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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Riaz Ahmed (Bahria University) |
| Abstract: | Literature reveals that clarity in communication and employing consistent process are critical for project managers to improve project performance. A limited number of studies focused on such critical factors affecting project performance. This study aims to investigate the significance of communication and project management processes in Public Sector projects. For this empirical study, cross sectional design was used to collect data collected from project managers working on projects in Pakistan. Data analysis indicates significant and positive influence of clarity in communication and employing consistent process on project performance. Findings imply that project managers with clarity in communication and establishing consistent processes have an important role in improving project performance and increasing organizational growth. |
| Keywords: | Clarity in communication, employ consistent processes, project manager, project performance. |
| JEL: | H83 |
| Date: | 2017–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sek:iacpro:5808136&r=ppm |
| By: | Milbradt, Konstantin; Oehmke, Martin |
| Abstract: | Financing terms and investment decisions are jointly determined. This interdependence, which links firms׳ asset and liability sides, can lead to short-termism in investment. In our model, financing frictions increase with the investment horizon, such that financing for long-term projects is relatively expensive and potentially rationed. In response, firms whose first-best investments are long-term may adopt second-best projects of shorter maturities. This worsens financing terms for firms with shorter-maturity projects, inducing them to change their investments as well. In equilibrium, investment is inefficiently short-term. Equilibrium asset-side adjustments by firms can amplify shocks and, while privately optimal, can be socially undesirable. |
| JEL: | F3 G3 |
| Date: | 2015–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:84513&r=ppm |
| By: | Daniel Albalate (GiM-IREA, Universitat de Barcelona); Paula Bel-Piñana (GiM-IREA, Universitat de Barcelona) |
| Abstract: | Public Private Partnerships (PPP) have become common in providing high-quality infrastructure in many countries worldwide. One of the main reasons for PPP agreements is to improve efficiency and quality in the delivery of public services, as well as to boost investments for expensive projects. Despite PPPs having been particularly widespread in the case of the construction and rehabilitation of high-capacity road infrastructure, their impact in terms of road safety outcomes is still unexplored. This paper studies the effects of PPPs on road safety outcomes by taking advantage of the variety of management models provided in the Spanish highway network. Results based on a panel-data fixed-effects method show that the most relevant aspect influencing road safety outcomes is the quality of design of the road. However, we find strong evidence suggesting that privately operated highways perform better in terms of road safety outcomes than publicly operated highways, for roads with a similar quality of design. |
| Keywords: | Public Private Partnership, highway, road safety, management |
| JEL: | H23 I18 L33 |
| Date: | 2017–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:xrp:wpaper:xreap2017-08&r=ppm |
| By: | Christoph Engel (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods); Svenja Hippel (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods) |
| Abstract: | Public goods are dealt with in two literatures that neglect each other. Mechanism design advises a social planner that expects individuals to misrepresent their valuations. Experiments study the provision of the good when preferences might be non-standard. We introduce the problem of the mechanism design literature into a public good experiment. Valuations for the good are heterogeneous. To each group we add a participant with power to impose a contribution scheme. We study four settings: the authority has no personal interest and (1) valuations are common knowledge or (2) active participants may misrepresent their types; the authority has a personal interest (3) and must decide before learning her own valuation or (4) knows her own valuation. Disinterested social planners predominantly choose a payment rule that gives every group member the same ?nal payoff, even if misrepresentation is possible. Authorities are overly optimistic about truth telling. Interested social planners abuse their power, except if the opportunity cost of a more balanced rule is small. |
| Keywords: | Public Good, Social Planner, Truthtelling, Experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D02 D03 D61 D62 D64 H23 K12 |
| Date: | 2017–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2017_23&r=ppm |
| By: | Denise Hoffman; Sarah Croake; David R. Mann; David Stapleton; Priyanka Anand; Chris Jones; Judy Geyer; Daniel Gubits; Stephen Bell; Andrew McGuirk; David Wittenburg; Debra Wrght; Amang Sukasih; David Judkins; Michael Sinclair |
| Abstract: | The Benefit Offset National Demonstration (BOND) tests variants of Social Security Disability Insurance program rules governing work and other supports. The BOND project includes two stages. Stage 1 supports an evaluation of how a national $1 to $2 benefit offset would affect earnings and program outcomes for the entire SSDI population. This report documents results of BOND Stage 1 impacts on earnings and benefit outcomes during the fourth calendar year of implementation (2014), process and participation analyses for 2015, and an overpayment analysis from 2011 to 2013. |
| Keywords: | Disability, Social Security, Employment, Benefit Offset |
| JEL: | I J |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:0429e47d268d44f287aee8577648d767&r=ppm |
| By: | Chen, Hui; Jorgensen, Bjorn |
| Abstract: | We analyze the effect of accounting bias on the competition and market structure of an industry. In our model, firms interim accounting reports on investment projects may contain bias introduced by the mandatory accounting system. We find that this bias strictly decreases firm's profits when investors do not have an abandonment option, but different results emerge when we allow the investors to divest in the interim. Specifically, a conservative accounting regime may increase the likelihood of projects being discontinued, inducing some firms to exit from the product market and leaving rivals to capture their market share. A conservative regime can thus soften market competition and result in ex ante higher investment payoff, higher consumer surplus, and higher total social welfare. Since industries often have common reporting standards, we also identify the degrees of industry-wide accounting bias that maximize the expected investor payoffs. Finally, we allow for investors to coordinate their divestment decisions when both firms report unfavorable costs and show an improvement to both firms profits and consumer surplus. |
| JEL: | M40 |
| Date: | 2016–11–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:64217&r=ppm |