar control group, using the difference-in-differences estimation technique. We find that beneficiaries of both network and cluster projects have created on average more jobs and have increased their sales more than non-funded firms over the period of study. We also find that smaller R&D consortia (i.e. network projects) have a positive and greater influence in terms of commercialisation, whereas bigger consortia (i.e. cluster projects) have a positive and greater influence in terms of employment growth. In general, projects of shorter duration (i.e. from one to two years) are those showing the best outcomes compared to projects of longer duration (i.e. from three to seven years).
    Keywords: EUREKA programme, R&D SMEs, Counterfactual analysis, Diff-in-diff estimation, Employment growth, Turnover growth
    Date: 2018–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ict:wpaper:2013/267672&r=ppm
  2. By: Koki Oikawa
    Abstract: In this study, we investigate the qualitative and quantitative effects of an R&D subsidy for clean technology and a Pigouvian tax on a dirty technology on environmental R&D when it is uncertain how long the research takes to complete. The model is formulated as an optimal stopping problem, in which the number of successes required to complete the R&D project is finite and which incorporates learning about the probability of success. We show that the optimal R&D subsidy with the consideration of learning is higher than that without it. We also find that an R&D subsidy performs better than a Pigouvian tax unless the government can induce suppliers to make cost reduction efforts even after the new technology successfully replaces the old one. Moreover, by a two-project model, we show that a uniform subsidy is better than a selective subsidy.
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tcr:wpaper:e93&r=ppm
  3. By: Madhav Raghavan
    Abstract: We consider a model in which projects are to be assigned to agents based on their preferences, and where projects have capacities, i.e., can each be assigned to a minimum and maximum number of agents. The extreme cases of our model are the social choice model (the same project is assigned to all agents) and the house allocation model (each project is assigned to at most one agent). We show that, with general capacities,an allocation rule satis es strategy-proofness, group-non-bossiness, limited in uence, unanimity, and neutrality, if and only if it is a strong serial priority rule. A strong serial priority rule is a natural extension of a dictatorial rule (from the social choice model) and a serial priority rule (from the house allocation model). Our result thus provides a bridge between the characterisations in Gibbard (1973, \Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result", Econometrica, 41, 587-601), Satterthwaite (1975,Strategy-proofness and Arrow's Conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions", Journal of Economic Theory, 10,187-216) and Svensson (1999, \Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods", Social Choice and Welfare, 16, 557-567).
    JEL: C78 D71
    Date: 2017–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lau:crdeep:17.17&r=ppm
  4. By: OECD
    Abstract: This document examines recent policy and technology approaches to bridging the digital divide in rural and remote areas in OECD countries. First, it discusses issues related to assessing broadband gaps, defining speeds and establishing national targets. Second, it describes policies being implemented to improve both access and uptake, such as fostering competition, promoting national, rural and community-led broadband initiatives, supporting open access policies and reducing deployment costs. Finally, it briefly reviews technological developments that are likely to influence the provision of services in underserved areas. Experience in OECD countries with fibre optics, coaxial cable, copper, fixed and mobile wireless, satellites and hybrid approaches, as well as with emerging technologies, are used to illustrate some of the technological trends discussed. This document also includes a summary of common challenges and good practices to bring improved communication services to individuals and communities in rural and remote areas.
    Date: 2018–02–23
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:stiaab:265-en&r=ppm
  5. By: Ashwin Arulselvan (Department of Management Science, Sir William Duncan Building, University of Strathclyde); Agnes Cseh (Institute of Economics, Research Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and Corvinus University of Budapest); Martin Groß (Institute for Mathematics, Technische Universität Berlin); David F. Manlove (School of Computing Science, Sir Alwyn Williams Building, University of Glasgow); Jannik Matuschke (TUM School of Management, Technische Universiät München)
    Abstract: We study a natural generalization of the maximum weight many-to- one matching problem. We are given an undirected bipartite graph G = (A[_ P;E) with weights on the edges in E, and with lower and upper quotas on the vertices in P.We seek a maximum weight many-to-one matching satisfying two sets of constraints: vertices in A are incident to at most one matching edge, while vertices in P are either unmatched or they are incident to a number of matching edges between their lower and upper quota. This problem, which we call maximum weight many-to-one matching with lower and upper quotas (wmlq), has applications to the assignment of students to projects within university courses, where there are constraints on the minimum and maximum numbers of students that must be assigned to each project. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive analysis of the complexity of wmlq from the viewpoints of classical polynomial time algorithms, xedparameter tractability, as well as approximability. We draw the line between NP-hard and polynomially tractable instances in terms of degree and quota constraints and provide ecient algorithms to solve the tractable ones. We further show that the problem can be solved in polynomial time for instances with bounded treewidth; however, the corresponding runtime is exponential in the treewidth with the maximum upper quota umax as basis, and we prove that this dependence is necessary unless FPT = W[1]. The approximability of wmlq is also discussed: we present an approximation algorithm for the general case with performance guarantee umax + 1, which is asymptotically best possible unless P = NP. Finally, we elaborate on how most of our positive results carry over to matchings in arbitrary graphs with lower quotas.
    Keywords: maximum matching, many-to-one matching, project allocation, inapproximability, bounded treewidth
    JEL: C63 C78
    Date: 2017–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:has:discpr:1724&r=ppm

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