nep-ppm New Economics Papers
on Project, Program and Portfolio Management
Issue of 2018‒02‒26
five papers chosen by
Arvi Kuura
Tartu Ülikool

  1. The Motivation of Temporary Agency Workers: An Empirical Analysis By Grund, Christian; Minten, Axel; Toporova, Nevena
  2. Harnessing the Ring of Fire: Political economy of clean energy development finance on geothermal development in Indonesia and the Philippines By Chelminski, K.
  3. Empowerment and the Dark Side of Delegation By Kräkel, Matthias
  4. Incentives for Motivated Experts in a Partnership By Ting Liu; Ching-to Albert Ma; Henry Y. Mak
  5. "The good news about bad news": Feedback about past organisational failure and its impact on worker productivity By Jeworrek, Sabrina; Mertins, Vanessa; Vlassopoulos, Michael

  1. By: Grund, Christian (RWTH Aachen University); Minten, Axel (RWTH Aachen University); Toporova, Nevena (Technische Universität München)
    Abstract: We are investigating the relationship between individual and job-related characteristics and the motivation of temporary agency workers. To do so, we are using a unique dataset from one of Germany's largest temporary work agencies. For 3,000 temporary agency workers, a subjective motivation appraisal is provided by the respective direct manager within the hiring company. It is possible to observe a positive relationship between the decision on transition to regular employment and the motivation of temporary agency workers. Women in temporary agency work demonstrate a higher degree of motivation than men. However, in the case of men a clearer correlation can be observed between project duration and motivation. A change of hiring company with follow-up projects has a negative effect on the temporary agency worker's motivation.
    Keywords: temporary agency work, atypical employment relation, empirical study, motivation, work morale
    JEL: J5 J81 M5
    Date: 2017–12
  2. By: Chelminski, K.
    Abstract: Located along the Ring of Fire in the Asia Pacific, both Indonesia and the Philippines have tremendous natural resource endowments in geothermal energy. Yet, the two countries have dramatic differences in the share of installed capacity they have developed with international development assistance for geothermal development over the last decades. This paper investigates the major interests, institutions and barriers to geothermal development in Indonesia and the Philippines and then examines how closely clean energy development finance has addressed these barriers. Using qualitative analysis and data from field research in both countries, this paper investigates the effectiveness of the clean energy development finance for renewable energy development. The main findings of this research show that clean energy development finance targeted major barriers to geothermal energy development, but the finance was limited in its impacts on removing the barriers or addressing major domestic political interests, particularly in the case of Indonesia. This research also illuminated limitations of the project-based development approach to solving macro-level problems in clean energy development.
    Keywords: clean energy development, development finance, energy policy, geothermal energy
    JEL: O13 Q42 N55
    Date: 2018–01–22
  3. By: Kräkel, Matthias (University of Bonn)
    Abstract: The existing delegation literature has focused on different preferences of principal and agent concerning project selection, which makes delegating authority costly for the principal. This paper shows that delegation has a cost even when the preferences of principal and agent are exogenously aligned. As application, the commitment effect of empowerment is considered, which has been addressed by the management and social psychology literature. In addition, it is shown that even in a setting without task commitment and other behavioral effects the principal might forgo delegation though being efficient.
    Keywords: commitment, delegation, limited liability, moral hazard, renegotiation
    JEL: D86 J33 J41 M5
    Date: 2018–01
  4. By: Ting Liu; Ching-to Albert Ma; Henry Y. Mak
    Abstract: A Principal has a set of projects, each having different benefit potentials, and each requiring a basic technology from one of two experts and time inputs from both experts. Experts enjoy motivation utilities from production, but have private information of their own motivation preferences and project potentials. Technology and time-input choices are experts' private decisions. Experts form a Partnership, which designs a sharing rule and a gatekeeping protocol to determine experts' priority on technology choice. Using a linear cost-share contract that lets experts make minimum profits, the Principal implements the first best by delegating all decisions to the Partnership.
    Keywords: Motivated Experts, Principal, Multiagent Incentives, Partnership, Gatekeeping, Sharing Rule
    JEL: D00 D02 D80 D83
    Date: 2017–10
  5. By: Jeworrek, Sabrina; Mertins, Vanessa; Vlassopoulos, Michael
    Abstract: Failure in organisations is a very common phenomenon. Little is known about whether past failure affects workers' subsequent performance. We conduct a field experiment in which we follow up a failed mail campaign to attract new volunteers with a phone campaign pursuing the same goal. We recruit temporary workers to carry out the phone campaign and randomly assign them to either receive or not receive information about the previous failure and measure their performance. We find that informed workers perform better - in terms of both numbers dialed (about 14% improvement) and completed interviews (about 20% improvement) - regardless of whether they had previously worked on the failed mail campaign. Evidence from a second experiment with student volunteers asked to support a campaign to reduce food waste suggests that the mechanism behind our finding relates to contextual inference: Informing workers/volunteers that they are pursuing a goal that is hard to attain seems to add meaning to the work involved, leading them to exert more effort.
    Keywords: contextual inference,feedback,failure,field experiment,meaning of work
    JEL: C93 J22 M50
    Date: 2018

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